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Abstract
How should we divide a good or set of goods among a set of agents? There are various
constraints that we can consider. We consider two particular constraints. The rst is
fairness { how can we nd fair allocations? The second is truthfulness { what if we do
not know agents valuations for the goods being allocated? What if these valuations need
to be elicited, and agents will misreport their valuations if it is benecial? Can we design
procedures that elicit agents' true valuations while preserving the quality of the allocation?
We consider truthful and fair resource allocation procedures through a computational
lens. We rst study fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible good, colloquially known as
the cake cutting problem. We depart from the existing literature and assume that agents
have restricted valuations that can be succinctly communicated. We consider the problems
of welfare-maximization, expressiveness, and truthfulness in cake cutting under this model.
In the second part of this dissertation we consider truthfulness in settings where pay-
ments can be used to incentivize agents to truthfully reveal their private information. A
mechanism asks agents to report their private preference information and computes an al-
location and payments based on these reports. The mechanism design problem is to nd
incentive compatible mechanisms which incentivize agents to truthfully reveal their private
information and simultaneously compute allocations with desirable properties. The tradi-
tional approach to mechanism design species mechanisms by hand and proves that certain
desirable properties are satised. This limits the design space to mechanisms that can be
written down and analyzed. We take a computational approach, giving computational pro-
cedures that produce mechanisms with desirable properties. Our rst contribution designs
a procedure that modies heuristic branch and bound search and makes it usable as the
allocation algorithm in an incentive compatible mechanism. Our second contribution draws
a novel connection between incentive compatible mechanisms and machine learning. We use
this connection to learn payment rules to pair with provided allocation rules. Our payment
rules are not exactly incentive compatibility, but they minimize a measure of how much
agents can gain by misreporting.
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Introduction
Resource allocation problems arise in all facets of life. Individuals and families decide how
to allocate their monetary resources and how to spend their time. Companies decide how
to allocate their human resources across dierent departments and priorities. Governments
must decide how to allocate military resources and how to divide pollution rights. These
are a just a tiny fraction of the resource allocation problems that are being considered and
solved on a daily basis.
In addition to looking at resource allocation problems across larger and larger cross-
sections of society, resource allocation problems can also be classied in terms of the re-
sources being allocated. The resources can be physical goods, such as precious metals or
a painting. They can be vanishing digital goods such as advertising slots on the Internet
[Edelman et al., 2007] and television [Nisan, 2010] or computing resources in the cloud.
As in the examples from the previous paragraph, it is also possible to consider monetary
resources as well as human capital.
The main take away is that resource allocation problems are widespread and important.
More formally, in a resource allocation problem, there is some resource or set of resources
that needs to be allocated among a set of agents. The agents have preferences for dierent
allocations of the resources. A resource allocation algorithm takes the agents' preferences
and determines an allocation of the resources to the agents and optionally an amount that
each agent needs to pay in exchange for its allocation.
In this dissertation, we undertake the rigorous study of resource allocation algorithms
with a focus on two desirable properties. The rst desirable property is fairness, which
requires that the algorithm nd an allocation (and optionally payments) that is deemed fair.
Fairness is a natural criterion to consider, and in certain settings fairness is an important
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consideration. For instance, when the government allocates resources, it has a strong interest
in fairness and not favoring any parties over others. In settings like divorce settlement, the
goal is to try and give the interested parties their fair share. If people have pooled together
resources for a shared resource such as computing servers, then it is important to allocate
time on the server in a fair way. There are several possible denitions of fairness and we
discuss the alternatives in the sequel, but an example of a natural fairness requirement is
envy-freeness, which requires that each agent prefer its own situation to that of any other
agent.
The second desirable property is truthfulness. While in some settings it is reasonable
to assume that the true preferences of the agents are known, in many settings, agents may
be self-interested and will misreport their preferences in order to increase their utility from
participation. In almost all commercial allocation settings the participants are companies
that are trying to maximize their prot and may or may not reveal their true preferences
depending on whether it is in their best interest. For instance, in the FCC's wireless
spectrum auctions, participants have used their bids to send signals to and implicitly collude
with other participants [Cramton and Schwartz, 2000]. With the coming of the digital age
and the Internet, many new resource allocation problems have been created, almost all
of which involve self-interested agents with private information. Perhaps the best-studied
example is the setting of sponsored search auctions, which provide the main source of
Google's revenue [Edelman et al., 2007].
Informally, truthfulness requires that it is (weakly) in an agent's best interest to report
its true preferences. Using the simple single-item auction setting as an example, consider a
rst-price auction and a second-price auction. Both auctions give the item to the highest
bidder, but a rst-price auction charges the bidder its bid while a second-price auction
charges the bidder the second highest bid. The rst-price auction is not truthful, since a
bidder has an incentive to shade its bid. It is an easy exercise to show that an agent's best
strategy is to bid its value for the item in a second-price auction, and the intuition is that
the agent cannot aect its payment since it is set by the second highest bid.
One might see the appeal of truthfulness, but still wonder why truthfulness matters if
non-truthful mechanisms still result in good allocations of our resources. We discuss this
more in the sequel, but there are several justications, ranging from practical to theoretical.
On the practical side, truthfulness makes it easy for agents to participate and makes for
procedures that are more fair in the sense that there is no advantage to being more sophis-
ticated or having more information about othe agents. On the theoretical side, economic
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theory establishes that it is in some sense without loss to study truthful procedures due to
the revelation principle.
In studying truthful and fair resource allocation, we adopt a computational lens. When
implementing resource allocation algorithms in practice, there can be two computational
barriers. First, if agent preferences are very rich, then it may not be possible for agents
to completely communicate their preferences. Second, it is necessary to ensure that our
resource allocation algorithms are computationally tractable, i.e., run in time polynomial in
the size of a natural input representation. Our discussion of fair resource allocation focuses
on restricted families of valuations (mappings from allocations to values) and is motivated
by the rst computational barrier. In our discussion of truthful mechanisms computation
is relevant in two ways: we use computational approaches to design mechanisms, and this
in turn helps to address settings where polynomial time computation is a barrier to some
otherwise truthful mechanisms.
1.1 Fairness and Cake Cutting
Our discussion of fair resource allocation algorithms focuses on fair division or the cake
cutting problem. In this setting, there is a single divisible good to be allocated among a set
of agents. The good is heterogeneous, in the sense that agents have dierent values for the
dierent parts of the good. As a concrete example, the divisible good could be time on a
compute server or a newly cleared plot of land. The typical goal in cake cutting is to give
a procedure that nds a fair allocation of the good. There are various notions of fairness,
but informally, proportionality requires that each agent receive at least 1=n of its value for
the entire good if there are n agents, envy-freeness requires that each agent prefer its own
allocation to that of any other agent, and equitability requires that all agents receive the
same value from their allocations.
Work on cake cutting dates back to Steinhaus in the 1940s [Steinhaus, 1948], and has
traditionally been studied by mathematicians, economists, and political scientists. More
recently, cake cutting has gained the attention of computer scientists and the articial
intelligence (AI) community (Procaccia [2009], Chen et al. [2010], Zivan et al. [2010], Cara-
giannis et al. [2011], Cohler et al. [2011], Brams et al. [2012a], Maya and Nisan [2012],
Br^ anzei and Miltersen [2013], Br^ anzei et al. [2013], Kurokawa et al. [2013]). The survey
by Procaccia [2013] provides a nice summary of recent work. Cake cutting is of interest
to AI due to its potential importance in multi-agent resource allocation [Chevaleyre et al.,
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2006]. Additionally, computer science provides a new and interesting perspective on cake
cutting by thinking about the representation of agent preferences and the computational
complexity of cake cutting.
Slightly more formally, there is a set of n agents and the cake is represented by the
interval [0;1]. Each agent has a value density function vi over the interval. The agent's
value for some set of disjoint subintervals is the integral of its value density function over
those subintervals. This denition makes agent's valuation functions additive and non-
atomic so that agents derive no value from receiving a subinterval [x;x] consisting of a
single point. Agent valuations are assumed to be normalized so that each agent receives
value 1 for the entire cake. This assumption is typically without loss of generality and
makes our exposition simpler, and we will discuss whether our results extend to the more
general unnormalized case. A cake cutting procedure or algorithm outputs an allocation
A1;:::;An where Ai represents a set of disjoint subintervals of [0;1] and Ai \ Aj = ;. An
allocation is proportional if each agent receives value at least 1=n, envy-free (EF) if each
agent values its assigned piece weakly more than the pieces of other agents, and equitable
(EQ) if all agents have the same value for the pieces they are assigned, i.e., for any two
agents i;j, agent i's value for Ai is the same as agent j's value for Aj.
1.1.1 Cake Cutting under Restricted Valuations
The classic cake cutting literature operates under the assumption that agents can have any
integrable value density function. As a result, classic cake cutting procedures never fully
pin down agents' valuations but instead guarantee that the computed allocation will have
the desired fairness properties with respect to any value density function consistent with
the agents' actions and responses to queries. As a simple example of a classic cake cutting
procedure, consider the Cut and Choose procedure for two agents. Agent 1 splits the cake
into two pieces of equal value, and agent 2 chooses the more preferred piece, leaving the
other piece to agent 1. While the nal allocation is fair, we do not know agent 2's exact
values for these two pieces, and we don't have much information about the agents' exact
value density functions on subintervals of each of these two pieces.
A key conceptual contribution of this dissertation, motivated by thinking about the rep-
resentation of agent valuations as inputs to a computational procedure, is the introduction
of the study of cake cutting when agents have restricted preferences. Indeed, the study of
restricted valuations can help with gaining a better understanding of the diculties of cake
cutting as well as make it easier for cake cutting algorithms to gain traction in practice.
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Specically, we consider cases where agent's value density functions have very specic
forms. We consider the piecewise uniform case where the density function is either 0 or
some constant c, the piecewise constant case where the value density function is piecewise
constant, and the piecewise linear case where the value density function is piecewise linear.
Though these families of valuation functions are restrictive, there are natural settings
where they might be appropriate. Piecewise uniform valuations capture the setting where
an agent has intervals that are preferred and intervals that yield no value, but the agent has
the same marginal value for the preferred intervals. If the divisible good is being allocated is
time on a shared compute server, then an agent could plausibly have such preferences if there
are some scheduling constraints that prevent it from making use of certain time intervals
but the agent is indierent among intervals without scheduling conicts. Similarly, if the
divisible good being allocated is land, then agents may have simple preferences that makes
plots of land acceptable only if they have access to a canal. Piecewise uniform valuations
capture these simple settings. In comparison, though piecewise constant and piecewise
linear valuations are also restrictive, they can be used to approximate general valuations
and so in a sense are not restrictive at all.
It is tempting to draw an analogy between agents with piecewise constant valuations
and an indivisible goods setting where there is an indivisible good for each subinterval
on which agents' value density functions are constant. Then allocations of cake can be
associated with probabilities of receiving each of these indivisible goods. The problem with
this analogy is that piecewise constant valuations allow agents to control the identity and
number of indivisible goods available whereas in indivisible good settings it is typically
assumed that the goods are pre-dened and cannot be aected by agents' preferences. We
discuss this point further in Chapter 6 when we compare our setting with the random
assignment problem.
We have thus far discussed the disadvantage of these restricted families, namely that
they are not as expressive as general valuations. However, these restricted families are very
useful for the following reason:
It is possible to succinctly communicate these preferences, thereby allowing for a new
class of cake cutting algorithms which operate directly on the underlying value density func-
tions.
For example, a piecewise uniform valuation can be communicated by listing the end-
points of an agent's intervals of interest. Similarly, a piecewise constant valuation can be
communicated by listing the endpoints of intervals on which an agent's density function is
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constant and providing the value of the density function on each of these intervals. Like-
wise, a piecewise linear valuation can be communicated by listing the endpoints of intervals
on which an agent's density function is linear and providing the slope and intercept of the
density function on each of these intervals.
In the context of mechanism design (to be discussed in the next section), assuming
restricted families of valuation functions allows for the study of direct mechanisms. Indeed,
the inspiration for studying restricted families of valuations came from our study of truthful
cake cutting (Chapter 6), but it turns out that allowing the algorithm to operate on the
exact valuations also gives rise to many other interesting questions.
1.1.2 Welfare Maximization in Cake Cutting
With restricted families of valuations and assuming that the algorithm has access to agent's
exact valuations, a natural question to ask is:
How should we choose among the set of fair allocations for various notions of fairness?
This question is less natural under the classic cake cutting model since an allocation
may be better or worse depending on the particular value density function that is consistent
with the agents' responses to queries made by the algorithm. A natural tie-breaker is to
consider the social welfare or total value created by an allocation (we will often drop the
modier social and just refer to social welfare as welfare). An allocation is maxsum fair if
it has the highest total welfare among allocations that are fair. For instance, a maxsum EF
allocation is an allocation that has the highest total welfare among all EF allocations.
Since welfare involves summing values across agents, the assumption that agent value
density functions are normalized so that Vi([0;1]) = 1 is no longer without loss since the
maxsum fair allocations will dier before and after normalization. In our study of maxsum
cake divisions we assume normalization, but the positive algorithmic results extend natu-
rally to settings where valuations are not normalized and the negative impossibility results
are only strengthened by expanding the set of possible valuations.
Our rst contribution is to consider algorithms for computing maxsum EF allocations.
When valuations are piecewise constant, we provide a linear program (LP) that nds a
maxsum EF allocation in time polynomial in the number of bits needed to specify the
agents' value density functions. For the case of two agents and piecewise linear valuations,
we show that exactly computing a maxsum EF allocation is not possible for polynomial time
algorithms. The reason is not due to computational complexity, but due to the fact that
there are cases where every maxsum EF allocation requires cuts at irrational points in [0;1]
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even when agents' value density functions can be expressed using rational numbers. We then
give an algorithm that computes an approximately EF allocation with welfare at least as
great as any maxsum EF allocation for two agents. This algorithm runs in time polynomial
in the input size and in O(log(1=)) where  controls the level of approximate envy-freeness.
We then consider general value density functions under a Lipschitz continuity condition
and leverage our piecewise constant result to give an algorithm that is approximately EF
and has welfare that approximates any maxsum EF allocation. This algorithm runs in time
polynomial in 1= where  controls the amount of deviation from exact envy-freeness and the
deviation from the welfare of any maxsum EF allocation. Though we focus our exposition
on maxsum EF allocations, our techniques extend to maxsum proportional and maxsum
EQ allocations (allocations that have maximal welfare among all proportional and all EQ
allocations respectively).
Having considered the problem of computing maxsum fair allocations, we next turn our
attention to understanding properties of these allocations. The goal is to shed light on the
relative qualities of these dierent maxsum fair allocations and help to choose among them
for particular applications. Specically, we consider whether these maxsum fair allocations
are Pareto-ecient, meaning that there are no allocations that make all agents weakly better
o and at least one agent strictly better o. When considering Pareto-eciency we allow the
allocations we compare against to be unfair, as maxsum fair allocations are trivially Pareto-
ecient if we limit our comparisons to fair allocations. We nd, surprisingly, that there
exist piecewise constant valuations for three agents in which every maxsum EF allocation
is not Pareto-ecient. For maxsum EQ or maxsum EF+EQ allocations the situation is
even more dire, as there piecewise uniform valuations where all maxsum EQ and maxsum
EF+EQ allocations are not Pareto-ecient. In contrast, it is an easy exercise to argue that
all maxsum proportional allocations are Pareto-ecient (for any valuations).
The second result along these lines compares the social welfare of maxsum EQ and max-
sum EF allocations. We prove that for piecewise linear valuations, the welfare of maxsum
EF allocations is always weakly greater than the welfare of maxsum EQ allocations. We
also use this result to show an approximate version of this result for general valuations.
This suggests that an exact result holds for the general case as well, but the proof of this
remains an open question.
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1.1.3 Expressiveness
We next turn our attention to a dierent aspect of cake cutting while still operating in a
direct revelation model on restricted families of valuations. One assumption that is made
in cake cutting is that agent valuation functions are additive. This is a consequence of the
denition of agent values as the integral of a value density function. One implication of this
is that agents gain positive value from disjoint intervals that are each very small in size.
While this idealized model may hold in certain settings, there are some settings where it is
unrealistic. For instance, when allocating time on a compute server, there are signicant
context switching costs that make many disjoint chunks of compute time less valuable.
Similarly, in the allocation of television advertising slots, slots that are less than 10 seconds
in length may not be useful. As a result, we undertake the study of cake cutting in a setting
where agents have piecewise uniform valuations with a minimum length parameter . This
parameter states that agents have no value for intervals less than  in length and prevents
the algorithm from allocating many disjoint intervals that are each very tiny.
While proportional and EF allocations always exist in the traditional cake cutting model,
the same is no longer true when agents have a minimum length parameter. As a simple
example, consider the case where both agents have a minimum length parameter of 1. In
this case, an agent must receive the entire interval to have positive value, leaving nothing
for the other agent. Hence, exact proportionality is impossible in this setting. However,
we provide a polynomial time algorithm that guarantees an approximately proportional
allocation where the approximation is additive. Our algorithm is a carefully constructed
generalization of a proportional cake cutting procedure for n agents, and we show that
it attains the optimal additive approximation guarantee. The approximation is worse for
larger values of , capturing the fact that it is more dicult to satisfy agents with large
values of . We prove that the additive approximation we provide is essentially optimal
among all algorithms that give an additive worst-case approximation guarantee.
We then consider proportionality and envy-freeness together in this model with a mini-
mum length parameter. For two agents, we give a polynomial time algorithm that nds an
allocation that satises the best possible approximation to proportionality while preserving
exact envy-freeness. The algorithm is quite intricate and specic to the two agent case and
nding a generalization for any number of agents is likely quite challenging.
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1.2 Truthfulness and Mechanism Design
Having touched on our contributions to fair resource allocation, we discuss truthfulness and
mechanism design (we will also consider truthfulness and fairness together for cake cutting).
We provide a more rigorous treatment of mechanism design in Chapter 2, but we give a brief
introduction here. In order to study truthfulness of resource allocation algorithms, we must
clearly dene what is meant by truthfulness. Our requirement of truthfulness arises from
the economic theory of mechanism design. In mechanism design, there are have n agents,
each agent has a type, there is a set of possible decisions. An agent's type species how
much utility it derives from every possible decision. In full generality, a mechanism allows
the agents to send a message to the mechanism, and the mechanism selects a decision based
on the messages passed by the agents. In this dissertation, we focus on direct mechanisms,
or mechanisms where the messages are direct reports of an agent's type. A mechanism is
therefore a mapping from a set of reported types, one for each agent, to a decision.
It is often the case that the decision can be broken down into an outcome component
and a payments component. The payments component may or may not be a part of the
decision. For example, in the cake cutting setting, the set of possible outcomes consists of
the permitted allocations of the cake and there are no payments, so the set of outcomes
coincides with the set of possible decisions. On the other hand, consider a single-item
auction. The possible outcomes consist of which agent the item is given to, and this is a
setting with payments, so the decision made by the mechanism includes the outcome and a
payment for each agent. When there are payments, we assume that agents have quasi-linear
utilities, so that an agent's utility for receiving some outcome and paying some amount is
equal to its value for the outcome minus the required payment. We often use the term
algorithm interchangeably with outcome rule, since the outcome rule is typically solving
some sort of optimization problem to maximize an objective given the agents' reported
valuations.
The goal of mechanism design is to make a good decision, where the quality of the
decision is evaluated with respect to the agents' true types. It is assumed that agents will
behave in a way that maximizes their utility and will not not necessarily report their true
types. A strategy maps an agent's true type to a reported type. Given strategies of other
agents, an agent has a set of strategies that are best responses. An equilibrium is a set of
strategies where each agent's strategy is a best response to the strategies of other agents.
To understand the quality of the decisions of a mechanism, it is necessary to identify the
equilibria of the mechanism.
9CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, we focus on truthful mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms with equilibria
where each agent's strategy is to report its true type. In truthful mechanisms, it is easy to
analyze the quality of the mechanism, as we can just measure the quality of the decision
with respect to reported types (which we can assume are the same as the true types) and
do not need to reason about the agent's true underlying types. It is also simple for agents
to participate in truthful mechanisms since agents need only report their true types and
need not strategize about their reports. Furthermore, it turns out that there is a sense in
which studying truthful mechanisms is without loss due to what is known as the revelation
principle.
There are various notions of truthful mechanisms depending on denition of what con-
stitutes an equilibrium. The strongest notion of equilibrium we consider, dominant strategy
equilibrium, requires that agents' best responses do not depend on the strategies of other
agents. Mechanisms with a truthful dominant strategy equilibrium are known as dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). In these mechanisms, reporting truthfully maximizes
an agents' utility regardless of the actual types of the other agents. A weaker notion of
equilibrium is Bayes-Nash equilibrium, which applies to settings where agents' types are
drawn from a commonly known distribution. In Bayes-Nash equilibrium, agent strategies
are best responses in expectation to the strategies of other agents, where the expectation is
taken over the possible types of the other agents. Mechanisms with a truthful Bayes-Nash
equilibrium are known as Bayes-Nash incentive compatible (BIC). In these mechanisms, re-
porting truthfully maximizes an agents' expected utility, assuming that other agents' types
are randomly drawn from the common knowledge distribution and that other agents re-
port truthfully. This is a weaker notion than DSIC because reporting truthfully is only
guaranteed to be a best response in expectation and only if other agents' report truthfully.
1.2.1 Truthful Cake Cutting
Our rst contribution to truthful resource allocation revisits the cake cutting problem with
restricted valuation functions. In particular, we examine the case of piecewise uniform
valuations and seek a mechanism that is both truthful and fair in this setting. Recall that
a mechanism in this setting is simply an algorithm that computes an allocation given the
agents' reported types.
Most prior work on cake cutting ignores strategic issues and simply assumes that agent
valuations are either publicly known or truthfully revealed. Indeed, our other contributions
to the cake cutting literature have this avor. Work that did consider strategic issues
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examines a very weak notion of truthfulness. The notion considered in previous papers
by Brams et al. [2006] and Brams et al. [2008] assumes that an agent will report its true
valuation rather than lie if there exist valuations of the other agents such that reporting
truthfully yields at least as much value as lying. In the words of Brams et al.,
The players are risk-averse and never strategically announce false measures if it
does not guarantee them more-valued pieces. ... Hence, a procedure is strategy-
proof if no player has a strategy that dominates his true value function [Brams
et al., 2008, page 362]
We depart from this prior work and instead attempt to nd mechanisms that are DSIC.
In contrast to the notion of of truthfulness studied by Brams et al., DSIC requires that
truthfully revealing one's type weakly dominates any other type report for all possible
reports of other agents.
We also depart from prior work by assuming that agents have piecewise uniform valua-
tions. This allows us to consider direct mechanisms, whereas prior work on strategic issues
operates in the classic cake cutting model where agent valuations are never fully revealed.
Indeed, our main result depends crucially on the piecewise uniform assumption and knowing
the agents' exact valuations.
Our main result is a deterministic mechanism that is DSIC, proportional, and EF. In
addition, this mechanism computes a Pareto-ecient allocation (relative to the reported
types) and runs in polynomial time. We also discuss randomized mechanisms and provide
mechanisms that are truthful in expectation and universally fair. Truthfulness in expectation
requires that an agent maximizes its expected utility by reporting truthfully where the
randomness is over the random choices of the mechanism. Universal fairness requires that
the computed allocation is always fair, regardless of the random choices of the mechanism.
We give randomized mechanisms that are truthful in expectation and universally fair for
piecewise linear valuations. The mechanisms rely on the existence of perfect partitions which
divide the cake into n pieces such that every agent has value 1=n for every piece. Though
these partitions seem very special, their existence has been known since the 1940s [Neyman,
1946]. These proofs are non-constructive, though, and our contribution is to provide explicit
constructions for agents with piecewise linear valuations.
1.2.2 Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are a focus of the rest of our discussion of truthful resource
allocation, though we point out where our results are also applicable to more general set-
tings. In a combinatorial auction, we wish to allocate a set of items to a set of agents, and
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agents hold private valuations over subsets or bundles of items. Combinatorial auctions are
useful (when compared with running separate single item auctions) when agent valuations
exhibit complementarities, i.e. the value for a bundle of items exceeds the sum of the values
of the individual items in the bundle.
The canonical example of complementary items is a left shoe and a right shoe, but many
real world resource allocation settings exhibit complementarities as well. For example, in
national wireless spectrum auctions in the United States, the individual items are bands of
spectrum in a particular region [Cramton, 2002]. A national cellular provider like Verizon
would exhibit strong complementarities for having spectrum across all regions (since it seeks
to be a national provider). Indeed, combinatorial auctions have found application in the
allocation of congested landing slots at airports [Ball et al., 2006], the procurement of service
providers for operating bus routes in London [Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 2006], and various
industrial procurement settings [Caplice and She, 2006, Bichler et al., 2006, Sandholm,
2013].
Combinatorial auctions determine an assignment of items to each agent and charge each
agent a payment. We assume that we are in a quasi-linear setting where agent utilities are
equal to their value for the items they receive minus the payment they make.
Combinatorial auctions provide a canonical example where the economic theory of mech-
anism design is at odds with limited computational power and serve as a motivation for the
study of computational mechanism design. Computational mechanism design adds the con-
straint that a mechanism needs to be computationally tractable, both in terms of eliciting
the valuations from the agents and in terms of computing the outcome and payments.
Slightly more formally, there is a set of n agents and a set of m items. Each agent
has a private type which determines its value for dierent possible subsets of items. An
agent's type provides a value for every possible bundle of items. An allocation assigns a
subset of items to each agent, ensuring that each item is allocated at most once. The
direct mechanism design problem is to nd an outcome rule that maps reported types to
an allocation and a payment rule that maps reported types to a payment for each agent.
Computational Challenges
Combinatorial auctions present two computational challenges. The rst is that in full gener-
ality, reporting an agent's valuation may require the specication of 2m real numbers, each
representing a value for a possible subset of items the agent receives. This preference elici-
tation problem makes direct mechanisms infeasible if agents do indeed have such complex
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preferences. One approach to circumvent these issues is to consider indirect mechanisms
(see Parkes [2001]). A second approach, which is the one we use in this dissertation, is to
focus on restricted classes of preferences. Specically, we examine cases where agents are
single-minded or multi-minded. What this means is that agents have a set of target bundles
in mind. If the agents receive a subset of items that does not include any target bundle,
then the agent receives value 0 for that subset. Otherwise, the agent receives a value equal
to the largest included target bundle. As a result, agents need only communicate their
target bundles and their values for those bundles, and this pins down their entire valuation
function.
The second computational challenge is that optimizing over the set of possible alloca-
tions can be a computationally dicult problem. As an example, consider the case where
the outcome rule maximizes social welfare. Finding a welfare-maximizing allocation is NP-
hard in most combinatorial auction settings, including the single-minded setting discussed
above [Rothkopf et al., 1998, Lehmann et al., 2002]. If computational constraints were
not important, then the class of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are incentive
compatible and have an outcome rule that exactly maximizes social welfare [Vickrey, 1961,
Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973]. The key to incentive compatibility in VCG mechanisms is the
design of a payment rule that aligns agents' incentives with the social welfare of the com-
puted allocation. Unfortunately, the VCG mechanism cannot be used if polynomial time
computation is required due to the NP-hardness of nding an allocation that exactly max-
imizes social welfare. A natural approach is to replace the outcome rule with an algorithm
that approximates the optimal social welfare while using a payment rule that is similar in
spirit to the VCG payment rule. The Clarke-Pivot version of the VCG mechanism can
be thought of as charging agent i the externality it imposes on other agents. The same
idea can be adapted to any outcome rule. Unfortunately, this new mechanism is no longer
incentive compatible. In fact, the outcome rule that approximately maximizes welfare may
not satisfy the necessary monotonicity properties for there to exist payment rules that form
an incentive compatible mechanism when combined with the outcome rule.
One approach to this problem is to develop polynomial time algorithms that nd al-
locations whose welfare is provably within some factor of the optimal welfare while si-
multaneously satisfying the required monotonicty properties for there to exist incentive
compatible payment rules. Specializing to the setting of single-minded combinatorial auc-
tions, Lehmann et al. [2002] take this approach and give a simple greedy algorithm that
satises the required monotonicity properties and guarantees that the computed allocation
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has welfare at least O(1=
p
m) times the optimal welfare. Similarly, Mu'alem and Nisan
[2008] devise algorithms that satisfy the monotonicity properties and compute an alloca-
tion with welfare at least O(1=(
p
m)) times the optimal for any xed  > 0 with runtime
that is exponential in 1=2. These approaches are analytical in the sense that these approx-
imation algorithms are completely specied, and the proofs of monotonicity and worst-case
approximation involve reasoning about the specics of the approximation algorithm.
In this dissertation, we focus on more computational approaches, where we do not
attempt to give a specication of the approximation algorithm, but rather we give compu-
tational procedures that produce algorithms with certain desirable properties. Specically,
we provide an approach that computationally modies Branch-and-Bound (BnB) search for
solving integer programs and makes it usable as the outcome rule for a truthful mechanism.
We also develop an approach that given an outcome rule, uses machine learning to nd
a payment rule that is approximately incentive compatible when paired with the outcome
rule. We discuss existing work related to these directions in the next section.
1.2.3 Computational Approaches to Mechanism Design
Conitzer and Sandholm [2002] introduced the agenda of automated mechanism design (AMD)
and formulated mechanism design as the search for an allocation rule and (possibly) a pay-
ment rule among a class of rules satisfying incentive constraints. While the basic idea was of
course already familiar from the seminal work of Myerson [1981], a novel aspect of the work
of Conitzer and Sandholm is that it explicitly represents a mechanism as a mapping from
type proles, where type spaces are assumed to be discrete, to outcomes and payments.
This explicit representation makes AMD intractable in general because the number of type
proles is exponential in the number of agents, and possibly also in other natural param-
eters of a problem such as the number of items in a combinatorial auction. One approach
that was adopted to make AMD more tractable is to search through a parameterized space
of incentive compatible mechanisms [Likhodedov and Sandholm, 2005, Guo and Conitzer,
2010b]. More recently, advances in AMD have been made in application to the design of
revenue optimal mechanisms and by considering BIC rather than DSIC [Cai et al., 2012a].
A dierent computational approach assumes that access to some approximation algo-
rithm that we wish to use as our outcome rule. The challenge, however, is that the approx-
imation algorithm may not have the proper monotonicity properties to guarantee existence
of incentive compatible payment rules.
For the target of DSIC mechanisms, Briest et al. [2005] give a construction that converts
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pseudopolynomial time algorithms that maximize welfare welfare into incentive compati-
ble fully polynomial time approximation schemes (FPTAS).1 Their insights also yield new
truthful mechanisms for settings without pseudopolynomial time algorithms, though these
mechanisms do not have the avor of converting a non-truthful algorithm; rather, they are
fully specied algorithms like those of Lehmann et al. [2002] and Mu'alem and Nisan [2008].
For the target of randomized truthful in expectation mechanisms, Lavi and Swamy [2011]
give a construction that converts a non-truthful approximation algorithm into a randomized
truthful in expectation mechanism that preserves the worst-case approximation guarantee
(in expectation) of the original rule. They require that the optimization problem can be
written as an integer program and that there exists an -approximation algorithm that also
bounds the integrality gap of the LP relaxation of the problem by . Their construction
yields a truthful in expectation mechanism with approximation guarantee of O(1=
p
m) when
applied to (general) CAs. Dughmi and Roughgarden [2010] give a construction that yields
a randomized truthful in expectation mechanis (with outcome rules which are an FPTAS)
for any welfare maximization problem that has an FPTAS and can be encoded as a set
packing problem.
For the target of BIC mechanisms, Hartline and Lucier [2010] and Hartline et al. [2011]
provide a general approach, for both single-parameter and multi-parameter domains, for
converting any algorithm into a BIC mechanism with essentially the same welfare as the
original algorithm. Related to this, Bei and Huang [2011] also tackle multi-parameter dis-
crete domains and give a construction that converts any algorithm into an -BIC while
losing a small amount in welfare. Recent work by Cai et al. [2012b] give a construction
that takes an algorithm that maximizes welfare and converts it into a revenue optimal BIC
mechanisms. This construction is computationally tractable when agents are additive (their
value for a bundle of items is the sum of their value for each item) and independent (an
agent's type is not correlated with other agent types). Cai et al. [2013] extend this construc-
tion to convert algorithms that only approximately maximize welfare into BIC mechanisms
that approximate the revenue optimal BIC mechanism with the same approximation factor.
Conitzer and Sandholm [2007] propose an incremental mechanism design approach
where a mechanism is incrementally made more truthful by nding and correcting vio-
lations of truthfulness. In a similar vein, Parkes [2009] proposes an agenda of heuristic
1A pseudopolynomial time algorithm runs in time that is polynomial in the numeric value of the input
rather than the number of bits needed to represent the input. An FPTAS is a scheme that given a desired
error  gives a solution within a factor 1    of optimal and runs in time polynomial in 1= and the size of
the input to the algorithm.
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mechanism design where heuristic algorithms are modied for the purposes of mechanism
design. The modications may not be black box (like those in the previous paragraph) in
the sense that they can be specic to the particular algorithm. These algorithms may not
have worst case guarantees, but they work well in practice. Along these lines, Parkes and
Duong [2007] and Constantin and Parkes [2009] apply a so-called \computational ironing"
approach to online stochastic combinatorial optimization (OSCO). Our work on monotone
branch and bound search is closely related to this agenda (see next section and Chapter
8). Also thematically related to heuristic mechanism design is the GrowRange method of
Parkes and Schoenebeck [2004], which provides an anytime algorithm for welfare optimiza-
tion in general CAs by expanding the range of a VCG-based algorithm, while allowing for
a time-based interruption by the center (although without providing full incentive compat-
ibility).
1.2.4 Monotone Branch and Bound Search
We make two contributions to work on computational approaches to mechanism design.
The rst investigates the setting of known single-minded CAs. A known single-minded CA
is the same as a single-minded CA, with the added assumption that agents' single target
bundles are publicly known. The only private information is therefore an agent's value for
its target bundle, thereby transforming the problem into a single-dimensional mechanism
design problem. While the known single-minded assumption is restrictive, Lehmann et al.
[2002] describe a pollution rights auction where companies bid for the right to emit certain
chemicals into the air, and the pollution proles of the companies are known. They also
describe communication network settings where bidders own nodes in the network and wish
to connect their nodes. If there is only a single path available between any pair of nodes,
then bidders are single-minded. If it is also public knowledge which companies own which
pairs of nodes, then this becomes a known single-minded setting.
Even in known single-minded CAs, computing the exact welfare-maximizing alloca-
tion is NP-hard, thereby preventing the application of the VCG mechanism computational
tractability is required. As discussed in the previous section, Lehmann et al. [2002] and
Mu'alem and Nisan [2008] tackle this problem and give incentive compatible mechanisms
that are computationally tractable, have worst-case guarantees on welfare, and satisfy the
requirements of incentive compatibility. These mechanisms rely on relatively simple allo-
cation algorithms, such as a greedy algorithm which ranks bundles by score and greedily
assigns bundles in order in decreasing score, or an allocation function which iterates over all
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feasible allocations that allocate fewer than some number of agents. However, if incentives
were not a concern, there are more sophisticated algorithms such as Branch-and-Bound
(BnB) search, which can eciently nd optimal solutions to the winner determination
problem on typical instances.
Specically, we consider a variant of BnB search where the search continues until a
solution is found that is within a factor  < 1 of optimal. This is possible due to the various
bounds that are maintained during the BnB search procedure. While running BnB search
to completion is monotone in each agent's reported value, running to a tolerance  < 1 is
no longer monotone. As a result, we devise a procedure that performs sensitivity checking
on the BnB search tree to check for monotonicity violations. If violations are found, i.e. an
agent is allocated for some initial report but deallocated for a higher report (recall that we
are in a single minded setting where an agent's report is just a single number so a higher
report is well-dened), we decide not to allocate the agent at its initial report. The core
technical contribution is the design of an optimized sensitivity checking procedure that takes
advantage of the structure in a BnB search tree.
We perform experiments on instances from the Combinatorial Auctions Test Suite
[Leyton-Brown et al., 2000], and we nd that the best parameterizations of our proce-
dure can outperform the existing methods of Lehmann et al. [2002] and Mu'alem and Nisan
[2008] in terms of welfare while taking less runtime than running BnB search to completion.
Additionally, our monotone BnB is fully parallelizable (the sensitivity checking can consider
each agent in isolation), thereby further reducing the runtime cost.
1.2.5 Learning Payment Rules
Our second contribution to computational approaches to mechanism design considers the
setting where there is some outcome rule that we wish to use but we do not have a payment
to pair with the outcome rule. For instance, we might have some heuristic algorithm that
nds allocations with good welfare, or we might have an algorithm that nds allocations
that maximize a non-standard objective function such as egalitarian welfare (maximize the
minimum value). Instead of imposing incentive compatibility as a hard constraint (which
might require us to modify the outcome rule), we relax the requirement of exact incentive
compatibility. Taking the outcome rule as given, we attempt to nd a payment rule with
good incentive properties.
Specically, we adopt statistical machine learning to infer payment rules that minimize
agents' expected ex post regret. The ex post regret (or just regret where it causes no confu-
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sion) of an agent for truthful reporting in a given instance is the maximum amount by which
its utility could increase through a misreport holding constant the reports of others. The
expected ex post regret is the average ex post regret over all agents and all preference types,
calculated with respect to a distribution on types. In addition to minimizing expected ex
post regret, we enforce an agent independence property on the payment rule that ensures
that (small) changes in an agent's report that do not change the computed outcome will
not be benecial.
At the core of our approach lies a relationship between incentive compatible mechanisms
and multi-class classiers. Given an outcome rule, the related multi-class classication
problem is to predict, given a type prole, the outcome that the outcome rule produces when
given the type prole. If we have an admissible classier, then based on the parameters of
the classier, it is possible to derive a payment rule to pair with the provided outcome rule.
We formally show that an exact, admissible classier yields a payment rule that is incentive
compatible when paired with the provided outcome rule, and that an incentive compatible
mechanism ensures the existence of an exact, admissible classier. We also show that an
admissible classier that minimizes a particular generalization error yields a payment rule
that minimizes expected regret.
We train our admissible, discriminant-based classiers by adapting structural support
vector machines [Joachims et al., 2009] to our mechanism design setting. We implement our
techniques and apply them to three problem domains where incentive compatible mecha-
nisms are not known. The rst setting is multi-minded CAs. We seek to maximize welfare,
but we adopt a greedy heuristic algorithm as the outcome rule since exactly maximizing
welfare is NP-hard. The second setting is CAs where agents have positive, k-wise dependent
valuations [Conitzer et al., 2005, Chevaleyre et al., 2008]. Exact welfare-maximization is
NP-hard in this setting as well, so we also adopt a greedy outcome rule that attempts to
maximize welfare, and we seek a payment rule that minimizes regret. The nal setting is
an assignment setting where there are as many items as agents and the goal is to nd an
assignment of exactly one item to each agent. Here we adopt an egalitarian outcome rule
that computes an assignment that maximizes the minimum value attained by any agent.
Because of the egalitarian objective, incentive compatible mechanisms are not known for
this setting. Our results show that we are able to nd payment rules with better regret
than natural VCG-based payment rules. These VCG-based payment rules adopt a similar
approach of charging an agent the externality it imposes on other agents, except that the
externality is measured with respect to an outcome rule that does not necessarily exactly
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maximize social welfare.
Several interesting complications arise in learning payment rules, and we provide solu-
tions to each of these. For CAs, the space of possible outcomes is exponential in the number
of items. This creates an exponentially large number of constraints in the structural support
vector machine formulation of the training problem. Solving the training problem requires
the existence of a polynomial time separation oracle. We do note that training can be per-
formed oine, so the runtime requirements for training may not be as stringent as those for
computing the actual payments given agent reports. For multi-minded CAs, we do not have
such a polynomial time separation oracle and are thus limited to training payment rules for
small problem sizes. On the other hand, by adopting positive k-wise dependent valuations,
we are able to formulate a polynomially sized training problem by drawing connections to
the literature on tractable maximum a-posteriori (MAP) estimation for associative Markov
networks [Taskar et al., 2004]. Another problem that arises is that the learned payment
rules may violate individual rationality (IR) in that an agent may be charged more than
its value for the outcome. We present several ways of mitigating IR violation by modifying
the training problem to learn payment rules with less IR violation and providing several IR
xes that modify the learned payment rule. We experimentally show that these solutions
are eective in the domains we study.
1.3 Outline
This dissertation can be thought of as consisting of two parts. In the rst part, we consider
cake cutting and fairness, without considering truthfulness. In the second part, we focus on
mechanism design problems and truthfulness. In this second part, we rst discuss truthful-
ness in a cake cutting setting and then proceed to develop two computational approaches
to mechanism design.
Chapter 2 provides background on resource allocation and mechanism design. We cover
some main results from mechanism design theory and provide precise denitions of truth-
fulness and motivations for the study of truthful mechanisms.
Chapter 3 formally denes the cake cutting problem and reviews some classic results
from the cake cutting literature. We discuss a direct revelation model which departs from
the classic model of cake cutting, and introduce the study of cake cutting under restricted
families of valuation functions. Chapters 4 and 5 consider questions related to the direct
revelation model and restricted families of valuations. In particular, Chapter 4 examines
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welfare-maximizing fair allocations, while Chapter 5 investigates a model that extends the
expressiveness of piecewise uniform valuations.
Chapter 6 begins our investigation of truthfulness and mechanism design. We con-
sider the cake cutting problem when agents have piecewise uniform valuations. Chapter
7 introduces some necessary background on combinatorial auctions (CAs). We introduce
the problem, touch on real world applications, and explain how combinatorial auctions
demonstrate the tension between a purely economic approach to mechanism design and
computational tractability. Chapters 8 and 9 describe our two computational approaches
to mechanism design, with Chapter 8 describing our monotone BnB search procedure and
Chapter 9 describing our procedure for learning payment rules using machine learning.
Chapter 10 concludes and discusses some possible future directions.
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Resource Allocation and
Mechanism Design
This chapter formally introduces the model for resource allocation and provides necessary
background on mechanism design.
2.1 Formal Model
A resource allocation problem is given by a set N = f1;2;:::;ng of agents that interact to
make a collective decision. D denotes the set of possible decisions and d denotes a member
of this set. Each agent i 2 N is associated with a type i from a set i of possible types.
There exists a utility function ui : i  D ! R for each agent i that maps a possible type
and decision to the agent's utility for that decision.
We write  = (1;:::;n) for a prole of types for the dierent agents,  = "i2Ni for
the set of possible type proles, and  i 2  i for a prole of types for all agents but i.
We are interested in procedures or algorithms that take the agent's types and compute
decisions.
Denition 2.1.1. A social choice function f :  ! D maps a prole of types  to a
decision d.
2.1.1 Concrete Examples
To make the setting concrete, consider the two main topics we discuss in this these: cake
cutting and combinatorial auctions. Chapters 3 and 7 provide a more formal and detailed
discussion, but here we give a brief overview of how these problems map to the formal model
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we have just dened. In cake cutting, there is a single divisible good being allocated. The
possible decisions D are assignments of parts of the divisible good to each agent, making
sure that the parts received by each agent are disjoint. The agents' types specify how much
utility they derive from dierent parts of the good. For instance, an agent of type 1
i might
prefer only the vanilla part of the cake; on the other hand, an agent of type 2
i might prefer
only the cherry. The combinatorial auction (CA) problem involves allocating a set of items
to the set of agents. The possible decisions D consist of an assignment of sets of items to
each agent as well as a payment that each agent has to make. The agents' types specify
how much utility they derive from a particular assignment of items and a specication of
payments for each agent.
2.1.2 Payments and Quasi-Linear Utility
As seen in the example, the set of possible decisions D may sometimes include a payment
that each agent has to make. We refer the settings with and without payments as mechanism
design with and without money respectively.
The social choice function f can be separated into an outcome rule (which species the
part of the decision unrelated to payments) and an optional payment rule (which species
the payments that each agent makes). Specically, we assume that there is some set of
outcomes 
, with o denoting an element of this set. For example, in cake cutting, the
set of outcomes 
 is equivalent D (since there are no payments) and consists of the fea-
sible allocations of cake. In the CA setting, the set of outcomes consists of the feasible
assignments of items to each agent, whereas the set of possible decisions consists of feasible
assignments along with payments charged to each agent. We assume that agents have a
valuation function Vi : i  
 ! R that species their values for elements of 
.
Denition 2.1.2. An outcome rule g :  ! 
 maps a set of reported types to an outcome,
and a payment rule p :  ! Rn
0 maps a set of reported types to a payment for each agent.
We use gi() to denote the part of the outcome aliated with agent i when appropriate.
In cake cutting, this is the part of the cake given to the agent. In CAs, this is the set
of items the agent obtains in the auction. In settings without money, ui(i;d) = Vi(i;o)
where o is the outcome chosen by decision d. In settings with money, we make the standard
assumption of quasi-linear preferences, i.e. ui(i;d) = Vi(i;o)   pi where o is the outcome
associated with decision d and pi is the payment of agent i specied by decision d.
23CHAPTER 2 RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND MECHANISM DESIGN
2.1.3 Properties
We are interested in social choice functions with specic properties. A natural and perhaps
the most common property to consider is the total value that agents receive from the
decision.
Denition 2.1.3. Given agent types  and decision d, the eciency or social welfare of
decision d is dened as:
sw(;d) =
n X
i=1
Vi(i;o);
where o is the outcome associated with decision d.
We can use this denition to dene what it means for social choice function to be
ecient.
Denition 2.1.4. A social choice function f is ecient if for all  2 ,
g() 2 argmax
d2D
sw(;d);
where g is the outcome part of the social choice function f.
A weaker property than eciency that does not require comparison of values across
dierent agents is Pareto-eciency.
Denition 2.1.5. A social choice function f is Pareto-ecient if for all  2 , there
does not exist an outcome o 2 
 such that Vi(i;o)  Vi(i;gi()) for every agent i and
Vj(j;o) > Vj(j;gj()) for some agent j, where g is the outcome part of the social choice
function f.
In other words, f always selects an outcome such that it is not possible to make every
agent weakly better o and at least one agent strictly better o. Note that the denitions
of eciency and Pareto-eciency look at the value that agents receive rather than agent
utilities. This captures the perspective of a system designer who wants to create maximal
value for society. Payments are not considered in these denitions though they aect agents'
utilities for the chosen decision.
2.2 Mechanism Design
In the previous section, we assume that we somehow know the agents' true type , whether
it is because agents are truthful or because their types are publicly known. In this section,
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we consider the mechanism design problem, which assumes that this information is private
to each agent. We separate our discussion into two separate cases. In the rst case, we
assume a mechanism design without money setting. In other words, we are not able to
use payments to incentivize agents to report their valuations truthfully. This is a realistic
assumption in certain settings where payments may be inappropriate such as negotiating
land allocation in peace treaties or deciding how to allocate assets in a divorce settlement
[Brams and Taylor, 1996]. The cake cutting problem typically assumes that payments are
not permitted. In the second case, we consider a mechanism design with money setting
where payments can be used to incentize agents to report truthfully. This setting includes
CAs.
In the rst case, a direct mechanism h consists of just an outcome rule g. In the second
case, a direct mechanism h is a pair (g;p), where g is an outcome rule, and p :  ! Rn
0
species a payment for each agent. A direct mechanism takes on the same form as a social
choice function. The reason we separate the terminology is to allow for indirect mechanisms
which allow agents to make reports that lie in a space dierent than i. Indirect mechanisms
are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but we give a brief discussion in relation to the
revelation principle in Section 2.2.2.
Since we assume agent types are private information, we seek mechanisms that induce
agents to make truthful reports. To unify our discussion of the two settings, we dene agent
utilities in each setting.
Denition 2.2.1. For a given mechanism h, the utility of an agent i depends on its true
type i, its reported type 0
i, and the reports of other agents  i.
For a mechanism without money h = g;g :  ! 
, the utility of an agent i is simply its
value for the chosen outcome:
ui((0
i; i);i) = Vi(i;g(0
i; i))
For a mechanism with money h = (g;p);g :  ! 
;p :  ! Rn
0, we make the standard
assumption of quasi-linear preferences. The agent's utility is its value for the outcome minus
the payment it has to make:
ui((0
i; i);i) = Vi(i;g(0
i; i))   pi(0
i; i)
Given these denitions, it is possible to quantify the amount that an agent can gain by
misreporting its type.
25CHAPTER 2 RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND MECHANISM DESIGN
Denition 2.2.2. Suppose that agent i has true type i and the other agents report types
 i. Agent i's ex post regret is dened as:
rgti(i; i) = max
0
i2i
ui
 
(0
i; i);i

  ui
 
(i; i);i

:
It is natural to consider mechanisms that do not make agents worse o if we assume
that the agents' reported types are their true types.
Denition 2.2.3. A mechanism h is individually rational (IR) if agents reporting their
true types are guaranteed non-negative utility, i.e., if for all i 2 N, i 2 i, and  i 2  i,
ui((i; i);i)  0.
The mechanism h plays an implicit role in the denitions for both regret and individual
rationality since agent utilities ui depend on the particular choice of h.
2.2.1 Truthful Mechanisms
We can now dene precisely what it means for a mechanism to induce truthful reports.
Denition 2.2.4. A mechanism (without money) h = g;g :  ! 
 or a mechanism (with
money) h = (g;p);g :  ! 
;p :  ! Rn
0 is dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC) if each agent maximizes its utility by reporting its true type, irrespective of the
reports of the other agents, i.e., if for all i 2 N, i 2 i,  i 2  i, and 0
i 2 i,
ui((i; i);i)  ui((0
i; i);i):
We often use incentive compatible or strategyproof to refer to DSIC. If a mechanism
is DSIC, agents experience zero ex post regret. In the case where the outcome rule and
payment rule are non-deterministic,2 we require an alternate notion of truthfulness.
Denition 2.2.5. A mechanism (without money) h = g or a mechanism (with money)
h = (g;p) is truthful in expectation, if each agent maximizes its expected utility by reporting
truthfully (regardless of the reports of other agents), where the expectation is taken over
the randomness of the mechanism, i.e., if for all i 2 N;i 2 i; i 2  i;0
i 2 i;
E[ui((i; i);i)]  E[ui((0
i; i);i)]:
2In this case it is more sensible to consider a combined outcome and payment rule that maps to the
simplex over 
  R
n
0.
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We mostly consider deterministic mechanisms in this dissertation and do not focus on
truthfulness in expectation, but we introduce it here to give background for understanding
related work. In the situation where agents' types are drawn from some distribution P(),
we can also dene a weaker notion of truthfulness.
Denition 2.2.6. Given that agent types are drawn from P(), a mechanism (without
money) h = g or a mechanism (with money) h = (g;p) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
(BIC) if each agent maximizes its expected utility by reporting its true type, assuming that
other agents are truthful, i.e., if for all i 2 N, i 2 i
E iP( iji)[ui((i; i);i)]  E iP( iji)[ui((0
i; i);i)]:
BIC is a weaker notion than DSIC since BIC only requires that reporting the true type
i is weakly best in expectation. It could be that there are some types of other agents
 i for which i is not the best report, but i yields weakly better expected utility over
the random draw of  i. Unlike DSIC mechanisms where agents have zero ex post regret,
agents may experience positive ex post regret in truthful in expectation and BIC mechanisms
depending on the particular random choice of the mechanism or random draw of agents'
types. However, in expectation (and assuming other agents are truthful in the case of BIC),
an agent maximizes its utility by reporting its true type.
A Characterization of Strategyproof Mechanisms
Having provided the denition of a DSIC mechanism, it is possible to give a characterization
of the outcome rule and payment rule pairs (for mechanism design with money settings)
that yield DSIC mechanisms. For the purposes of this dissertation, we consider settings
with natural restrictions on the agents' valuations and the outcome rules g.
Denition 2.2.7. Agent valuations exhibit no externalities if an agent's value for an out-
come only depends on its part of the outcome, i.e. Vi(i;o) = Vi(i;oi).
Denition 2.2.8. Outcome rule g satises consumer sovereignty if for all i 2 N, oi 2 
i,
and 0
 i 2  i, there exists 0
i 2 i such that gi(0
i;0
 i) = oi:
In other words for every possible outcome, there exists some reported type for agent i
that causes the mechanism to select that outcome. For example, in a single-item auction
that assigns the item to the highest bidder, if an agent submits a high enough bid, the agent
will win the item.
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Denition 2.2.9. Outcome rule g satises reachability of the null outcome if for all i 2 N,
i 2 i, and 0
 i 2  i, there exists 0
i 2 i such that vi(i;gi(0
i;0
 i)) = 0:
Reachability of the null outcome requires that there always exists some outcome that
gives the agent zero utility, and the agent can always cause this outcome to be selected. In
the single-item auction example, an agent can always receive zero utility by bidding zero.
The agent will not receive the item and pays zero and ends up with utility zero.3
Given the denitions of DSIC mechanisms and individual rationality from the previous
sections, observe that a DSIC mechanism with an outcome rule that satises reachability
of the null outcome implies individual rationality. The following characterization of DSIC
mechanisms is well-known (see e.g., Proposition 9.27 in Nisan [2007]) and easy to prove.
It is crucial to the discussion in Chapter 9 which draws connections between mechanism
design and classication problems in machine learning. We adapt it here for the case where
consumer soveriegnty holds.
Theorem 2.2.10. A mechanism with money (g;p) that satises consumer sovereignty is
DSIC if and only if the payment of an agent is independent of its reported type and the
chosen outcome simultaneously maximizes the utility of all agents, i.e., if for every type
prole  2 ,
pi() = ti( i;gi()) for all i 2 N; and (2.1)
gi() 2 argmax
o0
i2
i
 
vi(i;o0
i)   ti( i;o0
i)

for all i 2 N; (2.2)
for a price function ti :  i  
i ! R.
The rst property is the agent-independent property: conditioned on reports of others,
and an outcome, an agent's payment is independent of its own report. The second property
is the agent-optimizing property: the outcome should maximize an agent's utility given
these agent-independent prices and its reported valuation.
DSIC mechanisms can also be characterized in regard to necessary and sucient prop-
erties of outcome rules alone, and especially through monotonicity properties. These prop-
erties characterize those outcome rules for which there exists a payment rule such that the
outcome rule and payment rule form a DSIC mechanism [Saks and Yu, 2005, Ashlagi et al.,
2010].
3If all other agents bid zero there might be some chance the agent wins the item and gains positive utility.
To preclude this case we can let the agent bid a negative amount.
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A simple necessary condition for DSIC mechanisms is weak monotonicity [Lavi et al.,
2003, Bikhchandani et al., 2006].
Denition 2.2.11. An outcome rule g is weakly monotone if for all i;0
i 2 i,  i 2  i,
Vi(0
i;g(0
i; i))   Vi(0
i;g(i; i))  Vi(i;g(0
i; i))   Vi(i;g(i; i))
In other words, the dierence in value for between outcomes g(0
i; i) and g(i; i) is
weakly greater when an agent has type 0
i versus type i.
Depending on the domain of permitted agent valuations (i.e., the denitions of the sets
i), weak monotonicity may also be a sucient condition for the existence of a payment rule
p such that (g;p) is DSIC. A full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this dissertation
and the interested reader can consult [Lavi et al., 2003, Bikhchandani et al., 2006] and
references therein.
2.2.2 Truthfulness and the Revelation Principle
We have given denitions for truthful mechanisms. In this section, we provide some moti-
vation for the study of truthful mechanisms. One advantage of truthful mechanisms is that
is it easy for agents to participate in a truthful mechanism. In a DSIC or truthful in ex-
pectation mechanism, agents need need not reason about possible reports that other agents
are making. Related to this, a DSIC or truthful in expectation mechanism is fair in the
sense that unsophisticated agents are not at a disadvantage relative to more sophisticated,
strategic agents or agents with more information about other agents' types. Additionally,
truthful mechanisms are more predictable from the perspective of the mechanism designer.
If we depart from DSIC or truthful in expectation mechanisms, we need to think about
what deviations agents will make and how agents will respond to these deviations. In other
words, we need to consider equilibrium behavior. BIC mechanisms also depend on equilib-
rium reasoning (the expected utility is taken over the true type distribution), but we can
argue that this truthful equilibrium is more likely than other more complicated equilibria
given that it consists of the straightforward strategy of reporting one's true type. A nal
reason for the study of truthful mechanisms is that they are in some sense without loss due
to what is known as the revelation principle.
Before we discuss the revelation principle, we consider mechanisms that are not truthful
and how we can think about analyzing such mechanisms. The following section is specically
focused on the application of game theory to mechanism design, but we introduce several
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general game theory concepts such as strategies and equilibrium. Mas-Colell et al. [1995]
and Nisan et al. [2007] oer more comprehensive treatments.
Strategies, Indirect Mechanisms, and Solution Concepts
While we have introduced direct, truthful mechanisms, we can also consider non-truthful,
indirect mechanisms. An indirect mechanism asks for agents to report some message mi 2
Mi, where Mi is not necessarily the same as i. It then takes the messages and computes
an outcome and optionally payments for each agent. We use the notation ui((mi;m i);i)
to denote an agent's utility in an indirect mechanism when it has type i, it reports m i,
and other agents report m i.
The rst step in thinking about non-truthful mechanisms is to realize that agents will
now have strategies. A strategy dictates the actions an agent will take in dierent states
of the world. In the context of indirect mechanisms, a strategy si indicates for every type
i, the message si(i) = mi the agent will report to the mechanism.4 We would like to
make predictions about what kinds of strategies will arise when we deploy our non-truthful
mechanism. This brings us to the concept of equilibrium, i.e. strategies that are mutual
best responses to each other. We can now discuss increasingly general notions of equilibrium
in mechanisms. We refer to these dierent notions of equilibrium as solution concepts.
Denition 2.2.12. A set of strategies (s1;:::;sn) is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of a
mechanism if for all i, for all i 2 i, for all mi 2 Mi, for all m i 2 M i;
ui((si(i);m i);i)  ui((mi;m i);i):
Dominant-strategy equilibrium is very strong. It requires that for every possible type
i of an agent, there exists some report si(i) that dominates all other reports, regardless
of the reports of other agents. We also have a weaker notion when agent types are drawn
from a distribution P().
Denition 2.2.13. Assuming that agent types are drawn from P(), a set of strategies
(s1;:::;sn) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a mechanism if for all i, for all i 2 i, mi 2 Mi,
E iP( iji)[ui((si(i);s i( i));i)]  E iP( iji)[ui((mi;s i( i));i)]:
4Technically we can also allow randomization so that si maps  to Mi, but this distinction is not
important for the purposes of our discussion.
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Recalling our denitions of DSIC and BIC mechanisms from the previous section, these
equilibrium denitions look very similar, except that we have introduced strategies si(i)
to replace the agents' true type i and we have generalized the space of possible reports to
be Mi rather than i. Indeed, the revelation principle makes this relationship precise and
basically says that any mechanism with a dominant strategy or Bayes-Nash equilibrium can
be converted to a DSIC or BIC mechanism.
When agents strategize, from the system design perspective, we are interested in the
decision (either the outcome or the outcome-payment pair) that is chosen with respect to
the agents' true types. In other words, we are interested in the social choice function that
results from running a mechanism.
Denition 2.2.14. Given a set of strategies (s1;:::;sn) that is a dominant strategy or
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a mechanism h, we can dened the aliated social choice function
f that takes into takes into account the strategies, i.e. f() = h(s()). In this case, we say
that (s1;:::;sn) implements f in fdominant strategies, Bayes-Nash equilibriumg.
We are now ready to give the revelation principle.
Theorem 2.2.15. If some set of strategies s1;:::;sm and possibly indirect mechanism h
implement a social choice function f in dominant strategies or Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
then there exists a direct truthful mechanism that implements f in dominant strategies or
Bayes-Nash equilibrium respectively.
We do not give a formal proof of the theorem, but the intuition is that given some
indirect mechanism with an equilibrium, we can consider a direct mechanism that plays
the equilibrium on behalf of the agents and feeds this into the indirect mechanism. The
equilibrium conditions then guarantee that truthful reporting is the agent's best strategy
in the constructed direct mechanism.
The revelation principle was discovered for dominant strategies by Gibbard [1973] and
extended to Bayes-Nash equilibria by Dasgupta et al. [1979], Holmstr om [1979], and Myer-
son [1979]. The principle states that if we have some non-truthful indirect mechanism that
implements a social choice function f, then there exists a truthful, direct mechanism that
also implements f (if our solution concepts are dominant strategy equilibrium or Bayes-Nash
equilibrium). Therefore, in some sense, it is without loss of generality to focus our study on
truthful mechanisms. Indeed, it is much simpler to reason about truthful mechanisms than
to think about indirect mechanisms which can allow agents to make very complicated re-
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ports to the mechanism, and in addition, among direct mechanisms, the revelation principle
says that we can focus on truthful mechanisms.
On the other hand, the revelation principle does not have anything to say about the
particular details of a mechanism. It states that there is a truthful, direct mechanism that
implements the same social choice function f, but an indirect mechanism may implement
the same function with far less communication and/or computation. Indeed, communication
and computation become very relevant for settings like CAs and it may be benecial to use
indirect mechanisms (see e.g., Parkes [2001]).
2.2.3 Classic Mechanism Design Results
Having presented the mechanism design problem and provided some motivation for studying
truthful mechanisms, we now give some fundamental results from the mechanism design with
money literature.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
Denition 2.2.16. Suppose the agents' reported types are . A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism [Vickrey, 1961, Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973] is a direct mechanism that
consists of the following:
1. An outcome rule g that selects an outcome o 2 
 that maximizes social welfare with
respect to the reported types .
2. A payment rule pi that charges
pi = ti( i)  
X
j6=i
Vj(j;gj());
where ti is any function that depends only on  i.
VCG mechanisms dene an entire family of mechanisms since the choice of ti is left
open. VCG mechanisms are of great interest as they are DSIC.
Theorem 2.2.17. VCG mechanisms are DSIC.
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Proof. Consider an agent's utility when reporting type 0
i when its true type is i:
Ui((0
i; i);i) = Vi(i;g(0
i; i))   pi(0
i; i) (2.3)
= Vi(i;g(0
i; i))  
0
@ti( i)  
X
j6=i
Vj(j;g(0
i; i))
1
A (2.4)
=
n X
j=1
Vj(j;g(0
i; i))   ti( i): (2.5)
Agent i has no eect on the term ti( i), so we can focus on the rst term. g maximizes
social welfare, so if 0
i = i, then the outcome o chosen will maximize
Pn
j=1 Vj(j;o). If
the agent reports 0
i 6= i, then g will choose an outcome that maximizes social welfare with
respect to (0
i; i), and this outcome may not maximize
Pn
j=1 Vj(j;o). Therefore, agent i
is weakly better o by reporting its true type i.
Not only are VCG mechanisms DSIC, they are the only ecient, DSIC mechanisms if
the space of possible valuations satises a connectedness property [Green and Laont, 1973,
Holmstr om, 1979]. A common choice for the function ti is the Clarke-Pivot rule, which sets
ti = max
o2

X
j6=i
Vj(j;o):
The appeal of this particular choice for ti is that the resulting mechanism is individually
rational for many natural settings including combinatorial auctions without externalities
(i.e. each agent's value for an outcome only depends on the items it receives).
Single-Parameter Mechanism Design
VCG mechanisms are very general and apply to many dierent settings as long as the
outcome rule maximizes social welfare. In this section, we discuss mechanism design in the
special setting where agents' valuations can be summarized by a single real number. In
this setting, we have very nice characterizations of incentive-compatible mechanisms. The
following discussion is adapted from [Nisan et al., 2007].
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, each agent's type is a single real
number i that lies in some interval i = [`i;ui];`i  0, and each agent has a publicly
known set of winning outcomes 

i  
. The agent's value for a winning outcome is i and
0 for any other outcome. As an example, we can consider a single-item auction. Here the
single-parameter is an agent's value for the item, and the winning outcomes are the outcomes
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that allocate the item to the agent. A more complex example of a single-parameter setting
is a CA where each agent is interested in exactly one publicly known target bundle of items
(but their value for that bundle is not known). This is what is called a known single-minded
CA and is discussed further in Chapter 7. Here 

i consists of all allocations that give the
agent any superset of its target bundle.
A mechanism is normalized if an agent pays 0 when it is not winning. We have an exact
characterization of normalized incentive compatible mechanisms.
Theorem 2.2.18 ([Myerson, 1981]). A normalized mechanism (g;p) is incentive compatible
i
1. For all  i 2  i, i;0
i 2 i;i < 0
i, gi(i; i) 2 

i ) gi(0
i; i) 2 

i. In other
words, if non-winning outcomes are mapped to 0 and winning outcomes are mapped
to 1, then gi(; i) should be monotone.
2. pi(i; i) is dened as
(a) 0 if gi(i; i) = 2 

i,
(b) supf0
i 2 i : gi(0
i; i) = 2 

ig if there exists some 0
i 2 i where gi(0
i; i) = 2 

i,
(c) qi( i) otherwise.
The payment rule part of the Theorem 2.2.18 requires that payments to non-winning
agents are 0 and that we charge winning agents the threshold value at which they start
winning. If an agent always wins when other agents report  i, then we just require that
the payment be some value that does not depend on the agent's report.
Theorem 2.2.18 reduces the problem of nding truthful mechanisms to the problem of
nding monotone outcome rules. Once we have a monotone outcome rule, the payment
rule is pinned down by nding the threshold at which an agent goes from non-winning to
winning. The theorem can be generalized to randomized mechanisms and BIC mechanisms
for single-parameter settings. We refer the interested reader to [Myerson, 1981] or [Hartline
and Karlin, 2007] for more details.
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Cake Cutting
Cutting a cake is often used as a metaphor for allocating a divisible good. The diculty
is not cutting the cake into pieces of equal size, but rather that the cake is not uniformly
tasty: dierent agents prefer dierent parts of the cake, depending, e.g., on whether the
toppings are strawberries or cookies. The goal is to divide the cake in a way that is \fair";
the denition of fairness is a nontrivial issue in itself, which we discuss in the sequel.
The cake cutting problem dates back to the 1940s [Steinhaus, 1948] and for over sixty
years has attracted the attention of mathematicians, economists, and political scientists.
While most of the work in articial intelligence, and computer science in general, has focused
on the allocation of indivisible resources, recent years have seen an increasing interest among
computer scientists in the allocation of divisible resources ([Edmonds and Pruhs, 2006b,a,
Procaccia, 2009, Chen et al., 2010, Zivan et al., 2010, Maya and Nisan, 2012, Kurokawa
et al., 2013, Br^ anzei and Miltersen, 2013, Br^ anzei et al., 2013]).
On the one hand, the allocation of divisible resources is of relevance to multi-agent re-
source allocation [Chevaleyre et al., 2006]. On the other hand, computer science brings an
interesting perspective to the study of cake cutting related to thinking about the compu-
tational complexity of cake cutting and the representation and communication of agents'
valuations. In this chapter, we formally dene the cake cutting problem and the necessary
foundation to understand our contributions to the cake cutting literature.
3.1 Model
We consider a heterogeneous cake, represented by the interval [0;1]. A piece of cake is a
nite union of subintervals of [0;1]. We sometimes abuse this terminology by treating a
piece of cake as the set of the (inclusion-maximal) intervals that it contains. The length
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of the interval I = [x;y], denoted len(I), is y   x. For a piece of cake X we denote
len(X) =
P
I2X len(I).
The set of agents is denoted N = f1;:::;ng. Each agent i 2 N holds a private val-
uation function Vi, which maps given pieces of cake to the value agent i assigns them.
Formally, each agent i has a value density function, vi : [0;1] ! [0;1), that is piecewise
continuous. The function vi characterizes how agent i assigns value to dierent parts of the
cake. The value of a piece of cake X to agent i is then dened as Vi(X) =
R
X vi(x)dx =
P
I2X
R
I vi(x)dx. We note that the valuation functions are additive, i.e. for any two disjoint
pieces X and Y , Vi(X[Y ) = Vi(X)+Vi(Y ), and non-atomic, that is Vi([x;x]) = 0 for every
x 2 [0;1]. The last property implies that we do not have to worry about the boundaries of
intervals, i.e., open and closed intervals are identical for our purposes. While some of the
cake-cutting literature assumes that valuations are absolutely continuous (see e.g., Brams
et al. 2012b), i.e., that if any agent attaches zero value to a portion of the cake, then all
other players do, we do not make this assumption.
The output of a cake cutting algorithm is an allocation A1;:::;An of pieces of cake to
each agent such that pieces Ai are pairwise disjoint. For each i 2 N the piece Ai is allocated
to agent i, and the rest of the cake, i.e., [0;1] n
S
i2N Ai, is thrown away. We assume free
disposal, i.e., it is not necessary for the algorithm to allocate the entire cake and resources
can be thrown away without incurring a cost.
3.2 Fairness
Various notions of fairness have been studied in the literature. Here we introduce the two
most prominent notations: proportionality and envy-freeness. An allocation A1;:::;An is
proportional if for every i 2 N, Vi(Ai)  Vi([0;1])=n, that is, each agent receives at least a
(1=n)-fraction of the cake according to its own valuation. An allocation is envy-free (EF) if
for every i;j 2 N, Vi(Ai)  Vi(Aj), i.e., each agent prefers its own piece of cake to the piece
of cake allocated to any other agent. A proportional (resp., EF) cake cutting algorithm
always returns a proportional (resp., EF) allocation.
Note that when n = 2 proportionality implies envy-freeness. Indeed, Vi(Ai)+Vi(A3 i) 
1, and hence if Vi(Ai)  1=2 then Vi(A3 i)  1=2. Under the free disposal assumption the
converse is not true. For example, an allocation that throws away the entire cake is EF
but not proportional. In general, when n > 2 proportionality neither implies nor is implied
by envy-freeness. If free disposal is not assumed, that is, the entire cake is allocated, then
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envy-freeness implies proportionality for any n.
A third, less commonly studied notion of fairness is equitability (EQ). An allocation is
equitable if Vi(Ai) = Vj(Aj) for all pairs of agents i;j.
3.3 Normalization of Valuations
Throughout our discussion, we assume that agent valuations are normalized so that Vi([0;1]) =
1 for every agent i, i.e., we divide each agents' density function by Vi([0;1]). This assump-
tion is without loss if we are looking at proportional and/or EF allocations. An allocation
is proportional and/or EF for normalized valuations if and only if it is also proportional
and/or EF when valuations are not normalized. Similarly, the assumption is without loss if
we consider notions such as Pareto-eciency. On the other hand, if we consider optimizing
social welfare or the fairness notion of EQ, then normalizing valuations can change the
allocations we consider to be fair or welfare maximal. In Chapter 4, we look at maximizing
social welfare and EQ, so the assumption is not without loss. However, our algorithmic re-
sults extend to the unnormalized case as well, and our impossibilities are only strengthened
by widening the possible valuations. In Chapter 5 and 6, we discuss only fairness criteria
for which the assumption is without loss of generality.
3.4 Models of Interaction
The existence of proportional, EF, and EQ allocations has been well-known since the 1940s
(see Brams and Taylor [1995]). The cake cutting challenge is to come up with procedures
that nd such allocations. Prior work focuses on algorithms that accommodate arbitrarily
complex valuation functions. One of our innovations is advocating the study of cake cutting
under a direct revelation model that restricts consideration to cases when valuation functions
have a succinct representation.
3.4.1 Classic Model
Most of the literature on cake cutting looks for procedures that interact with the agents
and make decisions based on these interactions. Agents' complete valuations are never fully
revealed, but the procedures guarantee that a fair division will be found if agents follow the
procedure truthfully. A discrete cake cutting procedure is a procedure where there are a
discrete number of interactions with the agents, with later interactions possibly conditioned
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on earlier interactions. We are purposely vague about what constitutes an interaction here,
but this will become clearer later in this section. In contrast to a discrete procedure, a
moving knife algorithm allows an impartial referee to move a knife continuously across the
cake, stopping along the way when certain conditions are met (e.g., when an agent's value
for the part to the left of the cake exceeds a certain value). The key dierence is that
moving knives require this continuous maneuver of the knife, and there are some moving
knife procedures that cannot be simulated using a discrete procedure. We survey some of
the classic cake cutting results below.
Cut and Choose
Perhaps the most well-known cake cutting procedure is the Cut and Choose procedure for
two agents. In Cut and Choose, the rst agent cuts the cake at a point a such that it values
[0;a] at 1/2 and [a;1] at 1/2. The second agent chooses the piece that it prefers. This is a
discrete procedure as there are just two steps in the algorithm. It is easy to see that this
procedure is both proportional and EF. For proportionality, both agents receive value at
least 1/2. For EF, agent 1 is indierent between the two pieces and agent 2 receives the
piece it prefers.
Dubins-Spanier and Banach-Knaster
In order to obtain proportionality for n agents, we need a more clever procedure. We
start by examining the moving knife procedure of Dubins and Spanier [1961]. An impartial
referee moves a knife starting from 0 to the right. Whenever the piece to the left of the
knife is worth value 1=n to an agent, the agent shouts `stop' and is given the piece to the
left of the knife. We then restart the procedure with the remaining cake.
This moving knife procedure results in a proportional allocation. It is clear that the
agent that shouts `stop' receives value at least 1=n. The key observation is that for the
remaining agents, the rest of the cake is worth at least value (n   1)=n. We can make an
inductive argument and argue that n 1 agents will yell `stop' (and therefore receive value
exactly 1=n) and that the last agent remaining will have value at least 1=n for the remaining
cake.
While this procedure uses a moving knife, it can be converted to a discrete cake cutting
procedure that does not require an impartial referee to continuously move the knife across
the cake. We can ask each agent to cut a piece starting at 0 and moving right that is worth
value exactly 1=n. We then give the agent with the leftmost cut the piece starting from 0
38CHAPTER 3 CAKE CUTTING
and ending at its cutpoint. We can then repeat the procedure for the rest of the cake. This
is essentially the procedure discovered by Banach and Knaster circa 1944 (see e.g., [Brams
and Taylor, 1996]).
Though this procedure gives a proportional allocation, the allocation may not be EF.
Indeed, though agent 1 receives a piece worth exactly 1=n, there is no guarantee that the
pieces cut by the remaining agents will have value at most 1=n. In the extreme case,
suppose that agent 1 uniformly values [0;1] but the other agents only receive value from
[(n   1)=n;1:0]. Agent 1 will be very envious of the second agent who yells stop since that
agent will receive at least the interval [1=n;(n 1)=n] which is a worth a lot more to agent
1 than [0;1=n] if n > 2. Indeed, nding EF allocations proves to be signicantly more
challenging than nding proportional allocations.
Selfridge-Conway
An EF procedure for three agents was discovered around 1960 independently by John L.
Selfridge and John H. Conway [Brams and Taylor, 1996]. The clever procedure proceeds in
a number of steps. We label the players as 1, 2, and 3.
1. Initial division.
(a) Player 1 cuts the cake into three pieces A;B;C that have equal value from its
perspective.
(b) Player 2 takes the piece that it prefers the most and splits it into two pieces such
that one of the two pieces has the same value as the second most preferred piece.
Wlog assume that the piece preferred most by player 2 is A and the second most
preferred piece is B. Player 2 splits A into A0 and A00 such that V2(A0) = V2(B).
(c) Player 3 chooses the piece it prefers most from among A0;B;C.
(d) If player 3 did not choose A0, player 2 chooses A0. Otherwise, player 2 chooses
its more preferred piece from B;C.
(e) Player 1 is given the remaining piece of A0;B;C.
2. Division of the trimmings (A00).
(a) Either player 2 or player 3 receives A0. Let the player that receives A0 be denoted
by p and the other player by p0.
(b) p0 divides A00 into three equal pieces (according to its valuation).
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(c) p chooses its most preferred piece out of these three.
(d) Player 1 chooses its most preferred piece out of the remaining two pieces.
(e) p0 is allocated the remaining piece.
We now show that this division is indeed EF. First, consider player 1. Player p receives the
trimmed piece A0 along with part of the trimmings A00. Player 1 receives either B or C,
which from its perspective has value equal to A0 [ A00. As a result, player 1 will not envy
player p. Player p0 receives either B or C along with part of A00. But player 1 prefers its
share of A00 to that of player p0 (player 1 goes before player 2 when dividing A00) and views
B and C equally. So player 1 does not envy p0 either.
Consider player 2. Player 2 does not envy anyone after the initial division. If player 2
is p0, then player 2 does not envy anyone when viewing the division of A00 in isolation; after
all, A00 is divided so that the three pieces are equal according to p0. If player 2 is p, then
player 2 also does not envy anyone when viewing the division of A00 in isolation; after all,
player p goes rst in choosing the division of A00. Therefore, player 2 has no envy since it
has no envy after the initial division and no envy for the division of A00 (and valuations are
additive).
Consider player 3. Player 3 also does not envy anyone after the initial division since it
goes rst. Player 3 does not envy the division of A00 based on the same argument as for
player 2. Therefore, player 3 also has no envy.
This procedure is quite clever and seems quite delicately constructed so that the ultimate
division is EF. Indeed, an EF procedure for n > 3 agents is signicantly more complex.
Brams and Taylor
Brams and Taylor [1995] made a breakthrough when they introduced a discrete procedure
that nds an EF allocation for any number of agents in a nite number of steps. We do not
provide a detailed outline of the procedure here (the procedure for just four agents consists
of 20 steps), but the procedure operates by creating EF allocations for a fraction of the cake
(by having the agents trim pieces to introduce ties as in the Selfridge-Conway procedure)
and then recursively handling the leftover parts of the cake. Though the procedure is nite,
it is not bounded. For any number of steps T, there exist some valuations of agents for
which the procedure takes more than T steps to nish. Saberi and Wang [2009] introduce
a moving knife procedure that terminates in a bounded number of steps for 5 agents, but
it is not clear if this procedure can be simulated by some discrete procedure. For n > 5, we
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do not have any bounded EF algorithms that allocate the entire cake. (We can always just
throw away the entire cake if we only insist on envy-freeness but allow some parts of the
cake to be thrown away.)
3.4.2 Complexity of Cake Cutting
While we have informally dened a discrete cake cutting procedure as a procedure that
has a discrete number of steps (in contrast to a moving knife procedure which requires
continuously moving a knife), a natural question to consider is how computationally complex
is it to nd dierent fair allocations. In order to answer this question, we need to be precise
about how we measure complexity.
Robertson and Webb [1998] introduced a concrete model of complexity for cake cutting
algorithms; under their model an algorithm is restricted to making two types of queries: an
evaluation query (whereby the algorithm learns the value of an agent with respect to a given
interval) and a cut query (whereby the algorithm obtains a piece worth a given value to an
agent). Through the queries the algorithm must obtain sucient information to output a
fair allocation. This model is very general and can capture all the well known discrete cake
cutting procedures. For example, the Cut and Choose procedure can be executed by asking
the rst agent to cut a piece, starting at 0 and moving right, that is worth value exactly
1/2. We can then issue an eval query for one of the pieces to the second agent and give the
second agent the piece that is worth at least 1/2.
Under the Robertson and Webb model, proportional cake cutting is well understood.
Even and Paz [1984] provide a divide-and-conquer procedure that uses O(nlogn) queries,
and lower bound of 
(nlogn) was established by Edmonds and Pruhs [2006a]. On the
other hand, there remains a large gap in the understanding of EF procedures. Procaccia
[2009] establishes a lower bound of 
(n2), but as mentioned above, there are no bounded
procedures known for n > 5 agents. Recently, Kurokawa et al. [2013] showed that the
diculty of nding bounded procedures persists even if we consider the restricted family of
piecewise uniform valuations (introduced below in Section 3.5) as any bounded procedure
for piecewise uniform valuations would imply a bounded procedure for general valuations.
3.4.3 Direct Revelation Model
In this disseration, we depart from Robertson and Webb model and instead assume that
the agents report their full valuation functions to the algorithm. In order for this to be
reasonable, we restrict agents' valuations to families that allow for succinct representations.
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(a) Value density function for a piecewise
constant valuation that is not piecewise
uniform.
0 0.5 1
0
1
2
(b) Value density function for a piecewise
uniform valuation.
Figure 3.1: An illustration of special value density functions.
We discuss these families of valuation functions in the next section.
A side eect of work in the direct revelation model is that our algorithms are centralized
whereas many of the classic algorithms can be implemented in a decentralized way (e.g.,
Cut and Choose). In particular, an interesting question that we leave to future work is
whether the algorithms we present can be eciently implemented via evaluation and cut
queries.
3.5 Families of Valuation Functions
A valuation function Vi is piecewise linear if its corresponding value density function vi
is piecewise linear, that is [0;1] can be partitioned into a nite number of intervals such
that vi is linear on each interval. Similarly, a valuation function Vi is piecewise constant
if its corresponding value density function vi is piecewise constant (see Figure 3.1(a)). A
valuation function Vi is piecewise uniform if moreover vi is either some constant c 2 R+
(the same one across intervals) or zero. See Figure 3.1(b) for an illustration.
Piecewise uniform valuation functions imply that each agent i 2 N is uniformly inter-
ested in a nite union of intervals, which we call its reference piece of cake and denote by Ui.
For example, in Figure 3.1(b), Ui = [0;0:25] [ [0:6;0:85]. Given a piece of cake X, it holds
that Vi(X) = len(X \ Ui)=len(Ui). Though simple, piecewise uniform valuations capture
some natural settings. As an example, suppose that the cake represents access time to a
backup server. Each agent is equally interested in time intervals when its computer is idle
or when it is not modifying its data.
Piecewise constant and piecewise linear valuation functions are signicantly more general
than piecewise uniform valuations. Though they can both be succinctly communicated (see
the next section), they can both approximate general valuations by using a large number of
intervals and selecting a constant or linear density on each interval that approximates the
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general value density function.
3.5.1 Computational Complexity
In the sequel, we will discuss various cake cutting algorithms under the direct revelation
model and for dierent families of valuation functions. We are not operating in the Robert-
son and Webb model, so it will not make sense to measure complexity by the number of
queries we make to the agents. Instead, we would like the algorithm that computes the
allocation based on agents' reported preferences to take time that is polynomial in the size
of the input representation. Therefore, in order to discuss computational complexity (and
how computation time scales with the size of the input), we need to clearly dene the size
of the input to the algorithm.
In all cases, the size of the input is the number of bits needed to specify the agents' pref-
erences. For piecewise uniform valuations, this involves telling the algorithm the endpoints
of the desired intervals. For piecewise constant valuations, this involves communicating the
endpoints of the desired intervals as well as the value of the density function on each of
these intervals. For piecewise linear valuations, this involves communicating the endpoints
of the desired intervals as well as the slope and intercept of the density on each of these
intervals. We assume that the endpoints of intervals as well as any slopes or intercepts can
be expressed using k-bit rationals (i.e., a=b where a and b are both k-bit integers). We seek
algorithms that run in time polynomial in k.
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Welfare Maximization and Cake
Cutting
The classic literature on cake cutting focuses on nding fair allocations. However, depending
on the fairness criterion and agents' valuations, there may by multiple fair allocations. A
natural way to choose a single allocation from a set of fair allocations is to consider the
social welfare of dierent fair allocations. In this chapter, we provide algorithms for nding
welfare-maximizing fair allocations and discuss properties of these allocations.
4.1 Preliminaries
We dene the social welfare or eciency of an allocation A = (A1;:::;An), which we denote
e(A), as the sum of agent values for the pieces they are given, i.e.,
e(A) =
n X
i=1
Vi(Xi):
An allocation A is maxsum among a set of possible allocations S if e(A) = maxA02S e(A0).
An allocation A is ecient if it is maxsum among all possible allocations. We will be in-
terested in looking at maxsum fair allocations, where S is a set of fair allocations (either
proportional, EF, EQ, or combinations of the three). We append the notion of fairness to
maxsum when we have a specic notion of fairness in mind. For instance, a maxsum EF
allocation refers to an allocation that has maximal social welfare among all EF allocations.
As we note in Section 3.3, we assume throughout this chapter that agent values are
normalized so that Vi([0;1]) = 1 for every agent i. Since we are discussing maximizing
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social welfare, this assumption is not without loss. We discuss in Sections 4.2.5 and 4.3.3
why our results do not crucially depend on this assumption. Even if normalization were
required, we could consider a setting where agents' utilities are relative and depend on the
fraction of their total perceived value for the good they end up receiving.
We assume a direct revelation model as discussed in Section 3.4.3. In this model, agents
report their valuations V1;:::;Vn to the algorithm (by reporting their value density functions
v1;:::;vn, and the algorithm makes an allocation based on these reports. These reports
reports may dier from the agent's true valuations. We do not consider truthfulness in this
chapter, so our algorithms and results can be thought to compute maxsum fair allocations
with respect to reported valuations, or one can assume agents are truthful. We ignore
this distinction in the sequel and adopt value Vi and value density vi in describing our
algorithms.
4.2 Computing Welfare Maximizing Fair Allocations
In this section, we consider the problem of giving tractable algorithms for computing a
maxsum fair allocation. Our notion of tractability is that our algorithms run in time
polynomial in the number of bits needed to communicate the agents' value density functions.
We focus specically on maxsum EF allocations, but we will point our where our methods
can be easily adapted to other notions of fairness Section 4.2.5. Our goal in this section is
therefore:
Given the value density functions, tractably compute a maxsum EF allocation.
In some cases we relax this goal, asking only for approximate eciency, approximate envy-
freeness, or both.
Our presentation of the results progresses through three levels of generality in terms of
the supported valuation functions. In Section 4.2.2 we assume that the valuation functions
are piecewise constant. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that computes maxsum EF
allocations via a simple linear programming approach.
In Section 4.2.3 we deal with piecewise linear valuations, a rather general class of val-
uation functions that strictly contains the class of piecewise constant valuations. We rst
provide an algorithm that singles out a maxsum EF allocation for the case of two agents.
Unfortunately, we show that in this setting, and even with two agents, no tractable algorithm
exists, as in some instances any maxsum EF allocation must be specied using irrational
45CHAPTER 4 WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AND CAKE CUTTING
numbers. We therefore leverage our (intractable) algorithm to produce a tractable algo-
rithm that computes approximately EF allocations for two agents that are as ecient as
any maxsum EF allocation. The algorithm runs in time polynomial in log1=, where 
species the amount of envy permitted. Technically, this is facilitated by a delicate search
procedure, which in particular employs a technique of Papadimitriou [1979] for searching
over rational numbers.
Section 4.2.4 deals with general valuation functions and any number of agents. We
design a tractable algorithm that computes approximately maxsum, approximately EF
allocations by approximating the given valuation functions by piecewise constant functions
and employing the results of Section 4.2.2. Our algorithm runs in time polynomial in
1=, where  species the deviation from optimality as well as the amount of envy that is
permitted.
4.2.1 Related Work
Caragiannis et al. [2009] present a framework for quantifying the eciency loss due to fair-
ness requirements, including envy-freeness, under general valuation functions. Their price
of envy-freeness is the worst-case ratio between the total utility under an (unconstrained)
maxsum allocation, and the total utility under a maxsum EF allocation. Caragiannis et al.
provide a lower bound of 
(
p
n) and a weak upper bound of O(n) on the price of envy-
freeness, where n is the number of agents. Note that an upper bound singles out in every
instance (set of valuation functions) an allocation that achieves a certain ratio (O(n) in this
case), but makes no claim as to whether the allocation is optimal in terms of social welfare.
Reijnierse and Potters [1998] design a clever but complex algorithm that computes a
Pareto-ecient EF allocation, i.e., an EF allocation such that no other allocation (including
non-EF allocations) is at least as good for all the agents and better for at least one agent,
when agents hold piecewise constant valuations. The core of their algorithm involves map-
ping the cake cutting problem for piecewise constant valuations to a linear Fisher market.
A linear Fisher market is a setting where there is a set of divisible items, and an agent's
value for an item is linear in the amount of the item they receive and additive across items.
The subintervals on which all agents' value densities are constant are mapped to items in
the Fisher market, and each agent is endowed with the same xed budget. A Walrasian
equilibrium in this market (prices for items such that the market clears, agents spend their
budgets, and agents only purchase items with maximal utility to price ratio) turns out
to correspond to a Pareto-ecient EF allocation. Such an equilibrium can be computed
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approximately using the Eisenberg-Gale convex program [Eisenberg and Gale, 1959] or ex-
actly using methods developed by Devanur et al. [2002]. The main contrast with our work
is that we focus on nding maxsum EF allocations. It is easy to see that Pareto-ecient
EF allocations may not be maxsum EF. Consider a simple case where agent 1 uniformly
wants [0;0:5] and agent 2 uniformly likes the entire cake [0;1]. Giving [0;0:25] to agent 1
and [0:25;1:0] to agent 2 is EF and Pareto-ecient, but it is not maxsum EF. Indeed, we
can increase the total value obtained by giving [0;0:5] and [0:5;1:0] to agent 2. On the other
hand, we show in the next section (see Theorem 4.3.7) that even when agents have piece-
wise constant valuations, maxsum EF allocations may not be Pareto-ecient. Therefore,
our work examines a dierent question than this earlier work.
Reijnierse and Potters ultimately use their algorithm to compute approximately Pareto-
ecient EF allocations under general valuations; our approximation approach for general
valuations, presented in Section 4.2.4, is inspired by theirs.
Zivan et al. [2010] present a way to nd Pareto-ecient EF allocations that reduce
untruthful manipulations, also assuming agents hold piecewise constant valuations. As
discussed, maxsum EF allocation are dierent than Pareto-ecient EF allocations. Addi-
tionally, we do not examine strategic issues in this paper.
Nuchia and Sen [2001] provide a procedure which starts from an externally given EF
allocation and improves its eciency while maintaining envy-freeness. However, this proce-
dure is not guaranteed to produce an maxsum EF allocation. In Section 4.2.3 we do provide
such a guarantee by starting from an ecient allocation and improving its envy-freeness.
For general valuations, computing EF allocations is notoriously dicult (see, e.g., Pro-
caccia [2009]). However, there is a known approach for computing -EF allocations via
Sperner's Lemma [Su, 1999]. If one is only interested in approximate envy-freeness, our
approach is comparably simple, but signicantly more general as it makes it possible to also
optimize social welfare.
4.2.2 Piecewise Constant Valuations
We rst consider algorithms for computing maxsum EF allocations for piecewise constant
valuations (see Section 3.5). Though these valuations functions are restrictive, they model
certain real settings and these results are leveraged in Section 4.2.4 to address general
valuations.
The main result of this section is a simple polynomial-time algorithm for nding a
maxsum EF allocation when agents have piecewise constant valuations. As discussed in
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Algorithm 1
1. Mark the boundaries of the reported intervals of all agents, as well as 0 and 1.
2. Let J be the set of subintervals of [0;1] formed by consecutive marks.
3. Solve the following linear program:
max
n X
i=1
X
I2J
xiIVi(I) (4.1)
s.t.
n X
i=1
xiI  1 8I 2 J (4.2)
X
I2J
xiIVi(I) 
X
I2J
xjIVi(I) 8i;j 2 N (4.3)
xiI  0 8i 2 N;I 2 J (4.4)
4. Return an allocation which for all i 2 N and I 2 J allocates an xiI fraction of
subinterval I to agent i.
Section 3.5.1, we assume that the endpoints are agents' desired intervals are k-bit rationals
and that their value density functions take on values that are k-bit rationals.
Our procedure for nding a maxsum EF allocation is formally given as Algorithm 1.
Step 1 of the algorithm is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The linear program (LP) in Step 3 has
variables xiI for each i 2 N and I 2 J (where J is dened in Step 2), which represent the
fraction of interval I given to agent i. Crucially, the value density functions of all agents
are constant on each interval I 2 J, hence the value of each agent i 2 N for a fraction xiI
of interval I is xiIVi(I), and the agent's value for its piece is
P
I2J xiIVi(I). The objective
function (4.1) then simply gives the social welfare of the allocation. The rst constraint (4.2)
ensures that the allocation of each interval in J is valid, while the second constraint (4.3)
is the envy-freeness constraint. We have the following result.
Theorem 4.2.1. Assume that there are n agents with piecewise constant valuation func-
tions. Then Algorithm 1 computes a maxsum EF allocation in polynomial time.
Interestingly, setting the variables xiI to 1=n for every i 2 N and I 2 J|allocating to
each agent a 1=n-fraction of each interval in J|produces an allocation where Vi(Xj) = 1=n
for every i;j 2 N; we call the partition X1;:::;Xn with this property a perfect partition.
The allocation induced by a perfect partition is in particular EF. So, under piecewise con-
stant valuation functions nding an EF allocation is trivial, and computing a maxsum EF
allocation only slightly less so.
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Figure 4.1: An illustration of piecewise contant value density functions, where n = 2 and
the area under the density function of agent 1 (resp., agent 2) is lled with horizontal
(resp., vertical) lines. Marks made by Algorithm 1 are represented by white circles on the
horizontal axis. Note that both value density functions are constant between every pair of
consecutive marks.
4.2.3 Piecewise Linear Valuations
Piecewise linear valuation functions oer added expressiveness, yet can still be concisely
represented. As discussed in Section 3.5.1, the agent can specify the endpoints of the
intervals on which its value density function is linear, and then for each interval can provide
the slope and intercept of the value density function on that interval.
While Algorithm 1 exactly solves the piecewise constant case, it is not directly general-
izable to the piecewise linear case. The algorithm relies on the fact that we can split [0;1]
into a nite number of intervals on which agent value densities were constant. This allows
us to focus only on the fraction of each interval given to each agent rather than the specic
part of the interval. With piecewise linear valuations, it is not longer possible to split [0;1]
into a nite number of intervals on which value densities are constant.
The main result of this section is an algorithm that nds a maxsum EF allocation
for two agents when valuations are piecewise linear. Envy-freeness and proportionality
are equivalent in the case of two agents if the entire cake is allocated, so the algorithm
equivalently nds a maxsum proportional allocation. We rst outline an abstract algorithm
for handling these valuation functions. We then prove an impossibility result that an exact
implementation of this abstract algorithm is intractable. We conclude by sketching an
approximate implementation of the algorithm. An algorithm for any number of agents is
left open.
An abstract algorithm
At a high level, the algorithm starts with a maxsum (not necessarily EF) allocation, and
transfers pieces to the envious agent until the agent is no longer envious. The crux of the
procedure lies in the choice of which pieces are given to the envious agent. A key notion
49CHAPTER 4 WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AND CAKE CUTTING
Algorithm 2
1. If V1(Y12)  1=2 and V2(Y21)  1=2, give agent 1 Y1>2, agent 2 Y2>1.
(a) If V1(Y1>2)  1=2, give Y1=2 to agent 2.
(b) Otherwise, divide Y1=2 so that agent 1 receives value exactly 1/2.
2. Without loss of generality, assume V1(Y12) < 1=2. Give Y12 to agent 1. Let r be
the maximal r such that V1(Y12 [ YR1r)  1=2. Give Y>r to agent 1, and divide
Y=r so that agent 1 receives exactly value 1/2.
will be that of the ratio between the density functions of agent 1 and agent 2.
Denition 4.2.2. For x 2 [0;1] where v2(x) 6= 0, the value ratio at x for agent 1 is
R1(x) = v1(x)=v2(x). For x 2 [0;1] where v1(x) 6= 0, the value ratio at x for agent 2 is
R2(x) = v2(x)=v1(x).
Notationally, dene the sets
Yi op j = fx 2 [0;1] : vi(x) op vj(x)g (4.5)
YR1op r = fx : v1(x)  v2(x);v2(x) > 0;R1(x) op rg (4.6)
YR2op r = fx : v2(x)  v1(x);v1(x) > 0;R2(x) op rg (4.7)
where i;j 2 f1;2g and op 2 f>;;=g. For instance, Y12 = fx 2 [0;1] : v1(x)  v2(x)g
and YR1>r = fx 2 [0;1] : v1(x)  v2(x);v2(x) > 0;R1(x) > rg.
Using these notations we can present our algorithm, given as Algorithm 2. In the rest
of this subsection we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.3. Assume that there are two agents with piecewise linear valuations. Algo-
rithm 2 nds a maxsum EF allocation.
Before proving Theorem 4.2.3, we establish a few useful lemmas.
Lemma 4.2.4. Suppose that agent i 2 f1;2g receives a piece of cake Xi, with Vi(Xi)  1=2.
Agent i will not envy the other agent.
Proof. By additivity, Vi(Xi)+Vi([0;1]nXi) = 1. The proposition follows by observing that
the other agent receives at most [0;1] n Xi if agent i receives Xi.
Lemma 4.2.5. In any maxsum EF allocation, all intervals desired by at least one agent
are allocated (i.e., desired intervals are not discarded).
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Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there is some maxsum EF allocation X1;X2 that
does not allocate an interval I where v1(I) > 0 or v2(I) > 0. We can augment X1;X2
with an allocation of I that maintains envy-freeness while improving eciency. Indeed,
assume without loss of generality that there exists on I where v1(I) > 0. Divide I into
two subintervals I0;I00 such that V1(I0) = V1(I00). Allocate to agent 2 the subinterval with
higher value according to V2, and give the remaining subinterval to agent 1. Social welfare is
improved because agent 1 receives strictly greater value and agent 2 receives weakly greater
value. Envy-freeness is maintained since agent 1 is indierent between the two pieces, and
agent 2 prefers the additional piece it receives.
The following is a simple consequence of this observation.
Lemma 4.2.6. In any maxsum EF allocation, V1(X1)  1=2 and V2(X2)  1=2.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2.5, all desired intervals are allocated to one of the agents, so for
i 2 f1;2g, Vi(X1) + Vi(X2) = 1, and envy-freeness requires that Vi(Xi)  1=2.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.2.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.3. Consider each of the cases specied by Algorithm 2.
Case 1: V1(Y12)  1=2;V2(Y21)  1=2. Algorithm 2 allocates Y1>2 to agent 1 and Y2>1
to agent 2. The allocation made by Algorithm 2 is always ecient, since the agent who
strictly prefers an interval always receives it. What is left to be shown is that the allocation
is EF.
Case 1(a): V1(Y1>2)  1=2. Algorithm 2 gives Y1=2 to agent 2. V2(Y21)  1=2 by
assumption. Both agents have value at least 1/2, and by Lemma 4.2.4 are not envious.
Case 1(b): V1(Y1>2) < 1=2. Algorithm 2 splits Y1=2 so that agent 1 receives value exactly
1/2 after adding in Y1>2. This must be possible since V1(Y12)  1=2. Agent 1 is not
envious by Lemma 4.2.4. Let X2 be the piece given to agent 2 (the remaining portion of Y1=2
along with Y2>1). Algorithm 2 allocates the entire interval, so by additivity, V1(X2) = 1=2.
However, the piece X2 consists only of intervals where v2(x)  v1(x), so V2(X2)  V1(X2) =
1=2.
Case 2: V1(Y12) < 1=2. First, note that Algorithm 2 nds an EF allocation X1;X2.
Indeed, as before, agent 1 is not envious as V1(X1) = 1=2. Since agent 2 is given all the
intervals not given to agent 1, V1(X2) = 1=2. The piece X2 consists only of intervals where
v2(x) > v1(x), so V2(X2)  V1(X2) = 1=2.
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Because V1(Y12) < 1=2, envy-freeness requires us to sacrice eciency since we need
to give agent 1 some intervals that are strictly preferred by agent 2. To show that X1;X2
is a maxsum EF allocation, let X0
1;X0
2 be any maxsum EF allocation. Dene the following
three pieces of cake:
A = X1 \ X0
1 \ Y2>1;
B = (X1 n X0
1) \ Y2>1;
C = (X0
1 n X1) \ Y2>1:
A gives the intervals where both allocations lose eciency due to giving pieces preferred
by agent 2 to agent 1. B gives the intervals where X1;X2 loses eciency, and C gives the
intervals where X0
1;X0
2 loses eciency.
Let V1(Y12) = 1=2   ; > 0. Note that A \ B = ;;A \ C = ;, and A [ B =
X1 \ Y2>1;A [ C = X0
1 \ Y2>1. Algorithm 2 gives agent 1 exactly value 1/2 yielding:5
V1(A) + V1(B) =
Z
A
v1(x)dx +
Z
B
v1(x)dx = : (4.8)
Similarly, Lemma 4.2.6 says that since X0
1;X0
2 is a maxsum EF allocation, agent 1 must
receive value at least  from its allocation of Y2>1:
V1(A) + V1(C) =
Z
A
v1(x)dx +
Z
C
v1(x)dx  : (4.9)
Combining (4.8) and (4.9) yields
Z
C
v1(x)dx  
Z
B
v1(x)dx  0: (4.10)
Let `(X1;X2) denote the dierence between the eciency of a maxsum allocation (not
necessarily EF) and the eciency of X1;X2.
`(X1;X2) =
Z
A
(v2(x)   v1(x))dx +
Z
B
(v2(x)   v1(x))dx
`(X0
1;X0
2) 
Z
A
(v2(x)   v1(x))dx +
Z
C
(v2(x)   v1(x))dx
The loss for X0
1;X0
2 is an inequality because while Algorithm 2 gives all of Y1>2 to agent 1,
X0
1;X0
2 need not and may lose eciency from those intervals as well.
5We slightly abuse notation and take the integral over A;B;C to signify the sum of integrals over inclusion-
maximal subintervals of A;B;C respectively.
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To complete the proof, recall how Algorithm 2 constructs X1. Let r be the value
computed in Step 2 of Algorithm 2. By denition of Algorithm 2, X1 \ Y2>1 consists of all
points with R1(x) > r and some or all of the points with R1(x) = r. Therefore, if x 2 B
then R1(x)  r, and if x 2 C then R1(x)  r. We conclude that
`(X0
1;X0
2)   `(X1;X2)

Z
C
(v2(x)   v1(x))dx  
Z
B
(v2(x)   v1(x))dx
=
Z
C

v1(x)
R1(x)
  v1(x)

dx  
Z
B

v1(x)
R1(x)
  v1(x)

dx


1
r   1
Z
C
v1(x)dx  
Z
B
v1(x)dx

 0;
where the last inequality follows from (4.10).
Interestingly, Algorithm 2 does not make specic use of the assumption that valuations
are piecewise linear. In theory, it can be applied to more general classes of valuation
functions, provided that the sets Y1>2;Y1=2;Y2>1;Yr correspond to legal pieces of cake.
However, we do use the piecewise linear assumption in the next subsection.
Implementing Algorithm 2
To discuss implementation details, we need to be careful about how we represent the input
to our algorithm. As discussed in Section 3.5.1, we assume that the input to our algorithm
consists of the endpoints of agents' desired intervals and the slopes and intercepts of their
density functions on each of these intervals. We assume that the endpoints, slopes, and
intercepts can be specied with k-bit rationals. Since slopes and intercepts can be negative,
in this section we take k-bit rationals to include numbers of the form  a=b where a;b are
k-bit rationals.
While it is tempting to apply Algorithm 2 to produce a maxsum EF allocation, there
is a barrier to this approach. Even when the inputs are k-bit rational numbers, the r
dened in Step 2 of Algorithm 2 and the boundaries of the resulting allocation may be
irrational. In fact, this limitation is not specic to Algorithm 2. There are cases where the
allocation computed by Algorithm 2 is the unique maxsum EF allocation and has irrational
boundaries.
Theorem 4.2.7. There exist piecewise linear valuations whose interval boundaries, slopes,
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and intercepts are all rational numbers yet whose maxsum EF allocations can only be spec-
ied with irrational numbers.
Proof. Suppose agent 2 has value density function v2(x) = 2x over the entire interval [0;1]
and agent 1 has value density function
v1(x) =
8
> <
> :
1
2 if 0  x  1
4
32x+1
18 if 1
4 < x  1
(4.11)
The rst step of Algorithm 2 will give [0;1=4] to agent 1 and [1=4;1] to agent 2 since agent
1 has higher density on [0;1=4] and agent 2 has higher density on [1=4;1]. At this point,
agent 1 will be envious of agent 2, having only value (1=2)(1=4) = 1=8 for its piece (and
therefore value 7=8 for agent 2's piece).
The next step of Algorithm 2 takes parts of [1=4;1] from agent 2 and gives them to
agent 1 until agent 1 obtains value exactly 1/2. In particular, the algorithm allocates some
interval of the form [1=4;a] to agent 1 since R1(x) is decreasing on [1=4;1]. For agent 1
to obtain value exactly 1/2, the piece [1=4;a] must be worth exactly 3/8 to agent 1 (since
[0;1=4] is worth exactly 1=8). Thus, a will satisfy
Z a
1
4
v1(x)dx =
3
8
:
Solving this equation, we nd that a is given by
a =
 1 + 3
p
57
32
:
Therefore, the maxsum EF allocation computed by Algorithm 2 has irrational boundaries
and we cannot hope to specify it with a nite number of bits. To nish the proof, note
that in this example, there are no ties or places where we can specify multiple dierent
allocations as R1(x) is strictly increasing on [1=4;1]. We can therefore argue that the
allocation produced by Algorithm 2 is the unique maxsum EF allocation since any other
allocation would result in transfers of intervals with lower R1(x) from agent 2 to agent 1,
leading to more eciency loss (using similar arguments as the proof of Theorem 4.2.3. As a
result, we cannot get around the problem of irrational boundaries by selecting a particular
maxsum EF allocation.
As a result, it is necessary to resort to approximation. Indeed, we relax envy-freeness
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by considering approximately EF allocations. Specically, an allocation is -EF if for all
i;j 2 N, Vi(Xi)  Vi(Xj)  (see, e.g., Lipton et al. [2004]). The following theorem formally
presents our approximation guarantees.
Theorem 4.2.8. Assume that there are two agents with piecewise linear valuations. For
any  > 0 there is an algorithm that runs in time polynomial in the input and log(1=), and
nds an -EF allocation A0 such that e(A0)  e(A), where A is a maxsum EF allocation.
Proof (Sketch). The full proof is deferred to the appendix of this chapter, but we give a
brief sketch here. In the case considered in Step 1 of Algorithm 2, we would like to nd a
point x such that
V1(([0;x] \ Y1=2) [ Y1>2) = 1=2:
Using binary search over [0;1], we nd a point x that is smaller but very close to x. It
is then possible to bound the envy, while the resulting allocation is at least as ecient as
any maxsum EF allocation. In Step 2 of Algorithm 2, we need to search for a ratio r close
to r. This is more subtle, because very small dierences in jr   rj can lead to signicant
dierences in the derived value when there is a long interval with constant value ratio.
Fortunately, in this problematic case it can be shown that r is a rational, and hence it is
sucient to nd the rational r closest to r. This can be done using a delicate search over
rationals, via techniques due to Papadimitriou [1979].
4.2.4 General Valuations
In this section we give a method for handling general valuation functions (under some mild
conditions) and for any number of agents. We approximate general valuation functions with
piecewise constant valuations and leverage Algorithm 1. We construct an allocation that is
-EF and whose eciency is within  of any maxsum EF allocation.
Lemma 4.2.9. Given  > 0 and value density functions v1;:::;vn, suppose that v0
1;:::;v0
n
are piecewise constant value density functions such that for all i 2 N,
vi(x)  v0
i(x)  vi(x) + =2: (4.12)
Let A = (X1;:::;Xn) be a maxsum EF allocation with respect to valuations Vi (induced by
vi), and let A0 = (X0
1;:::;X0
n) be a maxsum =2-EF allocation with respect to valuations V 0
i
(induced by v0
i). Then A0 is -EF and e(A0)  e(A)   =2.
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Proof. To show that A0 is -EF with respect to V1;:::;Vn, let i;j 2 N, and note that A0
is =2-EF with respect to V 0
i , so V 0
i (X0
i)  V 0
i (X0
j)   =2. Thus, using (4.12), Vi(X0
i) 
V 0
i (X0
i)   =2  V 0
i (X0
j)     Vi(X0
j)   .
For the second part of the lemma, we rst claim that
n X
i=1
V 0
i (X0
i) 
n X
i=1
V 0
i (Xi): (4.13)
To prove this, it is sucient to show that A is =2-EF with respect to V 0
1;:::;V 0
n, as A0
represents the maxsum =2-EF allocation with respect to V 0
1;:::;V 0
n (so A cannot possibly
provide more welfare). Indeed, A is EF with respect to V1;:::;Vn, and hence
V 0
i (Xi)  Vi(Xi)  Vi(Xj)  V 0
i (Xj)   =2:
Next, it holds that
n X
i=1
Vi(X0
i) =
n X
i=1
Z
X0
i
vi(x)dx

n X
i=1
Z
X0
i
(v0
i(x)   =2)dx
=
 
n X
i=1
Z
X0
i
v0
i(x)dx
!
  =2
=
 
n X
i=1
V 0
i (X0
i)
!
  =2:
(4.14)
Now, the assertion that e(A0) =
Pn
i=1 Vi(X0
i)  (
Pn
i=1 Vi(Xi)) =2 = e(A) =2 directly
follows by combining Equations (4.13), (4.14), and (4.12).
Given piecewise constant value density functions v0
1;:::;v0
n that satisfy (4.12), it is easy
to nd a maxsum =2-EF allocation A0 by applying Algorithm 1 to these valuations, where
the envy-freeness constraint (4.3) is relaxed by =2.
To nd v0
1;:::;v0
n that satisfy (4.12), we assume that v1;:::;vn are K-Lipschitz, i.e., for
all x;y 2 [0;1],
jvi(x)   vi(y)j  K  jx   yj:
Now, split [0;1] into d4K=e intervals of size at most =(4K). Let S = fk=2p : k 2 [0;M2p]g,
where M is an upper bound on vi(x) for all i 2 N and x 2 [0;1], and p will be specied later.
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For each interval I and agent i, let v(I) = maxx2I vi(x). For all x 2 I let v0
i(x) = s(I),
where s(I) = minfs 2 S : s  v(I)g.
The K-Lipschitz condition ensures that the density function varies by at most =4 on
each interval. If we take p = d2 + log(1=)e, then s(I)   v(I)  =4, and v0
i satises
condition 4.12.
While the K-Lipschitz condition rules out valuation density functions with discontinu-
ities, our results extend to valuation density functions with a nite number of discontinuities
that are K-Lipschitz on each continuous subinterval. In particular, we can use the described
procedure separately on each continuous subinterval to nd v0
i that satisfy (4.12). We have
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.10. Assume that there are n agents with value density functions v1;:::;vn
that have a nite number of discontinuities, are K-Lipschitz on each continuous subinterval,
and have maximum value M. For any  > 0, there is an algorithm that runs in time
polynomial in n;logM;K;1= and computes an -EF allocation whose eciency is within 
of any maxsum EF allocation.
4.2.5 Discussion
Normalization
Though we assume normalization for ease of exposition, the results in this section extend
naturally to unnormalized valuations. With unnormalized valuations, we let each agent have
a dierent value for the entire cake [0;1]. For piecewise constant valuations (Section 4.2.2),
the LP still returns the maxsum EF allocation even if agent valuations are not normalized.
For piecewise linear valuations and two agents (Section 4.2.3), the intuition of trying to
swap intervals with high ratios before intervals with smaller ratios still applies when agent
valuations are not normalized. The dierence is that the cases need to be separated based
on whether agent values are at least Vi([0;1])=2 instead of 1=2. For approximating general
valuations, the same techniques apply when agent valuations are not normalized. We rst
approximate the valuations with piecewise constant valuations. Then we nd a maxsum
=2-EF allocation using the LP for piecewise constant valuations. Then we argue that
this allocation is approximately EF with respect to the true valuations and approximately
maximizes social welfare.
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Comparison of Section 4.2.3 with Theorem 4.2.10
Given the rather strong Theorem 4.2.10, one may wonder in what way the results of Sec-
tion 4.2.3 are superior. In fact, for the (interesting, we believe) case of two agents with
piecewise linear valuations, the method of Section 4.2.3 has two technical advantages. First,
it produces an -EF allocation that is as ecient as the maxsum EF allocation. Second,
Theorem 4.2.8 provides running time that is polynomial in the representation and therefore
logarithmic in the slope of the valuation functions, as the slope is specied by O(k)-bit
rationals. In contrast, the running time in Theorem 4.2.10 is polynomial in the slope (since
the maximum slope determines the Lipschitz constant), and hence exponential in the rep-
resentation. Finally, note that piecewise linear (rather than constant) valuation functions
can in theory be used to approximate general valuations, making it possible to relax the
assumptions of Theorem 4.2.10 (when there are only two agents).
Proportionality
Envy-freeness can be replaced with the weaker notion of proportionality in all of our results.
The purpose of our focus on envy-freeness is to simplify the exposition. As mentioned in
Section 3.2, any EF allocation is proportional, and for the case of two agents the two
notions coincide. Using the last observation, the results of Section 4.2.3 immediately hold
for proportionality. The results of Section 4.2.2 can easily be adapted by modifying (4.3).
This can then be used to obtain results similar to Section 4.2.4.
Direct Revelation
We have assumed a direct revelation model of cake cutting throughout this section. Of
course, in Section 4.2.4, which deals with general valuations, we cannot adopt this model.
However, notice that Theorem 4.2.10 merely requires nding values that are close to vi(x)
for a polynomial number of points x 2 [0;1]; an implicit, reasonable assumption is that the
valuation information at these points can be elicited from agents.
4.3 Properties of Maxsum Fair Allocations
Intuitively, a maxsum fair allocation is superior to an arbitrary fair allocation, for any
fairness criterion. Nevertheless, we do not know how good maxsum fair allocations are; can
one argue that they are truly more desirable than other allocations? Moreover, there are
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several notions of fairness to choose from; under which notion should one optimize social
welfare?
In this section, we consider dierent maxsum fair allocations. In particular, we focus on
maxsum EF, EQ and (EF and EQ) allocations. Specically, we ask whether these allocations
are Pareto-ecient (PE) among the set of all possible allocations. We then consider the
question of whether we can say anything of the social welfare of these dierent allocations.
We do not consider maxsum proportional allocations, as they are not interesting from the
perspective of Pareto-eciency. Indeed, it is easy to see that any maxsum proportional
allocation must be Pareto-ecient among all allocations. If not, we could make all agents
weakly better o, increasing social welfare while preserving proportionality.
We rst observe that, if there are only two agents, PE is guaranteed for maxsum EF allo-
cations, maxsum EQ allocations, and even maxsum EF and EQ allocations (i.e., allocations
that are maxsum among allocations that are both EF and EQ).
Our other results are more subtle and hinge on the structure of agents' valuation func-
tions. We consider the special case of piecewise uniform valuations and piecewise constant
valuations. We show that under piecewise uniform valuations, maxsum EF allocations are
always PE whereas there are cases where all maxsum EQ and maxsum EF+EQ allocations
are not PE. Under piecewise constant valuations, there are examples with three agents such
that all maxsum EF allocations are also not PE.
We then move onto comparing the social welfare under maxsum EF and maxsum EQ
allocations. We show that under piecewise linear valuations the social welfare of a maxsum
EF allocation is at least as great as the social welfare of a maxsum EQ allocation. We also
extend this result to general valuation functions albeit only approximately, in that (i) we
optimize among allocations that are EF up to , and (ii) the inequality holds up to .
4.3.1 Pareto Eciency of Maxsum Allocations
In this section, we study the Pareto eciency of maxsum allocations. In particular, we
establish the Pareto eciency of maxsum EF, EQ, and EF+EQ allocations in the case of
two agents and general valuations, and complement this result by showing that for three
agents or more, these allocations are not necessarily Pareto ecient.
Two Agents, General Valuations
The two-agent case has special signicance (for example, in the context of divorce settle-
ments), so we give special consideration to this case.
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Theorem 4.3.1. For general valuations and two agents, every maxsum EF, EQ, or EF+EQ
allocation is PE.
Before proving Theorem 4.3.1, we introduce the notion of ratio-based allocations for
the two-agent setting. Ratio-based allocations generalize the type of allocation produced
by Algorithm 2 in Section 4.2.3. We adopt the same notation for Ri, Yi op j, and YRi op r
introduced in that section. In addition, we let Y1 and Y2 denote the intervals on which only
agent 1's density is positive and only agent 2's density is positive respectively.
Denition 4.3.2. An allocation A = (A1;A2) is ratio-based if Y1  A1;Y2  A2 and either
one of the following holds:
 There exists an r 2 [0;1] such that
A1 = Y1>2 [ YR1>r [ C;
where C  YR1=r.
 There exists an r 2 [0;1] such that
A2 = Y2>1 [ YR2>r [ C;
where C  YR2=r.
We refer to agent 1 as the receiving agent in the rst case and agent 2 as the receiving agent
in the second case. We refer to r as the critical ratio.
In a ratio-based allocation, the receiving agent is always allocated intervals that it
strictly desires, as well as some intervals weakly desired by the other agent. For the special
case where the critical ratio is 1, both agents can be seen as receiving agents. In this case,
the allocation is ecient since all intervals are allocated to agents who weakly prefer the
interval. When the critical ratio is less than 1, there is a unique receiving agent i that
receives all intervals it weakly desires (Yi3 i) along with some intervals strictly desired
by the other agent. This necessarily results in a loss of welfare relative to the ecient
allocation. However, ratio-based allocations minimize the obtained loss. This is formalized
in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.3. Let A = (A1;A2) be a ratio-based allocation with agent 1 as the receiving
agent such that v = V1(A1)  V1(Y12). It holds that:
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1. For every allocation A0 = (A0
1;A0
2) such that V1(A0
1) = v, sw(A)  sw(A0).
2. For every allocation A0 = (A0
1;A0
2) such that V1(A0
1) > v, sw(A) > sw(A0).
An analogous assertion holds for agent 2.
Proof (sketch). The proof of the lemma closely resembles the proof of Theorem 4.2.3.
Among all allocations that grant agent 1 value v, the allocation that maximizes welfare
is one in which agent 1 is rst allocated all the intervals it strictly desires, and then, pos-
sibly, intervals that are strictly desired by agent 2, in a decreasing order of Ri(x). The
rst part entails no loss in welfare. The second part may entail some loss, but allocating
these intervals in a decreasing order of Ri(x) ensures that this is the lowest possible loss.
In addition, if agent 1 receives value greater than v, it must come from additional intervals
that are strictly desired by agent 2. This entails a greater loss in welfare.
The following is an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.3.3.
Lemma 4.3.4. Every ratio-based allocation is PE.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.3.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1. We address the three dierent allocation types.
Maxsum EF. We distinguish between two cases, as follows. If there exists an EF allocation
that is ecient, then every maxsum EF allocation is trivially PE. Otherwise, there must
exist an agent i such that Vi(Yi3 i) < 1=2 (Step 2 of Algorithm 2). While Algorithm 2
focuses on piecewise linear valuation functions, the algorithm works for general valuation
functions. Wlog, suppose V1(Y12) < 1=2. Theorem 4.2.3 establishes the existence of
a ratio-based allocation that gives agent 1 value of exactly 1/2 and is maxsum EF. Let
A = (A1;A2) be such an allocation. By Lemma 4.3.4, A is PE. Let A0 = (A0
1;A0
2) be
another maxsum EF allocation. In what follows we show that A0 is PE. We distinguish
between three cases.
1. If V1(A0
1) = 1=2, then, since A0 is maxsum EF, it follows that V2(A0
2) = V2(A2). In
this case, the fact that A is PE implies that A0 is PE as well.
2. If V1(A0
1) < 1=2, then V1(A0
2) < 1=2 (otherwise, contradicting EF). It follows by
Lemma 4.2.5 that A0 is not maxsum EF, a contradiction.
3. If V1(A0
1) > 1=2, then we get V1(A0
1) > 1=2 > V1(Y12). It follows by Lemma 4.3.3
that sw(A0) < sw(A), in contradiction to A0 being a maxsum EF allocation.
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Maxsum EQ. We distinguish between two cases.
 V1(Y12)  V2(Y2>1) and V2(Y21)  V1(V1>2). In this case we show that there exists
a maxsum EQ allocation that is ecient. This, in turn, implies that every maxsum
EQ allocation is PE. In particular, allocate Y1>2 to agent 1, Y2>1 to agent 2, and split
Y1=2 such that the agents' values for their pieces are equal. To see why this is feasible,
note that if we give Y1=2 to agent 1 in its entirety, then agent 1 has a greater value.
On the other hand, if we give all of Y1=2 to agent 2, then agent 2 has a greater value.
Therefore, there must exist some allocation of Y1=2 that equalizes their values. This
allocation is EQ and ecient.
 Wlog, suppose V1(Y12) < V2(Y2>1). We claim that in this case there exists a ratio-
based allocation with agent 1 as the receiving agent that is EQ. To see this, note that
as the critical ratio decreases from 1 to 0, agent 1 goes from receiving all of Y12 to
receiving the entire cake, i.e., from a value of V1(Y12) to a value of 1. On the other
hand, agent 2 goes from receiving all of Y2>1 to receiving none of the cake, i.e., from
value V2(Y2>1) > V1(Y12) to 0. Therefore, the agents' values must cross at some
point, and the assertion follows. By Lemma 4.3.4 this allocation is PE, and hence
maxsum EQ. Clearly, any maxsum EQ allocation must grant each agent the same
value as in the ratio-based maxsum EQ allocation. It follows that every maxsum EQ
allocation is PE.
Maxsum EF+EQ. In every maxsum EQ allocation, both agents receive value at least 1/2.
To see why this is true, consider the allocation given by cut and choose. Each agent obtains
value at least 1/2 in this allocation, and we can make it EQ by destroying intervals given to
the agent with higher value. Since both agents receive value at least 1/2, the maxsum EQ
allocation is also EF. It follows that for two agents, the set of maxsum EF+EQ allocations
coincides with the set of maxsum EQ allocations, for which the assertion of the theorem is
proved above.
Any Number of Agents, Restricted Valuations
We next turn to investigate maxsum EF, maxsum EQ, and maxsum EF+EQ allocations
under restricted valuations, but for any number of agents. As it turns out, at least un-
der piecewise uniform valuation functions, maxsum EF allocations are always PE whereas
maxsum EQ and maxsum EF+EQ allocations may not be.
Theorem 4.3.5. For piecewise uniform valuations, every maxsum EF allocation is PE.
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Proof sketch. When agent valuations are piecewise uniform, a sucient condition for PE is
that all intervals desired by at least one agent are allocated to an agent that has positive
density on the entire interval. To see why this is true, recall that when agents have piecewise
uniform valuations, their total value is exactly determined by the total length of desired
intervals they receive. If all desired intervals are allocated to agents with positive density,
then an allocation that makes everyone weakly better o and one agent strictly better o
cannot exist because this would require additional desired lengths to be created. It remains
to show that a maxsum EF allocation must have this property.
Suppose that a maxsum EF allocation A = (A1;:::;An) allocates some intervals to
agents that do not desire them or discards intervals altogether. Let X0 denote these inter-
vals. Under piecewise uniform valuations, we can split X0 into subintervals on which agent
densities are constant, and then give each agent a 1=n share of each of these subintervals.
We can append this allocation of X0 to A. Envy is not created, because each agent i has
value exactly (1=n)Vi(X0) for every piece in this allocation, but social welfare increases,
contradicting the assumption that A is maxsum.
Theorem 4.3.6. For piecewise uniform valuations and three agents, there are valuation
functions where all maxsum EQ and EF+EQ allocations are not PE.
Proof. Consider the following valuations. Agents 1 and 2 desire [0;0:1] and agent 3 desires
all of [0;1]. A maxsum EQ or maxsum EF+EQ allocation must split [0;0:1] between agents
1 and 2 and allocate [0;1] to agent 3 so that agent 3 receives value exactly 0.5. This is not
PE because we can split [0;0:1] between agents 1 and 2 and give agent 3 all of [0:1;1].
While there are cases where no maxsum EQ or EF+EQ allocation is PE under piecewise
uniform valuations, we need to move to piecewise constant valuations in order to nd cases
where no maxsum EF allocation is PE.
Theorem 4.3.7. For piecewise constant valuations and three agents, there are cases where
no maxsum EF allocation is PE.
Proof (sketch). Consider the following valuations for three agents. The cake is split into
three equal intervals, i.e., [0;1=3];[1=3;2=3];[2=3;1]. Each agent's value densities are con-
stant on each of these intervals. Agent 1 values interval 1 at 51/101 and interval 2 at 50/101,
i.e., has densities 153/101 on interval 1 and 150/101 on interval 2. Agent 2 values interval
1 at 50/101 and interval 2 at 51/101. Agent 3 values interval 1 at 51/111, interval 2 at
10/111, and interval 3 at 50/111 (Figure 4.2).
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Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
0
1
2
Figure 4.2: Value density functions for example where maxsum EF is not PO.
The ecient solution gives interval i to agent i. However, this allocation is not EF
because agent 3 envies agent 1. It can be shown via the LP formulation for the computation
of a maxsum EF allocation that to reduce this envy, there is a maxsum EF allocation that
gives agent 1 a share of intervals 1 and 2, agent 2 a share of intervals 1 and 2, and agent 3
all of interval 3. Further, an examination of this LP shows that this allocation is the unique
maxsum EF allocation. However, this allocation is not PE because agent 1 receives shares
of interval 2 (where agent 2 has higher density) while agent 2 receives shares of interval 1
(where agent 1 has higher density). As a result, there is a way to swap agent 1's shares
of interval 2 with agent 2's shares of interval 1 that leaves both agents better o. The full
proof is given in the appendix of this chapter.
4.3.2 Maxsum EQ vs. Maxsum EF Allocations
In this section, we show that for piecewise linear valuations, a maxsum EF allocation has
social welfare at least as large as any maxsum EQ allocation. We obtain an approximate
version of this result for general valuation functions.
Denote the social welfare of a maxsum EF (resp., EQ) allocation by OPTEF (resp.,
OPTEQ). Note that the two-agent version of the inequality OPTEQ  OPTEF, for any
valuation functions, follows from the fact that a maxsum EQ allocation is also EF, which
was established in passing in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1. As a recap, both agents receive
value at least 1/2 in a maxsum EQ allocation, and for two agents, this is a sucient
condition for envy-freeness.
For three agents, this argument no longer holds, even in the case of piecewise constant
valuations: a maxsum EQ allocation must give utility at least 1=3 to each agent, but this
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does not imply EF. For example, consider the piecewise uniform valuations where agents 1
and 2 value the whole cake (with density 1) and agent 3 only values [0:8;1] (with density
5). A maxsum EQ allocation would be to give agent 1 [0;5=11], agent 2 [5=11;10=11], and
agent 3 [10=11;1]. Each agent receives value 5=11, yet agent 3 envies agent 2.
Another interesting (but common) feature of this example is that OPTEQ < OPTEF,
with a strict inequality. One EF allocation is to give [0:8;1] to agent 3 and split [0;0:8]
between agents 1 and 2. This has social welfare of 1:8 compared to the maxsum EQ welfare
of 15=11  1:364.
Having built some intuition, we next present the main result of this section. An -EF
allocation is one where Vi(Ai)  Vi(Aj)    for all i;j 2 N. Let OPT-EF denote the social
welfare under a maxsum -EF allocation.
Theorem 4.3.8. For piecewise linear valuations,
OPTEQ  OPTEF:
Moreover, for general valuation functions and any  > 0,
OPTEQ  OPT-EF + :
The proof of Theorem 4.3.8 relies on a connection between piecewise linear valuation
functions and market equilibria for a collection of divisible goods inspired by Reijnierse and
Potters [1998]. Before we begin the proof, we draw this connection and cite the relevant
results from the market equilibria literature required in the proof.
A linear Fisher market is a market where agents N = f1;:::;ng have additive, linear
utility functions for a set G = f1;:::;mg of divisible goods. Each agent i 2 N is given a
budget ei and has a utility uij for each good j 2 G. A feasible allocation gives a fraction xij
of good j to agent i such that no good is over-allocated. The agent's total utility from an
allocation xij is
P
j uijxij. When agent valuations are piecewise linear, utilities in a feasible
Fisher market allocation can be replicated in the cake cutting setting.
Lemma 4.3.9. Let A1;:::;An be an allocation in the cake cutting setting. Dene a Fisher
market with the same agents, and a good j corresponding to each Aj and uij = Vi(Aj).
Let xij be a feasible allocation of goods in the Fisher market. There exists an allocation
A0
1;:::;A0
n such that Vi(A0
j) = uijxij. In other words, we can replicate agent utilities in the
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Fisher market with an allocation of the cake.
Proof. Given a feasible allocation xij in the Fisher market, create an allocation A0
1;:::;A0
n
as follows. For each original piece Aj, split Aj into subintervals on which every agent's value
density function is linear (this is possible since agent value densities are piecewise linear).
We would like to give each agent i a piece of Aj that it values at xijVi(Aj). Since the
valuations are linear, this can be achieved by giving agent i two equally-sized pieces from
each linear subinterval. For a given linear subinterval, process each agent one by one. For
each next agent, give the agent a
xij
2 fraction of the remaining interval starting from the
left and moving right, and a
xij
2 fraction of the remaining interval starting from the right
and moving left. Since the linear utilities are symmetric, agent i's value from its share of
Aj is xijVi(Aj) = xijuij, and summing over all intervals establishes the assertion of the
lemma.
Linear Fisher markets have the following very special properties (see e.g., Vazirani
[2007]).
Theorem 4.3.10. Consider a linear Fisher market where agent i has budget ei,
P
i2N ei =
1, and each good gives at least one agent positive utility. There exists a price vector p =
(p1;:::;pjGj), pj > 0,
P
j2G pj = 1, and a feasible allocation xij such that:
1. 8j 2 G;
P
i2N xij = 1,
2. 8i 2 N;j 2 G; If xij > 0, then j 2 argmaxj0(uij0=pj0),
3. 8i 2 N;
P
j2G pjxij = ei.
Leveraging this result, we prove Theorem 4.3.8.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.8. Begin with a maxsum EQ allocation A = (A
1;:::;A
n). Construct
a Fisher market where good j corresponds to A
j, uij = Vi(A
j) and each agent has budget
ei = 1=n. Let p;xij be the price vector and feasible allocation guaranteed by Theorem
4.3.10. Consider the allocation A0
1;:::;A0
n described in Lemma 4.3.9. We need to show
that this allocation is EF and yields total welfare weakly greater than that of the original
maxsum EQ allocation. Due to Lemma 4.3.9, we can relate the values for A0
1;:::;A0
n to the
utilities in the Fisher market.
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The proof that A0
1;:::;A0
n is EF appears in Reijnierse and Potters [1998]; the next
equations replicate it for completeness. Let u
i = maxk(uik=pk).
Vi(A0
i) =
X
k
uikxik =
X
k
uik
pk
pkxik
=
X
k
u
ipkxik = u
i=n
Vi(A0
j) =
X
k
uikxjk =
X
k
uik
pk
pkxjk

X
k
u
ipkxjk = u
i=n
It remains to show that
P
i Vi(A0
i) 
P
i Vi(A
i). Suppose Vi(A
i) = C for all i 2 N; then
OPTEQ =
P
i Vi(A
i) = nC. u
i maximizes uik=pk, so u
i is at least uii=pi, the utility to price
ratio for the good in the Fisher market corresponding to A
i. Therefore, Vi(A0
i) = u
i=n 
uii=(npi) = C=(npi).
Then,
OPTEF 
X
i
Vi(A0
i) 
X
i
C
npi
=
C
n
X
i
1
pi
:
Since
P
i pi = 1,
P
i(1=pi) is minimized by pi = 1=n for each i and is at least n2. Therefore,
OPTEF 
C
n
X
i
1
pi

C
n
n2 = nC = OPTEQ:
Next we establish our result for general valuation functions V1;:::;Vn (with Riemann
integrable value density functions). For  > 0, Riemann integrability of v1;:::;vn implies
that for all i 2 N there are 0 = x1 <  < xm = 1 such that the upper Darboux sum of vi
satises
1 =
Z 1
x=0
vi(x)dx

m X
k=1
"
(xk   xk 1) 
 
sup
x2[xk 1;xk]
vi(x)
!#
 1 +

n
:
(4.15)
For every k = 1;:::;m and every y 2 [xk 1;xk], let v0
i(y) = supx2[xk 1;xk] vi(x). We claim
that the corresponding piecewise constant valuation functions V 0
1;:::;V 0
n approximate the
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original valuation functions in the sense that for every piece of cake X,6
Vi(X)  V 0
i (X)  Vi(X) +

n
: (4.16)
Indeed, the left hand side of the inequality is trivial, and the right hand side follows from
Equation (4.15) and the fact that v0
i(x)  vi(x) for all x 2 [0;1]:
V 0
i (X)   Vi(X) =
Z
X
(v0
i(x)   vi(x))dx

Z 1
x=0
(v0
i(x)   vi(x))dx 

n
:
Assume as before that the maxsum EQ allocation A satises Vi(A
i) = C for all i 2 N. It
therefore holds that V 0
i (A
i)  C for all i 2 N. Using the same arguments as before (and
the fact that piecewise constant valuations are in particular piecewise linear), there exists
an allocation A0 that is EF with respect to V 0
1;:::;V 0
n and satises
X
i2N
V 0
i (A0
i)  nC =
X
i2N
Vi(A
i) = OPTEQ:
Equation (4.16) directly implies that the allocation A0 is -EF (in fact, (=n)-EF) with
respect to the valuations V1;:::;Vn. Therefore, it holds that
OPT-EF 
X
i2N
Vi(A0
i) 
X
i2N

V 0
i (A0
i)  

n

=
X
i2N
V 0
i (A0
i)  
X
i2N

n
 OPTEQ   :
4.3.3 Discussion
Normalization
As in the previous section, we assume in this section that agent valuations are normalized
so that Vi([0;1]) = 1 for all i. The PE results for two agents naturally extend to the setting
where agent valuations are not normalized. In particular, ratio-based allocations still play
an important role and maxsum fair allocations will be ratio-based. For settings with any
number of agents, the positive PE results for piecewise uniform valuations still hold. The
6It may be the case that V
0
i ([0;1]) > 1.
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other PE results are mostly impossibilities and clearly continue to hold if we expand the set
of allowable valuations. The results relating the welfare of maxsum EF and maxsum EQ do
not rely on agent valuations being normalized and should continue to hold when valuations
are not normalized.
Which Allocations to Choose?
Our work can be seen as another step on the path to identifying the most desirable al-
locations of divisible goods. In recent work, Brams et al. [2012b] coined the term perfect
allocations to describe allocations that are PE, EF, and EQ. Unfortunately, they show that
such allocations may not exist when there are three or more agents, however many cuts
are allowed. We therefore argue that maximizing social welfare under a subset of these
three properties provides an especially appealing solution, but as we discuss below, there
are trade-os among the dierent properties.
One may wonder, in light of Theorem 4.3.8, whether a maxsum EF allocation is superior
to a maxsum EQ allocation. While we believe that this is often true, we wish to add a
caveat. Consider an example where there are three agents with value density functions
v1(x) = v2(x) = 1, v3(x) = 2x. A maxsum EF allocation gives [0;1=3] to agent 1, [1=3;2=3]
to agent 2, and [2=3;1] to agent 3, for a sum of 1=3 + 1=3 + 5=9  1:22. This allocation
also happens to be PE. But there is a maxsum EQ allocation that is also EF (by dividing
the left portion of the cake between agents 1 and 2 in a way that 3 does not envy either)
and gives each agent a value of roughly 0.39, for a slightly lower sum of 1.17. The latter
allocation seems more desirable, because it maximizes the minimum value to the agents.
Indeed, the EF allocation creates signicant inequity between agents 1 and 2, on the one
hand, and agent 3 on the other (1=3 vs. 5=9); this 67% dierence in values in exchange
for only a 4% higher social welfare, compared with EQ (1:22 vs. 1:17), arguably tips the
balance in favor of the maxsum EQ allocation: it not only gives all agents the same \fair
share," unlike the maxsum EF allocation, but it is also EF.
4.4 Summary and Future Work
In this chapter, we explore maxsum fair allocations when agents have piecewise uniform,
piecewise constant, and piecewise linear valuations. Section 4.2 examines the algorithmic
problem of computing these maxsum fair allocations. The main results are an exact algo-
rithm for piecewise constant valuations and an approximate algorithm for piecewise linear
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and more general valuations.
Section 4.3 analyzes the properties of maxsum fair allocations in an attempt to shed
some light on which allocations should be chosen in a cake cutting setting. We show that
maxsum fair allocations are imperfect, and we crystallize some of the trade-os among
them. Our contributions inform the discussion of good methods for resource allocation
by (i) ruling out the possibility that maxsum EF allocations are always superior to other
allocations (by showing that they may not be PE), and (ii) demonstrating that moving from
EF to the egalitarian notion of EQ can only decrease social welfare.
4.4.1 Future Work
1. We have shown that maxsum EF allocations may not be PE, and hence one may
consider choosing an allocation that Pareto-dominates the maxsum EF allocation.
However, in the examples that we have been able to construct where the maxsum EF
allocation is indeed not PE, the dierence in social welfare between the maxsum EF
allocation and its Pareto-dominating allocation is very small. Bounding this dierence
(or ratio) remains an open question (which is somewhat related to work on the so-
called price of fairness [Caragiannis et al., 2009]), but if it is indeed always small, we
would argue that preserving EF is more important than a small gain in social welfare.
2. Another alternative is to satisfy PE by taking the maxsum over both EF and PE. Rei-
jnierse and Potters [1998] designed an elaborate algorithm that computes EF and PE
allocations. However, these allocations are not maxsum necessarily. The techniques
of Section 4.2 enable the computation of maxsum EF allocations, which are not nec-
essarily PE. Our most important, and presumably quite challenging, open problem is
nding a (tractable) algorithm that computes maxsum EF and PE allocations.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.2.8
We rst state the following simple propositions which shows that we can tractably compute
some quantities of interest.
Proposition 1. Suppose v1(x) = a1x + b1;v2(x) = a2x + b2 on some interval I, where
a1;a2;b1;b2 are k-bit rationals.
1. The intersection point of v1(x);v2(x) can be computed in time polynomial in k, and
the intersection point will be a 4k-bit rational.
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2. Let r be an O(k)-bit rational. The point x where v1(x)=v2(x) = r can be computed
in time polynomial in k, and this point is an O(k)-bit rational.
3. Let v;w 2 I, v < w, v;w are O(k)-bit rationals.
(a)
R w
v vi(x)dx can be computed in time polynomial in k.
(b) Consider  such that w  2 I;w   v. j
R w
v vi(x)dx 
R w 
v vi(x)dxj  2k+1.
Proof. 1. To compute the intersection, we set a1x + b1 = a2x + b2. Solving for x, we
have x = (b2  b1)=(a1  a2). It is straightforward to show that this intersection point
remains a 4k-bit rational.
2. Similar to 1., we set (a1x+b1)=(a2x+b2) = r and solve for x. x = (b2r b1)=(a1 ra2).
3. (a) The result follows by observing that
R
vi(x)dx =
R
(aix+bi)dx = aix2=2+bix+C:
(b) The maximum value a density function can obtain using k-bit rationals is 2k +
2k = 2k+1. As a result, 2k+1 bounds the area under the curve over an interval
of size .
Proposition 2. Consider an interval [x1;x2], where x1 and x2 were either reported as an end
point by the agents or the result of densities that crossed. Suppose v1(x) = a1x+b1;v2(x) =
a2x + b2 on this interval, where a1;a2;b1;b2 are k-bit rationals.
1. R1(x) is either strictly increasing, strictly decreasing, or constant on [x1;x2]. If R1(x)
is constant, then R1(x) is an 2k-bit rational.
2. Suppose that R1(x) is not constant on the interval. Let r = v1(x)=v2(x), r0 =
v1(x0)=v2(x0). jr   r0j   ) jx   x0j  27k+1.
Proof. 1. The rst observation is straightforward. If R1(x) is constant, then the ratio
must be determined solely by the slopes of the density functions and is a1=a2. This
is a 2k-bit rational.
2. To prove this, we want to bound dR1(x)=dx. dR1(x)=dx = (b2a1 + b1a2)=(a2x + b2)2.
We notice that this value is maximized when the denominator is close to 0. This
occurs at one of the end points of the interval. If a2x+b2 = 0 at one of the endpoints,
then a1x + b2 = 0 as well at that end point (we assume that v1(x)  v2(x) on the
interval.) This implies that the ratio is constant on the interval, so we need not
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consider that case. Therefore, a2x + b2 is strictly positive. Endpoints of the interval
are 4k-bit rationals, so the smallest possible value for the denominator occurs when
a2 = 1=2k;x = 1=24k. The value at this point is 1=25k. So we can bound dR1(x)=dx by
27k+1 (a bound for the numerator of dR1(x)=dx is 22k+1, and we set the denominator
to 1=25k).
We now proceed to a proof of Theorem 4.2.8.
Proof sketch. We demonstrate how we can approximately implement Algorithm 1 to a given
precision . Make a mark at the beginning and end of each interval as well as at 0 and 1. Let
J be the set of intervals formed by consecutive marks. jJj = O(m). On each I 2 J, check
whether the agents' value density functions intersect. If they do, break I into two separate
intervals at the point of intersection. Each agent's value density function has constant slope
on each I 2 J, so each original interval creates at most 2 new intervals, resulting in O(m)
intervals. By Proposition 1 the intersection points can be computed in time polynomial in
k and will be 4k-bit rationals. Let J 0 denote the new set of intervals after accounting for
intersecting value density functions.
Every I 2 J 0 has the following properties:
1. v1(x) = a1x + b1;v2(x) = a2x + b2 on I, for some k-bit rationals a1;a2;b1;b2.
2. Exactly one of the following holds:
(a) v1(x) < v2(x) 8x 2 int(I)
(b) v1(x) = v2(x) 8x 2 int(I)
(c) v1(x) > v2(x) 8x 2 int(I)
With J 0 dened, we can check the dierent cases of Algorithm 2. We use the same
notation as used in Algorithm 2, and the steps below refer to the steps in Algorithm 2.
Each interval in J 0 either belongs entirely to Y12 or to Y2>1. V1(Y12) and V2(Y21) can
be computed by nding each agent's value on the appropriate intervals, applying Proposi-
tion 1:3a.
Step 1a: Allocate Y1>2 to agent 1, Y21 to agent 2.
Step 1b: We need to nd an allocation of Y1=2 such that Y1>2 along with the allocation of
Y1=2 gives agent 1 value approximately 1/2. Since V1(Y12)  1=2, there is some x such
72CHAPTER 4 WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AND CAKE CUTTING
that giving agent 1 V1([0;x] \ Y1=2 [ Y1>2) = 1=2. Let x be the multiple of 1=2p that is
closest to x without going over, with p to be specied later. x can be found by doing binary
search over p-bits. Proposition 1:3b tells us that V1([0;x] \ Y1=2 [ Y1>2) will be within =2
of 1/2 for some p = O(log(1=) + k), ensuring that envy is at most . Note that we always
allocate intervals to an agent who weakly prefers the interval, so the allocation is optimal.
Step 2: We perform a search over the space of p1-bit rationals (value of p1 to be specied).
We search for a value ratio in our search space that is close to and at least r. By stipulating
that the value ratio is at least r, we ensure that we at least match the eciency of the
maximally ecient EF allocation since we give away fewer intervals where agent 1 has a
smaller density function. Search over p1-bit rationals can be done in O(p1) steps due to the
result in Papadimitriou [1979].
The search described in Papadimitriou [1979] requires a custom subroutine given as
Algorithm 3, which returns whether or not the desired value is at most some rational
number r.
Algorithm 3
AtMost(r)
1. Let u = V1(Yr [ Y12);len = V1(Y>r [ Y1>2) (for upper and lower bound).
2. u;len > 1=2. Return true.
3. u 2 [1=2   =2;1=2]. Give agent 1 Yr in addition to Y1>2. Break.
4. len < 1=2 < u. Give agent 1 Y>r. Let x be the largest p2-bit rational such that
V1(Y>r [ Y12 [ ([0;x] \ Y=r)  1=2. Break.
5. Return false.
AtMost can be performed tractably due to Proposition 1, which says that agent values
for Yr and Y>r can be computed in time polynomial in k. The nal step involves showing
that for appropriately chosen values of p1;p2, we will nd an allocation that is -EF and
as ecient as the maximally EF allocation. To show this, we revisit the dierent steps in
Algorithm 2. Let p1  7k + 1 + log(1=) + logm and p2  k + 2 + log(1=).
Step 2: There are two cases:
1. Y=r contains at least one entire interval I 2 J0. Algorithm 2 divides Y=r so that
agent 1's value from Y=r;Y>r;Y12 is exactly 1/2. Proposition 2.1 tells us that r is
a 2k-bit rational, so our search either nds r exactly or quits early because it found
some r that gives agent 1 value in [1=2   =2;1=2]. In the latter case, agent 1 is not
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envious, and we have given away fewer intervals in Y2>1 to agent 1 (compared with
the optimal EF allocation). In the former case, there is some x such that giving
agent 1 Y>r [ (Y=r \ [0;x]) [ Y12 gives agent 1 value exactly 1/2. By searching
over p2-bit rationals, we can nd an x close enough to x such that agent 1's value is
within =2 of 1/2, without going over (Proposition 1.3b). This ensures that agent 1 is
EF and that eciency is at least that of an optimal EF allocation because we allocate
strictly fewer intervals where agent 1 has lower value.
2. Y=r does not contain an interval I 2 J0. Therefore, if I is an interval with constant
value ratio, Yr either contains all of I or contains none of I. By Proposition 2.2,
if we are close enough to r, then the induced x values will be closed to x on each
I 2 J0. By choice of p1, we ensure that there is an r in our search space such that
V1(Yr [ Y12) 2 [1=2   ;1=2]. The search procedure nds such an r, and agent 1
has most  envy.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4.3.7
Proof. Suppose we split the cake into three equal intervals on which agents have the follow-
ing unnormalized values:
Agent 1 : [51;50;0] (4.17)
Agent 2 : [50;51;0] (4.18)
Agent 3 : [51;10;50] (4.19)
Suppose we write down the primal LP constraints in vector and matrix form. The vari-
ables will be x11;x12;x21;x22;x31;x32;x33, and the constraints are ordered by 1.) interval
constraints, 2.) EF constraints, ordered by agent.
Objective:
h
51
101
50
101
50
101
51
101
51
111
10
111
50
111
i
Matrix:
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2
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
4
1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
51
101  
50
101
51
101
50
101 0 0 0
 
51
101  
50
101 0 0
51
101
50
101 0
50
101
51
101  
50
101  
51
101 0 0 0
0 0  
50
101  
51
101
50
101
51
101 0
51
111
10
111 0 0  
51
111  
10
111  
50
111
0 0
51
111
10
111  
51
111  
10
111  
50
111
3
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
5

2
6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
6
4
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
7
5
In order to make the system a system of equalities, we add slack variables for each
constraint. Consider the basic feasible solution that corresponds to choosing the variables
x11;x12;x21;x22;x33 along with the slack variables for the EF constraints for (1;3);(2;1);(2;3);(3;2).
This results in the following solution where these variables are set as follows and all other
variables are set to 0:
h
133=136 1=80 3=136 79=80 1 1=2 13=680 693=1360 13=37
i
It remains to show that this solution is optimal. To do so, we compute the reduced costs
for each variable (including the slack variables). These are:
[0;0;0;0; 9=2960; 6077=15096;0; 39=80; 203=408; 1195=2516; 61=4080;0;0;0; 37=680;0]
Since only the basic variables have non-negative reduced costs, this is the unique optimal
solution. Since agent 1 obtains some of interval 2 and agent 2 obtains some of interval 1,
this is not a PO solution (since we can swap) and make both agents better o.
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Towards More Expressive Cake
Cutting
Suppose that agents' valuation functions are piecewise uniform. Under the standard cake
cutting model, agent valuations are additive. That is, agents receive value from arbitrarily
small subintervals, even if the subintervals are separated from other subintervals. Using the
metaphor of cake, agents are assumed to have use for \crumbs" of cake. However, there are
settings where agents' valuation functions are plausibly piecewise uniform but agents have
no use for these crumbs. For example, thinking of the cake as time, consider the allocation
of advertising time: an agent may be interested in time slots when related shows are aired,
but does not derive value from slots that are shorter than, say, thirty seconds. Similarly,
one can consider priority access time to an Internet service provider for, e.g., streaming
video or gaming. As a dierent example, consider the allocation of a strip of beach to real
estate developers; each developer is interested in areas with specic properties, but has no
use for tiny plots.
Therefore, more expressiveness is called for in the class of valuation functions. We
augment piecewise uniform valuations with an option to specify the minimum length of a
usable interval; we call these augmented valuations piecewise uniform with minimum length
(PUML). An agent's value for a piece of cake under PUML valuations is proportional to
the total length of its intersection with the agent's desired intervals, excluding subintervals
in the intersection that are shorter than the agent's specied minimum length.
PUML valuations depart from those used in the cake cutting literature since they can be
non-additive: it may be the case that two disjoint intervals each have zero value but their
union forms a contiguous interval that is longer than the minimum. In this respect, PUML
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valuations blur the line between divisible and indivisible goods: some divisions of a good
(i.e., an interval) are possible, whereas other divisions are impossible (as they would induce
worthless subintervals). We are aware of a single existing paper that studies cake cutting
under non-additive valuations [Berliant et al., 1992, Section 5], but these valuations do not
include PUML valuations, and are studied only in the context of the existence of Pareto-
ecient allocations. Expressiveness in mechanisms has been studied by Benisch et al. [2008]
and D utting et al. [2011], but the focal point of that work is to study the tradeos between
simplicity and expressiveness and they assume a setting where payments are permitted. We
focus on designing algorithms for our more expressive valuations.
5.1 Our Results
Consider two agents with PUML valuations, where the minimum length for each agent is
1 (that is, any strict subinterval of the entire cake is worthless). Clearly no proportional
allocation exists, but an EF allocation does exist. In fact, any division that gives some
nonempty piece to each agent will be EF. In such an alocation, both agents have value
zero for both pieces (this shows that under PUML valuations envy-freeness does not imply
proportionality even if the entire cake is allocated). Worse, one of the agents must have value
zero, so even approximate proportionality in a multiplicative sense, as studied in Edmonds
and Pruhs [2006a], is unattainable. We therefore consider approximate proportionality in
an additive sense, to be made formal later.
In Section 5.3 we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for any number of agents with
PUML valuations that provides an additive worst-case approximate proportionality guar-
antee. The algorithm is a generalization of a well-known fully proportional algorithm in
the traditional cake cutting setting. We also prove that our algorithm is optimal, as no
algorithm can attain a better worst-case proportionality guarantee.
With proportionality understood, in Section 5.4 we consider envy-freeness in combi-
nation with proportionality. For two agents with PUML valuations, we nd that (rather
surprisingly) we can obtain full envy-freeness while still satisfying the optimal approximate
proportionality guarantee, in polynomial time. We do this via an algorithm that is very
dierent from the approximately proportional algorithm for n agents and makes extensive
use of discarding intervals in order to attain full envy-freeness.
As in the previous chapter, we do not consider self-interested agents in this chapter.
In other words, our algorithm returns proportional and EF allocations with respect to the
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reported valuations V1;:::;Vn.
5.2 PUML Valuations
We augment piecewise uniform valuations with a minimum length parameter. Given i 2 N,
the minimal length parameter i indicates that agent i has no value for intervals of length
less than i. As described in Section 3.5, agents with piecewise uniform valuations have a
reference piece of cake Ui that describes the intervals the agent desires. Let D(i;X)  Ui\X
describe the intervals in X desired by agent i and d(i;X)  len(D(i;X)) describe the length
of these intervals. An agent's value for a piece of cake X can be written as
Vi(X) =
d(i;X)
d(i;[0;1])
:
In words, it is the ratio of desired lengths received to the total lengths desired by agent i.
For example, if D(i;[0;1]) = f[0;0:2];[0:5;0:8]g and X = f[0:1;0:3];[0:4;0:7]g, then
D(i;X) = f[0:1;0:2];[0:5;0:7]g, d(i;X) = 0:3, d(i;[0;1]) = 0:5, and Vi(X) = 0:6.
Denition 5.2.1. Under valuations that are piecewise uniform with minimum length (PUML),
each agent i 2 N uniformly desires a piece of cake D(i;[0;1]), and holds a minimum length
parameter i. The valuation function of the agent is dened by
Vi(X) =
P
I2D(i;X): jIji jIj
d(i;[0;1])
:
Note that the summation only includes intervals with length at least i.
Going back to the previous example, if D(i;[0;1]) = f[0;0:2];[0:5;0:8]g and X =
f[0:1;0:3];[0:4;0:7]g, and in addition i = 0:2, then fI 2 D(i;X) : jIj  ig = f(0:5;0:7)g,
and therefore Vi(X) = 0:4.
We will assume that every interval I in D(i;[0;1]) satises jIj  i, that is, agents do
not desire worthless intervals. We also assume free disposal, in that we can choose not
to allocate part of the cake without penalty. Under PUML valuations, this assumption
is without loss of generality, because we can \destroy" intervals by partitioning them into
worthless tiny subintervals. Even under PUML valuations, when we write D(i;X), we refer
to Ui \ X, even if some of these intervals might have length less than i. Similarly, d(i;X)
refers to the length of the desired intervals that intersect X, ignoring the minimum length
requirement.
In order to discuss computational complexity, as we do below, we must understand how
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the input is represented. PUML valuations can be concisely represented via the boundaries
of the desired intervals, and 1;:::;n. The size of the input is the number of bits used to
represent these parameters. As we have been assuming in this thesis, we assume the direct
revelation model where agents report their entire valuation function to the algorithm.
5.3 Proportionality
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, under standard assumptions on agent valuations, the Dubins-
Spanier moving knife procedure proves that proportional allocations always exist. Under
PUML valuations, proportionality (or even multiplicative approximate proportionality) is
not always achievable, as demonstrated by the example given earlier in this chapter where
both agents desire the entire cake and 1 = 2 = 1. Therefore, we seek to achieve an
additive approximate proportionality guarantee. This guarantee will depend on i: agents
with larger i are guaranteed less, as having a larger i restricts the allocations that can
give the agent its proportionality guarantee. Let `i = i=d(i;[0;1]) for each i 2 N.
Denition 5.3.1. An allocation X1;:::;Xn is -proportional with respect to valuations
V1;:::;Vn if for all i 2 N, Vi(Xi)  1=n     `i. A direct revelation cake cutting algorithm
is -proportional if when given input V1;:::;Vn, it always produces an allocation that is
-proportional with respect to V1;:::;Vn.
Equivalently, a -proportional algorithm guarantees that
X
I2D(i;Xi): jIji
jIj 
d(i;[0;1])
n
    i:
5.3.1 Algorithmic Results
To achieve approximately proportional allocations, we present Algorithm 4. This algorithm
is inspired by the Dubins-Spanier procedure, but shifts the points where agents metaphor-
ically say \stop" in a way that, as we shall see, provides optimal guarantees. The output
of the algorithm is the allocation X1;:::;Xn, which is fully assigned before the algorithm
returns.
This is obviously a polynomial-time algorithm. The following theorem quanties its
proportionality guarantees.
Theorem 5.3.2. Under PUML valuations, Algorithm 4 is (2(n   1)=n) -proportional and
polynomial-time.
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Algorithm 4 (2(n   1)=n)-proportional algorithm
Input: V1;:::;Vn
1. PropAllocate(N;0;(V1;:::;Vn))
PropAllocate(S;u;(V1;:::;Vn)):
1. If S = fig, set Xi = [u;1] and return.
2. For each i 2 S:
r

i = minfr : r 2 [u;1];Vi([u;r]) 
Vi([u;1])
jSj  
2(jSj 1)`i
jSj g.
3. r
 = mini2S r

i ;i
 = argmini2S r

i (break ties arbitrarily).
4. Set Xi = [u;r].
5. PropAllocate(S n fi
g;r)
In particular, the algorithm is at most 1-proportional for n = 2. Before proving the
theorem, we establish a simple lemma.
Lemma 5.3.3. Consider a contiguous interval [u;v]. Let w 2 [u;v]. Then Vi([w;v]) 
Vi([u;v])   Vi([u;w])   2`i.
Proof. Vi([u;w]) + Vi([w;v]) can be smaller than Vi([u;v]) because the cut point w might
break an interval that was previously of length at least i into two intervals that have length
less than i. For instance, suppose w 2 (b;c) where (b;c) 2 Di([u;v]). If w b  i;c w 
i, then no value is lost by adding the values for [u;w];[w;v] separately compared to the
value for [u;v]. However, if w   b < i or c   w < i, then we lose value by adding values
over [u;w];[w;v] separately. The most value that can be lost is 2`i (`i on either side of the
cut at w). Vi([u;w]) + Vi([w;v])  Vi([u;v])   2`i, and rearranging yields the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 5.3.2. The proof proceeds by induction on jSj and showing that PropAl-
locate gives each i 2 S at least value Vi([u;1])=jSj 2(jSj 1)`i=jSj, i.e., PropAllocate
is 2(jSj   1)=jSj- proportional with respect to [u;1] and the agents in S. This is straight-
forward to show for the allocated agent i. For the remaining agents, we use the fact that
the agents were not chosen in combination with Lemma 5.3.3 to conclude that they have
a large enough value for the unallocated cake such that the inductive hypothesis provides
their proportionality guarantee.
5.3.2 Impossibility Results
Consider once more the case of two agents. In this case Algorithm 4 guarantees that
each agent receives value of 1=2   `i. Suppose that both agents desire the entire cake and
1 = `1 = 2 = `2 = 1=2+; then one agent will receive value of zero, that is, it is impossible
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to guarantee a value of more than 1=2 `i + for any  > 0; hence the algorithm is optimal
for the case of n = 2. More generally, the following theorem establishes that the algorithm
is worst-case optimal for any number of agents.
Theorem 5.3.4. For every n there exist PUML valuations such that no cake cutting algo-
rithm is -proportional for  < 2(n   1)=n.
Proof. Let  = (n) < 1=n, and consider n   1 disjoint subintervals of length . Assume
each agent desires each of the n   1 subintervals. Set i = =2 +  for  > 0 and all i 2 N.
Let x be the linear multiplier of `i that species the guarantee for each agent. Clearly in
any allocation there is at least one agent i 2 N that gets zero in desired intervals, that is,
1
n
  x
i
d(i;f0;1g)
 0:
Substituting, we get
1
n
  x
=2 + 
(n   1)
 0
)
n   1
n
    x

2
+ 

 0:
Rearranging yields
x 
2(n   1)
n
 
2

2 + 

n   1
n

2(n   1)
n
 
4

:
The theorem follows by taking  ! 0.
Theorem 5.3.4 does not exclude the possibility that, for a given instance, there is an
allocation with a better degree of proportionality than the one computed by Algorithm
4. Indeed, there could be an algorithm that matches Algorithm 4 in the worst case but
returns allocations that have better proportionality guarantees in other cases. However,
the combinatorial richness of PUML valuations imposes limits on what can be achieved via
polynomial-time algorithms due to the following \inapproximability result."
Theorem 5.3.5. For any constant  2 (0;1=2), given n agents with PUML valuations such
that `i < 1=n, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two statements: (a) there
is a (1=2 + )-proportional allocation and (b) no (3=2   )-proportional allocation exists.
Proof (Sketch). We reduce the 3-dimensional matching problem to deciding whether an in-
stance of PUML valuations has an (1/2+)-proportional allocation or no (3/2-)-proportional
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allocation exists. A full proof is deferred to the appendix of this chapter.
In particular, for a given set of valuations V1;:::;Vn, let (V1;:::;Vn) be the smallest
value  such that a -proportional allocation exists. Theorem 5.3.5 says that there is
no polynomial time algorithm that always returns a ((V1;:::;Vn) + 1   2)-proportional
allocation for every set of valuations (if there were then we could solve the NP-hard problem
in the statement of Theorem 5.3.5). In other words, their is no polynomial-time algorithm
that approximates the best proportional allocation within an additive factor of 1. Algorithm
1 is close to optimal when viewed under this measure since it provides an additive 2(n 1)=n
approximation guarantee.
5.4 Proportionality and Envy-Freeness
While Theorem 5.3.2 provides an optimal worst-case proportionality guarantee, it does not
address envy-freeness. In fact, it is possible for an agent to be the rst allocated yet have
greater value for pieces later allocated to other agents.
A natural question to ask is whether we can attain envy-freeness while satisfying the
proportionality guarantee of Algorithm 4. In other words, is there an algorithm that is
2(n   1)=n-proportional and fully EF? For the case of two agents, we show that indeed
there is an algorithm (that is 1-proportional and EF), and we leave open the challenging
question of a general number of agents.
Under general classic valuations, nding an EF and proportional allocation is trivial
when n = 2 as we can use the Cut and Choose algorithm However, immediate variations
of this algorithm do not yield envy-freeness under PUML valuations. In fact, we will see
that achieving envy-freeness and 1-proportionality under PUML valuations is surprisingly
dicult. Our solution makes extensive use of the free disposal assumption, which was not
required above, in order to attain envy-freeness.
We introduce some new notation that is specic to this section. Lengths of intervals
will be denoted by Greek letters. It will be convenient to refer to disjoint subintervals of a
given interval. We dene a ltering F to be a function that takes an interval and returns
a set of disjoint subintervals of the given interval. For instance, for the interval [0;0:25],
we might choose to only allocate f[0;0:1];[0:2;0:25]g, throwing away [0:1;0:2]. In this case,
F([0;0:25]) = f[0;0:1];[0:2;0:25]g.
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5.4.1 An Algorithmic Skeleton
We rst observe that if a ltering with specic properties exists, then a 1-proportional and
EF allocation exists for two agents.
Denition 5.4.1. A ltering, point pair (Fi, xi) is fair if
Vi(Fi([0;xi])) = Vi(Fi([xi;1])) (5.1)
Vi(Fi([0;xi]))  1=2   `i (5.2)
Assuming that we can nd fair ltering, point pair, Algorithm 5 is 1-proportional and
EF. The high level idea is to start with a feasible allocation is that 1-proportional based on
the fair ltering, point pair. If some agent is envious, then let that agent choose between
the pieces generated by the other agent's fair ltering, point pair.
Algorithm 5 1-proportional and EF algorithm for n = 2
1. Compute fair ltering and point pairs (F1;x1), (F2;x2).
2. Assume x1  x2. Otherwise, the roles can be reversed.
3. Let X1 = F1([0;x1]), X2 = F2([x2;1]). If this is EF, return.
4. If both agents are envious, then swap the allocations and return.
5. If agent 1 is envious, let agent 1 choose between F2([0;x2]) and F2([x2;1]), giving agent 2 the
piece that was not chosen.
6. If agent 2 is envious, let agent 2 choose between F1([0;x1]) and F1([x1;1]), giving agent 1 the
piece that was not chosen.
Lemma 5.4.2. Assume that there exist fair ltering, point pairs (F1;x1), (F2;x2). Then
Algorithm 5 is 1-proportional and EF.
Proof. If Algorithm 5 terminates at Step 3, then both agents receive their proportionality
guarantee by (5.2) and are not envious. If Algorithm 5 terminates at Step 4, there is no envy
since both agents preferred the other's initial allocation. The proportionality guarantee is
satised since each agent prefers its nal allocation to its initial, but the initial allocation
satises (5.2). If Algorithm 5 terminates at Step 5, agent 2 receives its proportionality
guarantee, is indierent, and so is not envious. Agent 1 receives its proportionality guarantee
since it at worst receives F2([x2;1]) which it preferred to F1([0;x1]). Since agent 1 gets to
choose between F2([0;x2]) and F2([x2;1]), agent 1 cannot be envious. A similar argument
applies to termination at Step 6.
83CHAPTER 5 TOWARDS MORE EXPRESSIVE CAKE CUTTING
If we can carry out Step 1 of Algorithm 5, that is, compute fair ltering, point pairs
(F1;x1), (F2;x2), then Lemma 5.4.2 allows us to nd a 1-proportional and EF allocation.
We show that such ltering, point pairs always exist (and can be computed eciently) in
the next section.
5.4.2 Finding Fair Filtering, Point pairs
Algorithm 5 implies that we can treat the agents independently, as long as for any vi and
i we can nd a ltering, point pair Fi;xi. Therefore, we drop the agent subscripts and
pretend we are dealing with a single agent.
Before proceeding to the main constructive proof, we establish a result about what
lengths in desired intervals are attainable by throwing away intervals in the allocation.
Lemma 5.4.3. Suppose d(X) = k+ for some positive integer k and 0   < , i.e., the
length of the agent's desired intervals on X total k+. It is possible to throw away intervals
in X so that the agent receives desired lengths worth exactly k + 1 for any 0  1  . It
is also possible to throw away intervals in X so that the agent receives exactly (k   1) in
desired lengths.
Proof. (a). Let 0  1  . If there is some desired interval that has length greater than 2,
then we can remove  1 in lengths from one side of the interval. If no interval has length
greater than 2, then each interval has length in [;2). The sum of the excess above 
must be at least , so we can remove lengths of  1 without decreasing any interval to less
than  in length. (b) By (a), we can attain desired lengths of exactly k. If any remaining
interval has length exactly , then we can remove that interval. Otherwise, there is at least
 in excess that can be removed without decreasing any interval to length less than .
We now proceed to the main proof that a fair ltering, point pair (F;x) always exists.
Let c be the center of the cake from the point of view of the agent, i.e. d([0;c]) = d([c;1]) =
d([0;1])=2. Note that there may be an innite number of such points, so we take the
right-most one.
Let y and z denote the left and right end points of the desired interval that contains c,
as seen in Figure 5.1.
Although the agent may not receive value 1=2 from [0;c] and [c;1] because c   y and
z c may be smaller than , [0;c] and [c;1] always satisfy the proportionality guarantee for
both agents. This is formalized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.4.4. V ([0;c])  1=2   `;V ([c;1])  1=2   `.
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c y z 0 1
Figure 5.1: Desired intervals are shaded. The points y and z are the left and right boundaries
of the interval containing c.
Proof. The proof is immediate by observing that each agent can lose at most  in value on
either side of the cut point c.
In the case where V ([0;c]) = V ([c;1]), the identity ltering along with c is a fair ltering,
point pair.
We therefore assume V ([0;c]) < V ([c;1]). To construct a fair ltering, point pair (F;x),
we choose an x 2 fy;c;zg based on certain conditions. We then apply Lemma 5.4.3 to
throw away intervals in [0;x];[x;1] until the agent is indierent between the two intervals.
Symmetric arguments can be applied to handle the case V ([0;c]) > V ([c;1]).
We consider two separate cases, based on whether z   c <  or z   c  . Since
V ([0;c]) < V ([c;1])  1=2, we also have c   y < .
Case I: z   c < .
Let  = c   y; = z   c, as depicted in Figure 5.2.
c z y
 
Figure 5.2: The case where z   c < .
From above, we have that c   y < , so  < . Therefore, V ([0;c]) = V ([0;y]) =
1=2   =d([0;1]) and (since  < ) V ([c;1]) = 1=2   =d([0;1]). Since V ([0;c]) < V ([c;1]),
we obtain that  < .
Suppose that the desired lengths in [z;1] and [0;y] are uniquely expressed as k + 
and k2 + 2, respectively, where k;k2 are positive integers and 0  ;2 < . Since
V ([0;c]) < V ([c;1]), k2 + 2 < k + . First, we show that k2  k   1. Given the way
we chose c, k2 + 2 +  = k +  + . Therefore, (k   k2) = 2    +    . Since the
variables on the right hand side are all non-negative and 2 < ; < , (k   k2) < 2 so
k2  k   1. Now there are two cases:
Case I.1: k2 = k, therefore  > 2. Set x = c and, using Lemma 5.4.3a, we throw away
intervals in [z;1] so that the agent receives desired lengths k2+2 in both [0;x] and [x;1].
85CHAPTER 5 TOWARDS MORE EXPRESSIVE CAKE CUTTING
Case I.2: k2 = k   1. First observe that  +    (otherwise, the agent would not have
desired this interval). Set x = z and throw away [y + ;z]. The agent receives desired
lengths k+2 and k+ in [0;x] and [x;1], respectively. If   2, by Lemma 5.4.3a, we
throw away intervals in [x;1] so that the agent receives desired lengths exactly k + 2 in
both [0;x] and [x;1]. If  < 2, by Lemma 5.4.3a, we throw away intervals in [0;x] so that
the agent receives desired lengths exactly k +  in both [0;x] and [x;1].
In both cases, 1-proportionality is satised as the agent always receives at least k2+2
in desired intervals and therefore at least its value for [0;c]. By Lemma 5.4.4 we know that
this satises 1-proportionality.
Case II: z   c  .
c z    z y
  
Figure 5.3: The case where z   c  .
V ([c;1]) = 1=2 since the agent does not lose desired lengths in [c;1]. Let  = c   y; =
z      c, as seen in Figure 5.3. It is easy to handle the case where    by throwing
away interval [c;c+] and by setting x = c. The crucial observation is that since   , no
desired lengths are lost in [c+;1] and, hence, the agent has desired lengths of d([0;1])=2 
in both [0;x] and [x;1]. In the following, assume  < .  <  since we assume that
V ([0;c]) < V ([c;1]) = 1=2.
Let [0;y] and [z ;1] provide k2+2 and k+ in desired lengths for positive integers
k;k2 and 0  ;2 < . As in the previous case, we can show that k2  k   1 by using the
fact that k2 + 2 +  =  + k + . The details are omitted since they are the same as in
the previous case. We can now distinguish between two cases:
Case II.1: k2 = k. Since  <  and V ([0;c]) < V ([c;1]),   2. Set x = c, throw away
interval [c;z   ] and use Lemma 5.4.3a to throw away intervals in [z   ;1] so that the
agent gets exactly k + 2 in both [0;x] and [x;1].
Case II.2: k2 = k   1. Then, the interval [z;1] gives desired lengths of (k   1) + . First,
use Lemma 5.4.3b to throw away lengths in [z;1] so that the desired lengths in [z;1] are
exactly (k   2). Set x = y. If 2   + , throw away interval [y;z      2] in order to
obtain desired lengths of (k   1) + 2 in both [0;x] and [x;1]. If 2 >  + , use Lemma
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5.4.3a to throw away lengths in [0;x] so that the desired lengths in [0;x] and [x;1] are
exactly (k   1) +  + . This is the only case in which the desired lengths in [0;x] and
[x;1] are less than V ([0;c]). So, we still need to prove that (k   1) +  +  saties the
proportionality requirement (5.2). By the denition of point c, we have (k  1)+2 + =
 + k +  = d([0;1])=2, i.e., 2 =  +  +     which implies that  >  +  since 2 < .
Hence, (k   1) +  +  > (k   1) +  + 2  d([0;1])=2   .
5.4.3 Tying Things Together
Now that we have proven the existence of fair (F;x) for any agent valuations, we can apply
Lemma 5.4.2. In addition, note that Section 5.4.2 implicitly provides a computationally
ecient implementation of Step 1 of Algorithm 5, so the algorithm is clearly polynomial-
time. We therefore have the following result.
Theorem 5.4.5. Assume that n = 2 and the agents have PUML valuations. Then Algo-
rithm 5 is 1-proportional, envy-free, and polynomial-time.
5.5 Discussion
Normalization
Though we have presented this chapter assuming that agent valuations are normalized, the
positive results still hold even if agent valuations are not normalized. The main dierence
is that the proportionality guarantees now scale with the agent's total value for [0;1]. If an
agent has total value  for [0;1], then the proportionality guarantee becomes =n `i.
The negative results trivially still hold since we allow a larger set of agent valuations.
5.6 Summary and Future Work
In this chapter, we consider valuations that are more expressive than standard piecewise
uniform valuations. Specically, we allow agents to have a minimum length parameter which
indicates that they have no value for intervals less than a certain length. This captures the
possibility that agents do not gain value for very small, disjoint intervals of the divisible good
being allocated. The main results are an algorithm for nding approximately proportional
allocations (and a theorem showing that this result is tight) and an algorithm for nding
approximately proportional and EF allocations for two agents.
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5.6.1 Future Work
1. A positive side eect of our algorithmic framework is that it encourages agents not to
be \greedy": the smaller an agent's i is, the larger the degree of proportionality the
agent is guaranteed. We wish to emphasize though that this is not a formal game-
theoretic statement. Indeed, under the algorithms presented in this paper, agents can
certainly gain by lying about their valuation function or even about their minimum
length. In contrast, in the next chapter, we design a fully proportional, EF algorithm
that is also truthful under piecewise uniform valuations (without minimum length).
There is a large gap, both conceptual and technical, between piecewise uniform and
PUML valuations. It would be interesting to know whether there is a (2(n   1)=n)-
proportional and truthful algorithm under PUML valuations.
2. Algorithm 4, which works for any number of agents, is inspired by a proportional
algorithm that works for all valuations functions under classic assumptions. Similarly,
in a sense Algorithm 5 extends the Cut and Choose algorithm. Unfortunately, in
general envy-freeness is hard to obtain for more than two agents (see Section 3.4.1),
and in particular the techniques of Algorithm 5 do not appear to generalize to any
number of agents. Progress on this front would require fundamentally new techniques.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.3.5
Proof. Sketch of proof. The reduction uses a trick from an old paper on scheduling of
Lenstra, Shmoys, and Tardos (Mathematical Programming, 1990).
We start with an instance of the NP-hard 3-dimensional matching problem consisting
of three sets A;B, and C with m elements each and a collection of q triplets of the form
(ai;bj;ck) where ai;bj; and ck belong to A;B, and C, respectively. The question is whether
there exist m triplets that cover all the elements or not.
We call triplets that contain aj triplets of type j. Let tj be their number. Let  be a
negligibly small positive number. We have the following disjoint intervals:
 A triplet interval of length 3 +  for each triplet.
 Many additional intervals of length 3   . Let L be their number.
We have the following agents:
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 For each element of B [C, there is an element agent. Such an agent has value for the
triplet intervals corresponding to a triplet to which its corresponding element belongs
and all additional intervals. Its minimum length requirement is 1.
 For each j = 1;:::;m, there are 2tj  1 type agents. Each such agent has value for the
triplet intervals corresponding to triplets of type j and the additional intervals. Its
minimum length requirement is 1 + .
 Many auxiliary agents. Their exact number is twice the number of additional intervals.
These agents have value for the additional intervals only. Their minimum length
requirement is 1 + .
Note that the total number of agents is exactly 3m + 2(qm) + 2L and the number of
intervals is q +L. By setting L to a (polynomially) large number compared to m and q, we
have that the exact proportionality requirement for each agent is slightly below 3/2.
Observe that one triplet interval can accommodate either at most two element agents
(the ones corresponding to the two elements of B and C that are contained in the triplet)
and at most one type agent (the one with type equal to the type of the triplet), or (at most)
two type agents (and no element agents). Also, one additional interval can accommodate
at most two element, type, or auxiliary agents.
Now, if the original instance has a perfect matching then there exists an allocation in
which each agent has non-zero value (either 1 or 1 +  depending on whether it is element,
type, or auxiliary agent). The element agents take their triplet interval corresponding to
the triplet of the perfect matching, the type agents ll the space in triplet intervals of their
type, and the auxiliary agents occupy the additional intervals. This is an almost 1/2-
proportional allocation. Otherwise, this means that, there are at most m   1 intervals
that accommodate three agents, so some agent should receive no value, i.e., amost 3/2-
proportional allocation.
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Truthful Cake Cutting
Thus far we have discussed various cake cutting problems that emerge once we adopt a
direct revelation model with restricted valuation functions. In Chapter 4 we examine max-
sum fair allocations, both in terms of computing these allocations and understanding the
properties of dierent maxsum fair allocations. In Chapter 5, we present a slight modica-
tion to the classic cake cutting model and piecewise uniform valuations that allows for more
expressiveness. We did not consider strategic issues in either chapter, but rather assumed
access to true information on agent valuations.
In this chapter, we view cake cutting as a mechanism design problem where payments
are not permitted. Our goal is to nd cake cutting mechanisms (or algorithms) that are
DSIC. Very little prior work considers strategic issues in cake cutting, and the work that does
examines a very weak notion of truthfulness. Specically, prior work considers an algorithm
to be truthful if there exist valuations of other agents such that reporting truthfully is a strict
best response [Brams et al., 2006, 2008]. In contrast, DSIC requires that for all valuations
of other agents reporting truthfully weakly dominates any other report. Additionally, this
earlier work also operates in the classic cake cutting model. To make things precise, for the
rest of this chapter, we refer to mechanisms that satisfy the notion of truthfulness in prior
work as weakly-truthful and we refer to DSIC mechanisms as truthful.
As a concrete illustration of the dierence between the two notions, consider the most
basic cake cutting mechanism for the case of two agents, the Cut and Choose mechanism
introduced in Section 3.4.1. The mechanism as described in Section 3.4.1 is described with
the agents taking actions; equivalently, in a direct revelation approach, the mechanism can
act on behalf of agents using the reported valuations. Cut and Choose is weakly truthful,
since if agent 1 divides the cake into two pieces that are unequal according to its valuation
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then agent 2 may prefer the piece that is worth more to agent 1. Agent 2 clearly cannot
benet by lying. However, the mechanism is not truthful (in the DSIC sense). Indeed,
consider the case where agent 1 would simply like to receive as much cake as possible,
whereas the single-minded agent 2 is only interested in the interval [0;] where  is small
(for example, it may only be interested in the cherry). If agent 1 follows the protocol it
would only receive half of the cake. Agent 1 can do better by reporting that it values the
intervals [0;] and [;1] equally.
In this chapter we consider the design of truthful and fair (proportional and EF) cake
cutting mechanisms. We restrict ourselves to considering agents with piecewise uniform
valuations and operate under a direct revelation model. It is trivial to nd proportional
and EF allocations in this setting; the richness of our problem stems from our desire to
additionally achieve truthfulness.
6.1 Our Results
In Section 6.4 we consider deterministic mechanisms when agent valuations are piecewise
uniform. Our main result is a deterministic mechanism for any number of agents that
is truthful, proportional, EF, Lorenz dominant in a certain sense, Pareto-ecient, and
polynomial-time when agents have piecewise uniform valuations.
To gain intuition for our mechanism, it is insightful to examine the special case of two
agents. In the two agent mechanism, the crux of the allocation is how we should allocate
intervals that both agents desire. We can throw away intervals that are undesired by any
agent, and allocate the intervals that are only desired by a single agent to that agent.
Our mechanism then allocates the intervals desired by both agents to try to equalize the
total lengths given to each agent. If the length of intervals only desired by agent i exceeds
the length of intervals only desired by agent j, then agent i will be given a smaller share
of the mutually desired intervals. To see how this encourages truthfulness, consider the
deviation where an agent misstates and increases the lengths of intervals only desired by
that agent. The agent receives all of these intervals (which include intervals it does not
actually desire), but obtains a smaller share of the mutually desired intervals. It turns out
that the equalization of lengths removes the incentive for agents to misstate their valuations.
In the general mechanism for n agents, our mechanism examines what the fairness
requirement means for the allocation given to dierent agents. Agents who receive a small
amount of the cake due to fairness requirements are handled rst and given the best possible
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fair allocation. As an example of agents who might be handled rst, there could be a set
of agents who all desire the same small interval of the cake. For fairness to be maintained,
each of these agents must receive the same fraction of this small interval. These agents
would be selectively handled earlier by the mechanism. By protecting the disadvantaged
agents in this way, the mechanism removes the incentive to report larger intervals than those
that are truly desired. Our mechanism is highly dependent on the assumption that agents
hold piecewise uniform valuations and there is no easy way to generalize our techniques to
piecewise constant valuations.
In Section 6.5 we consider randomized mechanisms. We slightly relax truthfulness by
asking that the mechanism be truthful in expectation, that is, an agent cannot hope to
increase its expected value by lying for any reports of other agents. For general valuations,
we present a simple randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation, and is ex-post
proportional and EF. Our result relies on the existence of perfect partitions, which are parti-
tions of the cake where every agent has value exactly 1=n for every element of the partition.
Given a perfect partition, the randomized mechanism constructs an allocation by indexing
the elements of the partition, and allocating the elements to agents based on a randomly
drawn permutation. The perfect partition guarantees fairness, while truthfulness in expec-
tation is preserved because the agent's expected value is a function of the agent's value
for the entire cake and not of the specic partition. While perfect partitions are known to
exist, there is no known algorithm for constructing perfect partitions for general valuations.
We provide explicit constructions of perfect partitions when agents hold piecewise linear
valuations.
6.2 Related Work
In independent parallel work, Mossel and Tamuz [2010] ask similar questions about truthful
and fair cake cutting. However, their work only considers randomized mechanisms, and they
provide existence results rather than concrete mechanisms for specic classes of valuations.
They also focus solely on proportionality rather than proportionality and envy-freeness
together. Under general assumptions on valuation functions (which are essentially the same
as our denition of valid valuations), they show that there exists a mechanism that is
truthful in expectation and always guarantees each agent a value of more than 1=n. The
results are then extended to the case of indivisible goods. The technical overlap between
the two papers is very small; we refer the reader's attention to this overlap in a footnote in
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Section 6.5.
Thomson [2007] showed that a truthful and Pareto-ecient mechanism must be dicta-
torial in the slightly dierent setting of pie-cutting. In pie cutting, the pie is modeled as a
circular object and the feasible cuts are wedges, while in cake cutting the cake is modeled as
the interval [0,1] and feasible cuts are subintervals. Though the two settings appear similar
and even possibly equivalent, they are actually distinct and results for one setting do not
readily carry over to the other. Brams et al. [2008] provide a more in depth discussion.
Note that Pareto-eciency is not a fairness property and neither implies, nor is implied by,
envy-freeness or proportionality.
Our deterministic mechanism is closely related to the egalitarian solution studied by
Dutta and Ray [1989] for cooperative games and Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2004] for the ran-
dom assignment problem with dichotomous preferences. It is also related to the probabilistic
serial mechanism studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2001] and Katta and Sethuraman
[2006] for the random assignment problem. However, the cake cutting setting is distinct
from the cooperative games setting and the random assignment problem, so though our
mechanism uses similar ideas and techniques, our results are not implied by these earlier
results. The proof of strategyproofness in Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2004] does carry over to
our setting (when interpreted through the correct lens), but we provide our independently
discovered proof in the sequel.
Dutta and Ray [1989] propose the egalitarian solution for cooperative games with trans-
ferable utility. As cake cutting is not a transferable utility setting, the connection to Dutta
and Ray [1989] involves dening a convex, cooperative game when agents have piecewise
uniform valuations in the cake cutting setting. Our deterministic mechanism nds an allo-
cation that is closely related to the egalitarian solution, and our algorithm for nding the
solution also resembles that proposed in this earlier work. We expand on this connection in
Section 6.4.5, where we use it to show that our deterministic mechanism nds an allocation
that is Lorenz dominant in a certain sense.
Our mechanism also resembles the mechanisms proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[2001], Katta and Sethuraman [2006], and Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2004] for the random
assignment problem under dierent assumptions on preferences. Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[2001] study the setting where agents have strict ordinal preferences, Katta and Sethuraman
[2006] extend this to the full preference domain (where indierences are allowed), and
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2004] study the case when agents have dichotomous preferences
(i.e., items are either acceptable or unacceptable and agents are indierent between any two
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acceptable items).
Because we study cake cutting when agents have piecewise uniform valuations, we can
relate the cake cutting setting to the random assignment setting as follows. Given agents'
reports, make a mark at the beginning of and end of each agent's desired intervals. Construct
an item for every subinterval formed by consecutive marks. Giving an agent an item with
probability p is the same as allocating the agent a p-fraction of the associated subinterval.
While this transformation converts cake cutting into a discrete allocation problem, there
are fundamental dierences between our setting and the random assignment setting. First,
in our setting, agents' valuations aect the items that are created, whereas in the random
assignment problem items are assumed to be given. Second, in our setting, agents want
as many items as possible, while the random assignment setting assumes that each agent
wants at most one item. In addition to these two general dierences, there are dierences
specic to each of the previously studied settings.
If we look specically at dichotomous preferences studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[2004], our agents may not have dichotomous preferences for items created based on agent
reports; that is, some subintervals might be larger than others and agents, though they
have piecewise uniform valuations, might not have the same value for all desired items.
Even if we discretize the cake into many tiny items (to try and equalize agent values for
desired items), our agents still desire as many of the created items as possible. Despite these
dierences, Theorem 2 of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2004] does carry over to our setting if
we view the allocation matrices Z as specifying assignments of agents to intervals of [0;1].
We discovered this relationship after publication of our results, and we describe this in more
detail in Section 6.4.5.
If we look specically at strict ordinal preferences studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[2001], our agents may be indierent between the items formed by subintervals between
consecutive marks. On the other hand, our agents cannot hold arbitrary ordinal preferences
over subintervals between consecutive marks, since if two agents desire two subintervals,
both agents would value the longer subinterval more than the shorter. This last dierence
also persists under the full preference domain studied by Katta and Sethuraman [2006].
Because of these dierences, our results cannot be derived from these earlier results, despite
the underlying dependence on similar ideas.
The network ow ideas that we use to prove properties of our mechanism are similar
to those used by Katta and Sethuraman [2006] to show that the egalitarian assignment
solution can be computed in polynomial time. Interestingly, Katta and Sethuraman [2006]
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note that the egalitarian assignment solution is identical to another independent mechanism
for nding a lexicographically optimal ow in a network due to Megiddo [1979].
Recently, after the initial publication of our work, Maya and Nisan [2012] consider
the two agent case where agents have piecewise uniform valuations. They characterize
truthful mechanisms in this setting and derive bounds on the welfare of truthful mechanisms
in comparison to the optimal social welfare. Interestingly, they show that the truthful
mechanisms that have the best worst-case guarantees on social welfare are the truthful
and fair mechanisms, which are equivalent to our deterministic mechanism applied to two
agents.
6.3 Preliminaries
A cake cutting mechanism f is truthful if when an agent lies it is allocated a piece of cake
that is worth, according to its real valuation, no more than the piece of cake it was allocated
when reporting truthfully. Formally, denote Ai = fi(V1;:::;Vn), and let V be a class of
valuation functions. The mechanism f is truthful if for every agent i, every collection of
valuations functions V1;:::;Vn 2 V, and every V 0
i 2 V, it holds that Vi(fi(V1;:::;Vn)) 
Vi(fi(V1;:::;Vi 1;V 0
i ;Vi+1;:::;Vn)).
Our results require that agent valuations be elements of a restricted family of valuation
functions. For our deterministic mechanism, we require that agent valuations are piecewise
uniform. For our randomized mechanism, we allow agent valuations to be piecewise linear.
6.4 Deterministic Mechanisms
In order to attain a truthful, deterministic mechanism, we focus on the restricted family
of piecewise uniform valuations. The restricted family is still rich enough to make the
problem challenging and capture real world situations, and we believe that our results
provide a foundation for future work on truthful cake cutting. Indeed, it remains an open
question whether truthful, deterministic mechanisms exist for even the slightly richer family
of piecewise constant valuations. In the rest of this section, we assume that valuations are
piecewise uniform.
6.4.1 A Deterministic Mechanism
Before introducing our mechanism we present some required notation. Let S  N be a
subset of agents and let X be a piece of cake. Let D(S;X) denote the portions of X that
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are valued by at least one agent in S. Formally, recalling that Ui is the reference piece of cake
for agent i (the piece that species the agents' desired intervals), D(S;X) =
 S
i2S Ui

\X,
and is itself a union of intervals.
Let avg(S;X) = len(D(S;X))=jSj denote the average length of intervals in X desired
by at least one agent in S. We say that an allocation is exact with respect to S and X
if it allocates to each agent in S a piece of cake of length avg(S;X) comprised only of
desired intervals. Clearly this requires allocating all of D(S;X) since the total length of
allocated intervals is avg(S;X)  jSj = len(D(S;X)). Suppose S = f1;2g and X = [0;1]:
if U1 = U2 = [0;0:2] then agents 1 and 2 receiving [0;0:1] and [0:1;0:2] respectively is an
exact allocation; but if U1 = [0;0:2];U2 = [0:3;0:7] then there is no exact allocation. since
agent 1 cannot be given 0:3 in desired lengths.
The deterministic mechanism for n agents with piecewise uniform valuations is a recur-
sive mechanism that nds a subset of agents with a certain property, makes the allocation
decision for that subset, and then makes a recursive call on the remaining agents and the
remaining intervals. Specically, for a given set of agents S  N and a remaining piece of
cake to be allocated X, we nd the subset S0  S of agents with the smallest avg(S0;X).
We then give an exact allocation of D(S0;X) to S0. We recurse on S n S0 and the intervals
not desired by any agent in S0, i.e. X n D(S0;X). The pseudocode of the mechanism is
given as Mechanism 6.
Mechanism 6 (V1;:::;Vn)
1. FairAllocate(f1;:::;ng;[0;1];(V1;:::;Vn))
FairAllocate(S, X, V1;:::;Vn):
1. If S = ;, return.
2. Let Smin 2 argmin
S0S
avg(S0;X) (breaking ties arbitrarily).
3. Let E1;:::;En be an exact allocation with respect to Smin;X (breaking ties arbitrarily). For
each i 2 Smin, set Ai = Ei.
4. FairAllocate(S n Smin;X n D(Smin;X);(V1;:::;Vn)).
In particular, Steps 2 and 3 of FairAllocate imply that if S = fig then Ai = D(S;X).
For example, suppose X = [0;1], U1 = [0;0:1], U2 = [0;0:39], and U3 = [0;0:6]. In this
case, the subset with the smallest average is f1g, so agent 1 receives all of [0;0:1] and we
recurse on f2;3g;[0:1;1]. In the recursive call, set f2g has average 0:39 0:1 = 0:29, set f3g
has average 0:6   0:1 = 0:5, and set f2;3g has average (0:6   0:1)=2 = 0:25. As a result,
the entire set f2;3g is chosen as the set with smallest average, and an exact allocation of
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[0:1;1:0] is given to agents 2 and 3. One possible allocation is to give agent 2 [0:1;0:35] and
agent 3 [0:35;0:6]. Note that if agent 1 uniformly values [0;0:2] instead, the rst call would
choose f1;2g as the subset with the smallest average, equally allocating [0;0:39] between
agents 1 and 2 and giving the rest, [0:39;0:6], to agent 3.
Our goal in the rest of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4.1. Assume that the agents have piecewise uniform valuation functions. Then
Mechanism 6 is truthful, proportional, EF, Lorenz dominant (in a certain sense), Pareto-
ecient, and polynomial-time.
To prove the theorem we exploit a connection to network ow in Section 6.4.3. As
explained in Section 6.2, this technique is a simple generalization of related results in the
economics and operations research literature, but we include some of the details for com-
pleteness. Our main technical contributions in this section are the truthfulness and fairness
of Mechanism 6, which are established in Section 6.4.5.
6.4.2 The Two Agent Mechanism
To gain intuition for the general case of Theorem 6.4.1 we rst describe the special case of
two agents. Note that designing truthful, proportional and EF mechanisms even for this case
is nontrivial. To see the diculty, consider an intuitive rst attempt at a proportional and
EF mechanism. We have already seen that Cut and Choose is not truthful for two agents.
Another straightforward approach would be to mark the end points of all submitted intervals
and divide every resulting subinterval equally between the two agents. One possibility is
to always give the left half of each subinterval to agent 1 and the right half to the agent 2.
This mechanism is clearly proportional and EF since every agent receives value exactly 1/2.
However, it is not truthful due to a simple example. Under this mechanism, if both agents
value the entire cake, agent 1 receives [0;0:5] and the agent 2 receives [0:5;1]. Suppose
that agent 1's true valuation consists of only [0;0:5]. If it reports truthfully, it receives
[0;0:25];[0:5;0:75] which gives value 0.5. The agent can gain by instead reporting that it
values all of [0;1] and receive [0;0:5] which gives it value 1. In particular, suppose that
when both agents report [0;1], agent 1 receives [0;0:5]. In order for the mechanism to be
truthful, whenever agent 1 reports some set of subintervals of [0;0:5] and agent 2 reports
[0;1], the mechanism must allocate to agent 1 all of this agent's desired intervals.
We now discuss our truthful Mechanism 6 for the case of two agents. Recall that Ui
denotes the reference piece of cake of agent i 2 N, and for i 2 f1;2g let Wi = UinU3 i, and
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W12 = U1 \ U2. W1;W2;W12 are disjoint, and this will allow us to interchangeably write
len(W1) + len(W2) + len(W12) and len(W1 [ W2 [ W12).
For two agents, the decision of the mechanism hinges on the choice of Smin in the rst call
to FairAllocate. There are three possibilities for Smin : f1g;f2g;f1;2g. If Smin = fig,
then agent i receives Ui = Wi [ W12 and agent 3   i receives U3 i n Ui = W3 i. On the
other hand, if Smin = f1;2g, then the mechanism gives an exact allocation with each agent
receiving equal lengths. Agent i receives all of Wi and W12 is split so that the total lengths
for each agent are equal.
Properties of the two agent mechanism
To prove that the mechanism for two agents is well-dened, fair, Pareto-ecient, and truth-
ful,7 it is useful to introduce variables i = (len(W12) len(Wi)+len(W3 i))=2 for each agent.
It holds that 1 +2 = len(W12) and 1 +len(W1) = len(W12 [W1 [W2)=2 = 2 +len(W2).
Qualitatively, i measures the share of W12 that agent i is entitled to due to the size of
Wi. Smaller values of len(Wi) give the agent a larger claim to W12 and increase i. We can
relate values of these variables to the choices of Smin made by the mechanism.
By denition of Wi and W12, avg(f1g) = len(W1 [ W12), avg(f2g) = len(W2 [ W12),
avg(f1;2g) = len(W1 [ W2 [ W12)=2. There are three cases:
1. 1 < 0;2 > len(W12). Since len(W1) + 1 = len(W2) + 2, len(W1) > len(W2) and
therefore avg(f1g) > avg(f2g). Moreover, using 2 > len(W12), we have
len(W12)   len(W2) + len(W1)
2
> len(W12);
and it follows that
len(W12) + len(W2) + len(W1)
2
> len(W12) + len(W2);
that is, avg(f1;2g) > avg(f2g).
This case corresponds to Smin = f2g, and the mechanism gives all of W2 [ W12 to
agent 2 and all of W1 to agent 1.
2. 0  1  len(W12);0  2  len(W12). We can use the same arguments as the
previous case with the inequalities ipped to show that avg(f1;2g) < avg(f1g) and
7We defer a discussion of Lorenz dominance to the proof for the general case with n agents.
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avg(f1;2g) < avg(f2g). This case corresponds to Smin = f1;2g, and the mechanism
gives an exact allocation of W1 [ W2 [ W12 to the agents.
3. 2 < 0;1 > len(W12). The analysis is the same as case 1, with agents 1 and 2 changing
roles. This corresponds to Smin = f1g. Agent 1 receives all of W1 [ W12 and agent 2
receives all of W2.
First, we show that Mechanism 6 is well-dened. Mechanism 6 calls for an exact alloca-
tion to be made to Smin at each step, but this may not always be possible. When jSminj = 1
an exact allocation is trivial, but when Smin = f1;2g, we need to guarantee that we can
exactly split D(f1;2g;[0;1]). Because Smin = f1;2g only when 0  1;2  len(W12), this
is possible by giving Wi and i of W12 to agent i.
Next, we establish the fairness properties of proportionality and envy-freeness. If Smin =
f1;2g, proportionality and envy-freeness are clear. If Smin = f1g, then agent 1 receives all
of its desired intervals so its value is 1. Agent 2 receives only W2, but since Smin = f1g,
len(W1[W12)  len(W1[W12[W2)=2 which implies len(W12)  len(W2), and hence agent
2 receives value at least 1/2 and is not envious of agent 1.
Pareto-eciency is easy to see because in all cases, we allocate Wi to agent i and fully
allocate W12, so it is not possible to give more lengths to one agent without decreasing the
allocation of the other.
In order to establish Theorem 6.4.1 for the two agent case it remains to show truthfulness.
We will take the point of view of agent i 2 f1;2g. If it holds that i > len(W12) then the
agent receives all desired intervals and has no incentive to deviate, hence we can assume
that i  len(W12).
Note that an agent always receives all of Wi, so protable manipulations will try to
obtain more of W12 by increasing i while not losing too much of Wi. Also note that by
denition of i, an increase or decrease of len(Wi) by k will respectively decrease or increase
i by k=2.
Suppose that agent i reports U0
i 6= Ui, inducing new pieces W0
12, W0
1, W0
2. Before
manipulating the agent receives len(Wi) + max(i;0). Note that
len(W0
12) + len(W0
3 i) = len(U3 i) = len(W12) + len(W3 i);
that is, this sum is not aected by the report of agent i.
If len(W0
1) = len(W1) then i is unchanged, and the agent receives the same length of
intervals (though the actual intervals received may not be desired). If len(W0
i) = len(Wi) k
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then the agent loses at least k of Wi and gains at most k=2 from an increase in i; this is
not protable. Finally, if len(W0
i) = len(Wi)+k, then the agent gains undesired intervals of
length k and i is weakly smaller, so the agent does not gain any more of W12 by deviating.
An interpretation of the two agent mechanism.
When jSj = 2, the mechanism is equivalent to a swapping procedure. The proof of this
equivalence is postponed to the appendix of this chapter. As before, let W1;W2;W12 describe
the intervals that only agent 1 desires, only agent 2 desires, and both agents desire. Discard
the intervals that neither agent desires, and give an initial grant of half of W1;W2;W12
to each agent. Assume without loss of generality that len(W1)  len(W2). The swapping
procedure can be described as follows.
1. Swap pieces X;Y of equal length where agent 1 owns X, agent 2 owns Y , X  W2,
Y  W1.
2. Swap pieces X;Y of equal length where agent 1 owns X, agent 2 owns Y , X  W2,
Y  W12.
3. If there are still pieces of W2 owned by agent 1, give these intervals to agent 2.
This procedure rst gives each agent an equal piece of each kind of interval. The rst
swaps performed are mutually benecial: each agent gives pieces of the other agent's desired
intervals in exchange for pieces of its own desired intervals. However, eventually, agent 1
obtains all of W1 and these swaps no longer exist. The second swaps involve trades where
agent 2 receives remaining pieces of W2 in exchange for giving up pieces of W12. This trade
does not improve the utility of agent 2, but does improve the utility of agent 1. If agent 2
gives away all of its share of W12, then agent 1 receives all of W1 and W12, and agent 2 is
given all of W2 due to step 3 which gives the remaining shares of W2 to agent 2 for free. If
agent 2 obtains all of W2 without relinquishing all of its share of W12, then agents 1 and 2
split W12 (potentially unequally), and each agent i receives Wi.
6.4.3 Exact Allocations and Maximum Flows
Having dened Mechanism 6 and shown that it has the desired properties in the case of two
agents, we now generalize the proofs to n agents. Before turning to properties of truthfulness
and fairness, we point out that, as in the two agent case, it is unclear whether Mechanism 6
is well-dened. In particular, the mechanism requires an exact allocation E with respect to
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Figure 6.1: The ow network induced by the example.
the subset Smin and X, but it remains to show that such an allocation exists, and to provide
a way to compute it. To this end we exploit a close relationship between exact allocations
and maximum ows in networks.
For a given set of agents S  N and a piece of cake to be allocated X, dene a graph
G(S;X) as follows. We keep track of a set of marks, which will be used to generate nodes
in G(S;X). First mark the left and right boundaries of all intervals that are contained
in X. For each agent i 2 N and subinterval in Ui, mark the left and right boundaries of
subintervals that are contained in Ui \X. When we have nished this process, each pair of
consecutive markings will form an interval such that each agent either uniformly values the
entire interval or values none of the interval. In G(S;X), create a node for each interval
I formed by consecutive markings, and add a node for each agent i 2 N, a source node s,
and a sink node t. For each interval I, add a directed edge from source s to I with capacity
equal to the length of the interval. Each agent node is connected to t by an edge with
capacity avg(S;X). For each interval-agent pair (I;i), add a directed edge with innite
capacity from node I to the agent i if agent i desires interval I.
For example, suppose U1 = [0;0:25] [ [0:5;1] and U2 = [0:1;0:4]. If X = [0;1] then
the interval markings will be f0;0:1;0:25;0:4;0:5;1g. Agent 1 values [0;0:1], both agents
value [0:1;0:25], agent 2 values [0:25;0:4], neither agent values [0:4;0:5] and agent 1 values
[0:5;1]. It holds that len(D(f1;2g;[0;1])) = 0:9. Average values are 0.75, 0.3 and 0.45 for
sets f1g;f2g and f1;2g respectively. See Figure 6.1 for an illustration of the induced ow
network.
Lemma 6.4.2. Let S  N, and let X be a piece of cake. There is a ow of size len(D(S;X))
in G(S;X) if and only if for all S0  S, avg(S0;X)  avg(S;X).
We prove the lemma using an application of the classic Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem
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(see, e.g., Cormen et al. [2001]).
Proof. Assume that for all S0  S, avg(S0;X)  avg(S;X). By the Max-Flow Min-Cut
Theorem, the minimum capacity removed from a graph in order to disconnect the source
and sink is equal to the size of the maximum ow. The only edges with nite capacity in
G(S;X) are the ones that connect agent nodes to the sink, and the ones that connect the
source to the interval nodes.
Construct a candidate minimum cut by disconnecting some set of agent nodes T  S
from the sink at cost jTj  avg(S;X) and then disconnecting all the (s;I) connections to
interval nodes I desired by an agent i 2 SnT. This means that the total additional capacity
we need to remove is len(D(S n T;X)), the total length of intervals desired by at least one
agent in S n T. By assumption, this is at least jS n Tj  avg(S;X). As a result, this cut has
capacity of at least
jTj  avg(S;X) + jS n Tj  avg(S;X) = jSj  avg(S;X) = len(D(S;X)):
In the other direction, assume that there is a ow of size len(D(S;X)) in G(S;X),
and assume for contradiction that there exists S0  S such that avg(S0;X) < avg(S;X).
Construct a cut by disconnecting the (s;I) connections to interval nodes desired by an agent
i 2 S0, and disconnecting the agent nodes S n S0 from the sink. The total capacity of the
cut is
jS0j  avg(S0;X) + jS n S0j  avg(S;X) < jS0j  avg(S;X) + jS n S0j  avg(S;X)
= jSj  avg(S;X)
= len(D(S;X));
and by the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem the maximum ow must be of size less than
len(D(S;X)), in contradiction to our assumption.
The following lemma establishes that a ow of size len(D(S;X)) in G(S;X) induces an
exact allocation.
Lemma 6.4.3. Let S  N, and let X be a piece of cake. There exists an exact allocation
with respect to S;X if and only if there exists a maximum ow of size len(D(S;X)) in
G(S;X).
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Proof. Suppose that we have a maximum ow of size len(D(S;X)); we show how to use this
ow to generate an exact allocation with respect to S;X. For each edge between interval
node I and agent i 2 N that receives positive ow of c in the max ow, allocate c of I to
agent i. This allocation is feasible because the interval nodes represent disjoint subintervals
of X and the ow to the interval's node is limited by the capacity of the edge between s
and the interval node, which is the length of the interval. In addition, this allocation must
give each agent exactly avg(S;X) in desired intervals. To see this, note that all paths to
the sink must pass through agent nodes, and the sum of capacities of the edges between
between the agents and the sink is D(S;X). For a maximum ow to have size D(S;X),
these edges must saturated.
In the other direction, suppose that we have an exact allocation with respect to S;X.
We can generate a feasible ow of size len(D(S;X)) by setting a ow of c on an edge (I;i)
if agent i receives c of interval I in the exact allocation, and saturating all the edges (s;I)
and (i;t) for intervals I and agents i 2 N.
By combining the \if" directions of Lemma 6.4.2 and Lemma 6.4.3 we see that the
mechanism is indeed well-dened: if S has the smallest average then there exists an exact
allocation with respect to S;X. The network in Figure 6.1 does not satisfy the minimum
average requirement and does not provide a corresponding exact allocation. Moreover,
we obtain a tractable mechanism for computing an exact allocation, by computing the
maximum ow and deriving an exact allocation. A maximum ow can be computed in
time that is polynomial in the number of nodes, that is, polynomial in our input size (see,
e.g., Cormen et al. [2001]).
6.4.4 Polynomial Time
In order to show that Mechanism 6 can be implemented in polynomial time it remains to
show that it is also possible to implement Step 2 of FairAllocate in polynomial time.
Indeed, an ecient implementation of Step 2 would mean that FairAllocate can be
implemented in polynomial time, and there are at most n + 1 calls to FairAllocate. So,
the task is to nd Smin 2 argminS0Savg(S;X) in polynomial time, given S  N and a piece
of cake X. This can be done using network ow arguments, which are an easy variation on
those employed by Katta and Sethuraman [2006] (see Section 6.2 for a full discussion). For
completeness we quickly describe an implementation that is less ecient than Katta and
Sethuraman [2006] but nevertheless polynomial time.
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Given S  N, a piece of cake X, and c > 0, construct a graph G0(S;X;c); this graph
is identical to G(S;X) as dened above, except that the capacity on the edges between the
agents and the sink is c (instead of avg(S;X)). The proof of the following statement is
identical to the proof of Lemma 6.4.2 (by replacing avg(S;X) with c everywhere): there is
a ow of size cjSj in the network G0(S;X;c) if and only if for all S0  S, avg(S0;X)  c.
Assume that the boundaries of the agents' reference pieces of cake are represented by
at most k bits, i.e. multiples of 1=2k. For ease of exposition (so that we deal with integers
rather than rationals), scale the interval by 2kn! so that the boundaries are an element of
f0;n!;2n!;:::;2kn!g.
There is a maximum c such that G0(S;X;c) has a ow of size cjSj. This c is a
member of a set of numbers that includes all the possible values of avg(S0;X) for S0  S.
Because we have scaled the boundaries, the possible values for the average are contained
in f0;1;:::;2kn!g. Indeed, the numerator is an element of f0;n!;2n!;:::;2kn!g, and the
denominator is in f1;:::;ng. It holds that we can search for c by performing binary search
over f0;1;:::;2kn!g in polynomial time. Binary search takes O(k+nlogn) iterations, with
each iteration taking time polynomial in k;n. Even though we multiply values by 2kn!, the
number of bits needed is only O(k + nlogn) and still polynomial in n;k.
Now, consider c +1. This network does not have a network ow of size (c +1)jSj. We
can nd a minimum cut in this network in polynomial time (see, e.g., [Cormen et al., 2001]).
In this cut there is a subset T  S such that the cut separates S nT from the sink, and the
intervals desired by T from the source. This subset T must have avg(T;X) < c + 1, and
since avg(T;X) (after scaling) must be an integer, avg(T;X)  c.
We wish to claim that T is the Smin we are looking for. Indeed, note that since there is
a ow of size cjSj in G0(S;X;c), it must hold that for all S0  S, avg(S0;X)  c, which
directly implies the claim.
6.4.5 Fairness, Eciency, Truthfulness
Our main tool in proving that Mechanism 6 is truthful and EF is the following lemma.
Lemma 6.4.4. Let S1;:::;Sm be the ordered sequence of agent sets with the smallest av-
erage as chosen by Mechanism 6 and X1;:::;Xm be the ordered sequence of pieces to be
allocated in calls to FairAllocate. That is, X1 = [0;1];X2 = X1 n D(S1;X1);:::;Xm =
Xm 1 n D(Sm 1;Xm 1). Then for all i > j, avg(Si;Xi)  avg(Sj;Xj), and agents that are
members of later sets receive weakly more in desired lengths.
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Proof. Suppose not. Then at some point, avg(Si;Xi) > avg(Si+1;Xi+1). Now consider
Si[Si+1. We will show that avg(Si[Si+1;Xi) < avg(Si;Xi), contradicting the choice of Si
as the subset of agents with the smallest avg at step i. Note that Si and Si+1 are disjoint
since agents are removed once they have been part of the subset with the smallest average.
Thus,
avg(Si [ Si+1;Xi) =
len(D(Si [ Si+1;Xi))
jSij + jSi+1j
=
len(D(Si;Xi)) + len(D(Si+1;Xi n D(Si;Xi)))
jSij + jSi+1j
=
jSij  avg(Si;Xi) + jSi+1j  avg(Si+1;Xi+1)
jSij + jSi+1j
<
jSij  avg(Si;Xi) + jSi+1j  avg(Si;Xi)
jSij + jSi+1j
= avg(Si;Xi);
where the second transition is true since Si and Si+1 are disjoint, and the inequality follows
from our assumption.
Envy-freeness
Envy-freeness now follows immediately from Lemma 6.4.4. Indeed, consider an agent i 2 N,
and as before let Sj be the subset of agents with the smallest average in the j'th call to
FairAllocate. Suppose i 2 Sj. The agent does not envy other agents in Sj since these
agents are given an exact allocation and all receive the same length in desired intervals. By
Lemma 6.4.4, the agent does not envy agents in Sk for k < j because the amount agents
receive weakly increases with each call. The agent does not envy agents in Sk for k > j
because all intervals desired by the agent are allocated and removed from consideration
when the agent receives its allocation.
Proportionality
Before we establish proportionality, we prove the following useful lemma, which shows that
no intervals are wasted in the allocation produced by Mechanism 6.
Lemma 6.4.5. Mechanism 6 assigns all subintervals desired by at least one agent to an
agent who desires the interval.
Proof. Every interval in [0;1] is either allocated in one of the calls to FairAllocate, or it
is left unallocated by the nal call to FairAllocate. If an interval is allocated in one of
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the calls to FairAllocate, then it is part of an exact allocation, and in an exact allocation,
each allocated agent receives only desired intervals. If an interval is left unallocated in the
nal call to FairAllocate, then it must be that no agent desired the interval. Indeed, all
intervals desired by agents allocated prior to the nal call have already been allocated, and
the nal call allocates all of D(S0;X0) to agents in S0, where S0 and X0 are the inputs to
the nal call of FairAllocate.
Combining Lemma 6.4.5 with envy-freeness gives us proportionality. Indeed, suppose
that some agent i receives less than len(D(fig;[0;1])=jSj of its desired intervals. Because
no desired intervals are thrown away, some other agent must receive a length of at least
len(D(fig;[0;1])=jSj of the desired intervals of agent i, in contradiction to envy-freeness.
Lorenz Dominance
The allocation produced by Mechanism 6 is related to the egalitarian solution for super-
modular transferable utility cooperative games described by Dutta and Ray [1989]. In
particular, the length in intervals received by an agent in Mechanism 6 is equal to the value
assigned to an agent in the egalitarian solution of a corresponding convex cooperative game.
To translate our setting into the cooperative game setting, consider the following coali-
tional value function for each set of agents S:
v(S) = len(D(S;[0;1]))
This value function is clearly concave, so to translate to the convex setting, we consider
the negation. Viewed in this light, we have a cost-sharing scenario, where the interval [0;1]
represents inputs to production which must be purchased. For instance, we can think of
[0;1] as a strip of land, and each agent requires irrigation canals on certain subintervals of
this strip of land. Once irrigation canals are built on a given subinterval, they can be used
jointly by all the agents.
For convex games, Dutta and Ray [1989] give an algorithm (which is very similar to
Mechanism 6) to nd the egalitarian solution, and they show that the egalitarian solution
Lorenz dominates every solution in the core of the cooperative game. To understand the
signicance of this result in our setting, we rst need to understand Lorenz dominance and
the core.
Translated to our setting, Lorenz dominance is the following criterion. For a given allo-
cation A1;:::;An, dene a lengths vector `(A1;:::;An) which sorts the lengths in intervals
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agents receive from smallest to largest. An allocation A1;:::;An Lorenz dominates an allo-
cation A0
1;:::;A0
n if
Pk
i=1 `i(A1;:::;An) 
Pk
i=1 `i(A0
1;:::;A0
n) for all 1  k  n with strict
inequality for some k. In other words, the partial sums of the lengths vector are weakly
greater, with strict inequality for at least one partial sum. As an example, if we have two
agents that split the interval [0,1] (they each receive lengths of 0.5), then this allocation
Lorenz dominates an allocation that gives the entire interval to a single agent.
Translated to our setting, the core consists of all allocations where no subset of agents
S is allocated more than len(D(S;[0;1])) in intervals. In particular, the core contains at
least all allocations that do not allocate intervals to agents who do not desire them. Indeed,
if agents only receive desired intervals, there is no way that the total length of intervals
received by agents in a subset S can exceed len(D(S;[0;1]).
Given the correspondence between the egalitarian solution and the allocation produced
by Mechanism 1, the allocation Lorenz dominates any other allocation that only allocates
intervals to agents who desire them and has a distinct lengths vector. There may be multiple
allocations with the same lengths vector. As a result, the allocation we produce does not
Lorenz dominate every other allocation; however, it does Lorenz dominate every other
allocation that generates a distinct lengths vector.
It was a priori unclear whether there would exist an allocation in which the desired
lengths received by agents corresponds to the values in the egalitarian solution because our
setting is not a transferable utility setting. This is what is established in Section 6.4.3.
Moreover, our denition of Lorenz dominance looks at the lengths vector and not agent
utilities. Indeed, it is easy to show that a similar criterion is not satised if we characterize
allocations by the vectors of agent's utilities.
Pareto-eciency
Each agent's utility is a function of the length in desired intervals it receives. As a result,
Pareto-eciency follows directly from the discussion on Lorenz dominance.
Truthfulness
We establish truthfulness by examining the possible ways in which an agent can aect the
progression of Mechanism 6. In particular, we examine whether an agent i 2 S would want
to deviate from truthfulness in each call to FairAllocate(S;X). Let Smin denote the
set of agents with the smallest average if agent i reports truthfully. For a given call to
FairAllocate, agent i can report a valuation which changes the exact allocation made to
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Smin or which changes the choice of Smin (or both).
We rst consider deviations which try to modify the exact allocation for Smin;X. The
exact allocation for Smin only depends on the reports of agents in Smin, so we assume
i 2 Smin. If agent i reports truthfully, it receives exactly len(D(Smin;X))=jSminj in
desired lengths. Agent i can deviate, causing the set of desired intervals to change to
D0(Smin;X). If len(D0(Smin;X))  len(D(Smin;X)), then this is not protable. Suppose
that len(D0(Smin;X)) > len(D(Smin;X)). Now each agent receives len(D0(Smin;X))=jSminj
of intervals. The intervals received by agents other than i are in D(Smin;X) since the other
agents have not changed their reports. Subtracting o these intervals, the maximum length
in desired intervals agent i can receive from this deviation is len(D(Smin;X))   (jSj   1) 
len(D0(Smin;X))=jSminj  len(D(Smin;X))=jSminj, and this deviation is not protable.
We next consider deviations which attempt to change the choice of subset with the
smallest average. There are two cases to consider. Let avg0 denote the new averages
induced by a deviation of agent i.
1. i = 2 Smin. For any set S0, if i = 2 S0, agent i cannot change D(S0;X) with its reports.
As a result, agent i cannot make the mechanism choose some other S0;i = 2 S0 since the
agent cannot change avg(Smin;X) or avg(S0;X). Therefore, the agent's only deviation
is to try and make the mechanism choose a set S0;i 2 S0. However, in order to do
so, the agent must make avg0(S0;X)  avg(Smin;X) and will receive avg0(S0;X) in
desired lengths. By Lemma 6.4.4, the agent was receiving at least avg(Smin;X) under
truthful reports since the agent was chosen in a later round, so this is not protable.
2. i 2 Smin. Agent i receives avg(Smin;X) if it reports truthfully. Suppose agent i
deviates and forces selection of another set S0 as the set with the smallest aver-
age. If i 2 S0, then to be protable, avg0(S0;X)  avg(Smin;X). If i = 2 S0, then
agent i could not have aected avg(S0;X) and S0 was not chosen when i was truth-
ful, so avg0(S0;X)  avg(Smin;X). Either way, to be protable, it must be that
avg0(S0;X)  avg(Smin;X). Now consider some agent j 2 Smin. When agent i re-
ported truthfully, agent j was receiving avg(Smin;X) of D(Smin;X). If j 2 S0, then
agent j receives exactly avg0(S0;X) in intervals. If j = 2 S0, then by Lemma 6.4.4,
agent j receives at least avg0(S0;X) in intervals. In either case, agent j receives at
least avg0(S0;X) in intervals.
Using arguments similar to the case above, we can now show that no deviation is
protable. While agent i deviates, the other agents in Smin do not, so the intervals
108CHAPTER 6 TRUTHFUL CAKE CUTTING
they receive are a part of D(Smin;X). This leaves
len(D(Smin;X))   (jSminj   1)  avg0(S0;X)
 len(D(Smin;X))   (jSminj   1)  avg(Smin;X)
= avg(Smin;X)
in desired intervals for agent i, so the deviation is not protable.
This completes the proof of truthfulness. Putting everything together gives us Theo-
rem 6.4.1.
Group Strategyproofness
Group strategyproofness is a stronger notion than truthfulness that requires that it is not
possible for any group of agents to collectively deviate and make each of their allocations
weakly better o while making at least one agent strictly better o. Theorem 2 of Bogo-
molnaia and Moulin [2004] proves that essentially the same procedure as Algorithm 6 when
applied to the random assignment problem with dichotomous preferences yields a group
strategyproof mechanism.
Upon closer examination of the proof of Theorem 2, though the proof was written
specically in the context of random assignment, the same ideas essentially carry over to
the cake cutting setting. The proof relies on similar ideas, essentially arguing that by
deviating it is not possible to gain more of the intervals that are also desired by the non-
deviating agents. The proof itself is very specic to the random assignment setting and
argues about allocation matrices Z that specify what fraction of each item each agent
receives. However, if we instead view Z not as an allocation matrix but instead as a
specication of a cake cutting allocation (an assignment of subintervals of [0;1]) to each
agent, then the proof carries through for the cake cutting setting as well. As a result, their
proof shows that not only is Algorithm 6 truthful, but it also satises the stronger notion
of group strategyproofness. We do not make this a main part of our Theorem 6.4.1 since it
was not an independent contribution of ours.
6.5 Randomized Mechanisms
In the previous section we saw that designing deterministic truthful and fair mechanisms
is not an easy task, even if the valuation functions of the agents are rather restricted. In
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this section we demonstrate that by allowing randomness we can obtain signicantly more
general results.
A randomized cake cutting mechanism outputs a random allocation given the reported
valuation functions of the agents. There are very few previous papers regarding randomized
mechanisms for cake cutting. A rare example is the paper by Edmonds and Pruhs [2006b],
where they give a randomized mechanism that achieves approximate proportionality with
high probability. We are looking for a more stringent notion of fairness. We say that
a randomized mechanism is universally proportional (resp., universally EF) if it always
returns an allocation that is proportional (resp., EF).
One could also ask for universal truthfulness, that is, require that an agent may never
benet from lying, regardless of the randomness of the mechanism. A universally truthful
mechanism is simply a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.
However, asking for both universal fairness and universal truthfulness would not allow us
to enjoy the additional exibility that randomization provides. Therefore, we slightly relax
our truthfulness requirement. Informally, we say that a randomized mechanism is truthful
in expectation if, for all possible valuation functions of the other agents, the expected value
an agent receives for its allocation cannot be increased by lying, where the expectation is
taken over the randomness of the mechanism.
We remark that while truthfulness in expectation seems natural, consistent as it is with
expected utility maximization, fairness (i.e., proportionality and envy-freeness) is something
that we would like to hold ex-post; fairness is a property of the specic allocation that is
being made, and continues to be relevant after the mechanism has terminated. Interest-
ingly enough, if we were to turn this around, then achieving universal truthfulness and
envy-freeness/proportionality in expectation is trivial: simply allocate the entire cake to a
uniformly random agent!
There is a simple class of randomized mechanisms which are truthful in expectation.
Specically, dene a partition mechanism as follows. On input V1;:::;Vn a partition mech-
anism chooses a partition fX1;:::;Xng of [0,1]. The mechanism then uniformly samples a
random permutation  over the n agents, and assigns agent i the piece X(i). If an agent
reports truthfully, then in expectation, it receives value
Pn
j=1
1
nVi(Xj) = 1=n. If the agent
reports some other valuation V 0
i , then the partition the mechanism chooses may change to
fX0
1;:::;X0
ng, but the agent still receives value
Pn
j=1
1
nVi(X0
j) = 1=n.
However, depending on the partitions chosen, a partition mechanism may not be univer-
sally proportional and EF. In order to obtain a mechanism that is universally proportional
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and EF, we require that the partitions selected are perfect partitions. A partition is perfect
for reports V1;:::;Vn if Vi(Xj) = 1=n for every i and j. As the agents have value exactly
1=n for every element of the partition, a partition which always selects perfect partitions is
clearly universally proportional and EF.8
Though partition mechanisms which select perfect partitions are truthful in expectation
and universally proportional and EF, there still remains the obstacle of actually nding a
perfect partition given the valuation functions of the agents. Does such a partition exist, and
can it be computed? More than sixty years ago, Neyman [1946] proved that if the valuation
functions of the agents are dened by the integral of a continuous probability measure then
there exists a perfect partition. Unfortunately, Neyman's proof is nonconstructive, and to
this day there is no known constructive method under general assumptions on the valuation
functions. This is not surprising since a perfect partition induces an EF allocation, and
nding an EF allocation in a bounded number of steps for more than four agents is an open
problem.
However, if we assume more structure on agent preferences, then it is possible to explic-
itly construct perfect partitions. As an example, consider the class of piecewise constant
valuation functions. Each agent makes a mark at the left and right boundaries of each of the
intervals it is interested in, and we add two marks at 0 and 1. The value density function of
each agent is constant over each subinterval between two consecutive marks, as this subin-
terval is either contained in one of the subintervals agent i is interested in or completely
disjoint from any of them. Hence, the allocation that assigns to each agent exactly 1=n of
each of the subintervals between two consecutive marks is a perfect partition. A similar
procedure can be applied to piecewise linear valuation functions by observing that if agent
densities are linear on a subinterval, we can partition the subinterval into n elements that
have the same value to each agent. Specically, we can divide the subinterval into 2n pieces
of equal length and label the pieces 1;:::;2n from left to right. To construct element i of
the partition, we match piece i with piece 2n i+1. An agent has the same value for every
element of the partition due to the assumption of linear densities on the subinterval.
8Mossel and Tamuz [2010] also observe that partition mechanisms which select perfect partitions are
truthful in expectation and universally proportional.
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6.6 Discussion
The free disposal assumption
For our deterministic result we rely heavily on the ability to throw undesired pieces of the
cake away. The reason this is important is that it prevents agents from being able to gain by
reporting smaller intervals, in hopes of gaining a larger share of the overlap while obtaining
desired intervals for free. The following example illustrates why removing the free disposal
assumption can be problematic.
Since we can no longer discard undesired intervals, we must specify how to allocate
the undesired intervals. Suppose we decide to allocate undesired intervals evenly between
agents 1 and 2, giving the left half to agent 1. While this seems benign, our mechanism is
no longer truthful.
Suppose there are two agents. Consider the allocation made when both agents report
that they desire the interval [0;0:2]. Mechanism 6 calls for any allocation that splits [0;0:2]
equally between the agents.9 Assume a simple implementation that gives [0;0:1] to agent 1
and [0:1;0:2] to agent 2. Our rule for allocating undesired intervals gives [0:2;0:6] to agent
1 and [0:6;1] to agent 2.
Now consider the case where agent 1 values [0;0:6] and agent 2 values [0;0:2]. If the
agents report truthfully, Mechanism 6 gives [0;0:2] to agent 2 and [0:2;0:6] to agent 1.
Agent 1 receives [0:6;0:8] and agent 2 receives [0:8;1] due to our rule for allocating undesired
intervals. Agent 1 receives value 2/3. On the other hand, if agent 1 reports [0;0:2] (assuming
agent 2 remains truthful), it receives [0;0:1] [ [0:2;0:6] which gives value 5/6. Notice that
the problem here persists even if we allocate [0:2;0:6] to agent 2 when both agents report
[0;0:2]. In this case, agent 2 can deviate when it has true value [0;0:6] and agent 1 reports
[0;0:2].
It is unclear whether we can dispose of the free disposal assumption. Indeed, it may be
that there is an impossibility result when we force all intervals to be allocated. It would be
nice to be able to apply the same insights of Mechanism 6, though as the example shows, we
now have to be careful about the exact mechanics of how intervals are allocated rather than
simply the fraction of each interval each agent receives. This adds signicant complexity to
the problem which we are able to avoid in Mechanism 6 when we assume free disposal.
9In Mechanism 6, any exact allocation suces in FairAllocate, and it is not necessary to worry about
the specic way an exact allocation is achieved.
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6.7 Summary and Future Work
Departing from the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5, which do not consider strategic issues,
this chapter considers the question of nding DSIC mechanisms for cake cutting under
restricted valuations. The main result is a polynomial time DSIC mechanism that is pro-
portional, EF, and PE when agents have piecewise uniform valuations. A secondary result
shows that if randomized mechanisms are allowed, there exists a polynomial time random-
ized mechanism that always nds an allocation that is proportional and EF when agents
have piecewise linear valuations.
6.7.1 Future Work
1. The most prominent technical challenge is to generalize Mechanism 6. The rst step
would be a deterministic, truthful, proportional, and EF mechanism under the as-
sumption that the agents have piecewise constant valuations, and the second step
would be achieving the same result with respect to piecewise linear valuations. While
our mechanism for piecewise uniform valuations is Pareto-ecient, Schummer [1997]
proves that in a setting of pre-dened divisible goods, the only Pareto-ecient and
truthful mechanism is a dictatorship that gives all goods to a single agent. Since piece-
wise constant valuations contain this setting (by creating separate intervals for each
good and letting agents express their level of utility for each good by varying their
utility function on each interval), we cannot hope for truthfulness, Pareto-eciency,
and fairness when we move to piecewise constant valuations. However, we might still
be able to attain truthfulness and fairness (proportionality and envy-freeness). Un-
fortunately we cannot rule out the scenario where no such mechanisms exist; future
work would have to resolve this issue.
2. As we have done throughout this thesis, we have worked with restricted valuations
and a direct revelation model.
It is unclear whether our mechanisms can be eciently implemented via evaluation
and cut queries. In particular, it is unclear whether it is possible to exactly isolate
the agents' desired intervals using a nite number of queries. This does not preclude,
however, the existence of results that are analogous to ours via mechanisms that only
rely on evaluation and cut queries.
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Appendix: Equivalence of Swapping Procedure and Mecha-
nism 6
We prove that the swapping procedure from Section 6.4.2 is equivalent to Mechanism 6 for
two agents. In the swapping procedure from Section 6.4.2, there are two cases. The rst is
where agent 2 gives away all of its share of W12, and the second is where agents 1 and 2 divide
W12. We can give precise conditions for when each of the two cases occurs. After the rst set
of swaps, agent 1 has all of W1, and agent 2 has len(W2 [W1)=2 of W2 and still desires the
(len(W2)   len(W1))=2 of W2 still held by agent 1. If len(W12)=2  (len(W2)   len(W1))=2
then agent 2 can get all of W2 without exhausting all of its share of W12, and the agents
equally split W1[W2[W12. Otherwise, agent 1 receives all of W1;W12 and agent 2 receives
only W2.
The crux of the swapping procedure is the allocation of W12. Each agent always receives
Wi, and W12 is allocated to try and equalize the total lengths of intervals obtained by each
agent. However, this may not always be possible because agent 1 may desire less than
len(W1 [ W2 [ W12)=2, and in this case, agent 1 receives all of W12. To summarize, there
are two cases in the swapping procedure:
1. len(W1 [ W12)  len(W1 [ W2 [ W12)=2. Agent 1 receives W1, agent 2 receives W2
and the agents split W12 so that their allocated lengths are equal.
2. len(W1 [ W12) < len(W1 [ W2 [ W12)=2. Agent 1 receives W1 [ W12 and agent 2
receives W2.
To see that this swapping procedure is exactly equivalent to Mechanism 6 for two agents,
assume again without loss of generality that len(W1)  len(W2). In Mechanism 6, either
f1g or f1;2g is the subset with the smallest average. f1;2g is the chosen subset if len(W1)+
len(W12)  (len(W1[W2[W12)=2. If f1;2g is chosen, then agents 1 and 2 split W1[W2[W12
in an exact allocation. If f1g is chosen, then agent 1 receives all of W1;W12, and agent 2
receives all of W2.
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Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions are a canonical problem at the heart of the intersection of computer
science and economics. In combinatorial auctions, multiple items are auctioned at the
same time. We assume that agent valuations are private and must be elicited by the
auction mechanism. On the economic side, these auctions are desirable as they naturally
accommodate complex bidder preferences for the goods.
As an example, suppose that two items exhibit strong complementarities. More con-
cretely, consider an auction for wireless spectrum, where spectrum rights for dierent regions
of the US are being auctioned. Verizon gains a signicant bonus if it is able to obtain rights
in all the regions and build a national network. A combinatorial auction allows this to be
expressed as all the regions are allocated in a single auction.
On the other hand, running separate auctions for each region would force Verizon to
guess about its probability of obtaining subsequent regions when bidding for a region. In
particular, in hopes of obtaining a national network, Verizon is willing to pay more than its
value for regional spectrum. If Verizon ultimately does not receive a national network (for
instance because of an aggresive regional provider), it could be left paying more than its
value for the spectrum it actually receives. This is known as the exposure problem and is one
of the arguments in favor of combinatorial auctions. Indeed, combinatorial auctions have
been adopted to allocate wireless spectrum in many dierent countries (see e.g. [Cramton,
2002]), to nd bus route operators in London [Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 2006], to procure
goods and services in industrial settings [Caplice and She, 2006, Bichler et al., 2006,
Sandholm, 2013].
Though combinatorial auctions are able to accommodate complex bidder preferences,
allocating a set of items altogether gives rise to interesting computational challenges. If
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we have m items, then there are 2m possible subsets of items that an agent can obtain.
A fully general preference would allow for the bidder to specify a dierent value for every
possible subset of items. Even if we impose natural restrictions such as monotonicity (i.e.,
an agent's value for a superset of a set S is at least its value for S), this still does not decrease
the number of values needed to pin down a bidder's valuation. As a result, combinatorial
auctions give rise to a preference elicitation problem where we need to learn enough about
an agent's preference so we can make an intelligent allocation decisions without forcing the
agent to communicate its entire valuation function since that is computationally intractable
(in a worst case sense). We will not address preference elicitation in this dissertation, but
more information on the topic can be found in Cramton et al. [2006]. Instead, we limit the
valuations we consider to families of valuations that can be succinctly communicated (e.g.
by listing values for target bundles of interest and having rules for how these translate to
values for any bundle of items).
Another computational issue that arises is the winner determination problem. Suppose
that we are given agent preferences and wish to nd an allocation that maximizes social
welfare. It turns out that in many combinatorial auction settings this problem is compu-
tationally intractable. In this chapter, we present the model for combinatorial auctions as
well as some basic results that will be relevant to the next two chapters on monotone branch
and bound search and learning payment rules.
7.1 Model
In the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, there is a set N of agents and set G of items,
with jNj = n, jGj = m. Each agent has a private valuation function vi : 2G ! R0 which
expresses the agent's value for each possible bundle of items. We adopt the same notation
as Section 2.2.10 A valuation prole (v1;:::;vn) = v consists of a valuation function for
each agent. It will be useful to write a valuation prole from the perspective of agent i
as v = (vi;v i), where vi gives agent i's valuation function and v i refers to the valuation
function of all other agents.
The combinatorial auction problem is a mechanism design with money problem (Section
2.2), and we make the typical assumption that agent utilities are quasi-linear. The set of
possible outcomes 
 is an assignment of items to each agent such that no item is given to
10The notation in Section 2.2 uses a capital Vi for agent valuations, and this is used in our discussion
of cake cutting as well. In our discussion of CAs and subsequent chapters, we use a lowercase vi for agent
valuations.
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multiple agents. We call elements of 
 allocations. The mechanism design goal is to nd
an outcome rule g that maps a valuation prole v to an element of 
 and a payment rule
that maps a valuation prole v to a payment for each agent such that g chooses an element
of 
 that has good properties for each v, and g and p together incentivize agents to report
their valuations truthfully.
7.2 Computational Complexity
Even if we momentarily ignore the incentive problem of designing g and p so that agents
report their valuations truthfully, a fundamental computational problem arises when we
consider CAs and social welfare maximization. Suppose that our objective as a designer is
to nd an allocation that maximizes social welfare with respect to the reported valuations.
This problem is known as the winner determination problem. This problem is related to a
weighted set-packing problem and is NP-hard, even if we limit ourselves to fairly restrictive
preferences. [Cramton et al., 2006] contains a full discussion, and we summarize the parts
relevant to this thesis in this section.
Before we discuss computational complexity, we must dene precisely the inputs to our
algorithm. One possibility is to say that the inputs are an exhaustive specication of the
agents' valuation functions. That is, for each agent, the input consists of 2m numbers, with
each number representing the agent's value for some subset of items. One problem with this
approach is that even communicating these numbers becomes infeasible as m grows large.
Another problem is that if we use this representation, then a polynomial time algorithm
would allow time that scales polynomially with n and 2m rather than polynomially in n
and m. As a result, we need to consider more succinct input representations or bidding
languages.
Two fundamental bidding languages are the OR and XOR bidding languages [Sandholm,
2002, Fujishima et al., 1999]. In both languages, agents submit lists of pairs (Sj;vi(Sj))
where Sj  G. The OR language interprets the bids as being additive as long as the subsets
listed do not intersect. If an agent submits f(S1;vi(S1));(S2;vi(S2))g with S1\S2 = ;, then
it is assumed that the agent receives value vi(S1) + vi(S2) for the subset S1 [ S2.11 On the
other hand, the XOR language assumes that bids are mutually exclusive. That is, at most
one of the bids can be accepted, so in the given example, if the agent were given S1 [ S2,
its value would be max(vi(S1);vi(S2)). It is also possible to combine the two languages
11In general if we have overlapping bids then an agent's value for S is the maximum sum of values for
disjoint bids contained in S.
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by creating dummy items, and this is known as the OR* language [Fujishima et al., 1999].
The properties of these languages is beyond the scope of the thesis, but interested reader is
referred to [Nisan, 2006].
With OR, XOR, or OR* bids, we now have a natural input size for winner determination.
Because agents list specic bundles and values in these bidding languages, we can use the
number of specic bundles listed as the input size. We then seek algorithms that run in time
polynomial in the number of (bundle, value) pairs submitted by the agents as well as n and
m. We now specialize to the XOR bidding language, but similar intractability results hold
for the OR and OR* languages [Sandholm, 2006]. To discuss computational complexity, we
consider the decision version of winner determination, which asks, for a given set of XOR
bids, whether there exists a feasible allocation that has value at most K, where K is any
positive number.
Theorem 7.2.1. [Rothkopf et al., 1998] The decision problem for winner determination
with XOR bids is NP-hard.
The proof shows that winner determination is equivalent to a weighted set packing
problem. This negative result holds even if agents are single-minded and can only submit a
single (bid, value) pair. Additionally, even when agents are single-minded, it is not possible
to approximate the optimal allocation in polynomial time.
Theorem 7.2.2. [Sandholm, 2002, Lehmann et al., 2002] It is not possible for polynomial
time algorithms to guarantee a solution with social welfare at least m 1=2+ times the optimal
social welfare. The result requires that NP 6= ZPP, where ZPP is the class of problems that
can be solved using randomized algorithms that always return the correct answer (regardless
of the realization of the random coin tosses).
7.3 Computational Mechanism Design
The negative computational complexity results serve as one motivation for the study of
computational mechanism design (CMD). CMD imposes that in addition to g and p satis-
fying incentive constraints, we would like the computation of g and p to be tractable, i.e.
take polynomial time in the natural input parameters to the problem.
If we are looking to maximize social welfare in combinatorial auctions and are not
considering computational limits, then we can apply the VCG mechanism discussed in
Section 2.2.3. However, the VCG mechanism requires us to nd the allocation that exactly
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optimizes social welfare, and this problem is NP-hard as discussed in the previous section.
It is tempting to simply replace g with some algorithm g0 that approximately maximizes
social welfare and to use a payment rule that shares the same spirit as the VCG payment
rule in charging agent i the externality it imposes on the agents. Rather than charging
agent i
X
j6=i
vj(g(v))   max
!2

0
@
X
j6=i
vj(!)
1
A;
we can charge agent i
X
j6=i
vj(g0(v))  
X
j6=i
vj(g0(v1;:::;vi 1;vi+1;:::;vn)):
Here we assume that g0 is well-dened when passed n   1 agents as the right hand side of
the expression requires us to compute the allocation when agent i is removed. This is a
reasonable assumption for most algorithms that attempt to maximize welfare.
Unfortunately, using g0 along with the VCG-style payment rule is not DSIC. One easy
way to see why this might be true is to observe that g0 might not satisfy the necessary
properties for there to exist a payment rule that makes it incentive compatible. For instance,
if we are in a restricted CA setting that is single-parameter (such as the known single-minded
setting discussed below), our approximation algorithm g0 might not be monotone in this
single-parameter. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, monotonicity is necessary for there to exist
a payment rule that is DSIC when combined with g0. Even if g0 satises the necessary
conditions for there to exist a DSIC payment rule, the VCG-style payment rule may not be
the right payment rule.
As a result, it is dicult to rely on classic results like the VCG mechanism if we consider
computational constraints in CAs and welfare maximization. We cannot exactly optimize
social welfare and we cannot use a VCG-style rule for algorithms that approximately op-
timize welfare. The challenge is to simultaneously nd (a) approximation algorithms that
do a good job of maximizing welfare and (b) payment rules that work together with the
approximation algorithm to satisfy incentive constraints.
7.4 Single-Minded CAs
There is much recent work in CMD, and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to broadly
survey the state of the eld. Section II of [Nisan et al., 2007] provides a more thorough
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exposition. Here we introduce the special case of single-minded CAs as they will be relevant
for the next two chapters. We also point the reader to Section 1.2.3 and the related work
sections of Chapters 8 and 9 for additional background on related work in CMD.
In single-minded CA, each agent is interested in a single bundle. Therefore, an agent's
valuation is summarized by its target bundle Si along with its value for this bundle vi(Si).
If the target bundle Si is publicly known, then this becomes a single-parameter setting since
an agent's valuation is pinned down by its value for the publicly known target bundle.
While restrictive, there are settings where bidders may be known single-minded. Lehmann
et al. [2002] describe a pollution rights auction where companies are bidding for the right to
emit certain chemicals into the air, and the pollution proles of the companies are known.
They also describe communication network settings where bidders own nodes in the network
and wish to connect their nodes. If there is only a single-path between any pair of nodes,
then bidders are single-minded. If it is also public knowledge which companies own which
pairs of nodes, then this becomes a known single-minded setting.
While the known single-minded setting is easier than the single-minded setting from
an incentives perspective (since an agent can only lie about its value for the target bundle
and not the identity of the bundle), computing the welfare-maximizing allocation is still
NP-hard as discussed in Section 7.2.
Single-minded CA oer an example of a setting where algorithms that approximately
maximize welfare have been used successfully in the context of mechanism design. Lehmann
et al. [2002] provide a greedy algorithm and associated payment rule with a 1=
p
m welfare
guarantee (relative to the optimal welfare), where m is the number of items being allo-
cated, and a matching lower-bound. More recently, Mu'alem and Nisan [2008] provide an
approximation for the special case of known single-minded CAs with guarantee 1=(
p
m)
for any xed  > 0, with runtime that is exponential in 1=2. These advancements both pro-
vide worst-case guarantees in terms of welfare compared with the optimal and polynomial
time computation. The drawback is that in order to obtain these worst-case guarantees and
incentive-compatibility it is necessary to be able to reason analytically about the algorithms.
In the next two chapters, we explore a more computational approach to designing mech-
anisms. In Chapter 8, we consider using branch and bound search as our algorithm for
nding an allocation with good welfare. In Chapter 9, we relax our requirement for exact
incentive-compatibility and provide a general framework that learns payment rules to pair
with any provided outcome rule.
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Monotone Branch and Bound
Search
In this chapter, we consider the mechanism design problem for known single-minded CAs.
While we focus on this specic setting, our high-level ideas apply to the more general set-
ting of single-parameter downward-closed domains (allocation problems where removing an
agent's allocation from a feasible allocation remains feasible). As discussed in Section 7.4,
known single-minded CAs are an interesting problem in CMD as the winner determina-
tion problem remains NP-hard, despite the severe restrictions on agent valuations and the
assumption that agents' target bundles are publicly known. The existing approaches of
Lehmann et al. [2002] and Mu'alem and Nisan [2008] give polynomial time algorithms with
worst-case guarantees on the welfare of the computed allocation along with appropriate
payments that make the resulting mechanism DSIC.
However, if incentives were not a concern, we have more sophisticated algorithms such
as Branch-and-Bound (BnB) search, which can eciently nd optimal solutions to the
winner determination problem on typical instances. Following a research agenda on heuristic
mechanism design [Parkes, 2009], we seek to leverage heuristic algorithms such as BnB
search for the purpose of CMD.
BnB search is a canonical method for solving optimization problems that are formulated
as integer programs (IPs). Search proceeds by branching on decisions in regard to whether
or not an agent is allocated (\branch"), and looking to prune large parts of the search space
through linear program (LP) relaxations (\bound"). In cases where it is too computationally
expensive to compute the optimal solution, an optimality tolerance  2 (0;1] is adopted, and
search is terminated when a solution is identied that is proven to be within multiplicative
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fraction  of the optimal solution.
But therein lies the core problem in combining BnB with incentive compatible mecha-
nism design:
(i) a natural adaptation of the payments of the VCG mechanism need not be truthful
when coupled with an approximate solution to a welfare optimization problem (see Section
7.3, and
(ii) the allocation generated by BnB search when used with an optimality tolerance
 < 1 need not be monotone, in the sense that an agent might go from winning at some
bid value wi to losing at some bid w0
i > wi.
BnB search is monotone for  = 1 because it computes the optimal allocation. But
monotonicity can fail with BnB when  < 1, because a higher agent value can trigger
a dierent search decision somewhere in the search tree, eventually leading to the search
terminating with an alternate solution that is within a factor  of optimal but does not
include the agent.
8.1 Our Results
Correcting this failure of monotonicity, we follow an approach introduced by Parkes and
Duong [2007] in a dierent context. Given an instance, we check to see whether agent i
allocated at bid wi becomes unallocated for any bid w0
i > wi (xing the other bids.) If this
occurs, then the outcome is \corrected" (or ironed) such that the agent is not allocated at
bid wi. By doing this for all inputs, we achieve monotone BnB search (and thus incentive-
compatibility). Moreover, the approach retains good welfare if the original search algorithm
is monotone for most agents on most inputs.
The technical challenge is to nd an ecient method to trace the eect on the outcome
of BnB search as the bid value of an agent is increased, taking each agent in turn. From
the perspective of an IP, we are increasing an objective coecient and tracing the eect
on decisions made during BnB search (e.g., branch decisions and pruning decisions.) The
technical innovations involved in making this sensitivity analysis of BnB search ecient
include:
 An ecient technique to identify the next highest objective value coecient at which
a dierent search decision would be made for a given BnB search state.
 Caching search states to avoid re-running early steps of BnB search that remain the
same when testing higher objective value coecients.
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 Leveraging structure of BnB search to identify sucient conditions that ensure that
agent i is allocated in any BnB solution, and terminating sensitivity checks early when this
is the case.
 Caching of LP solutions to avoid expensive re-computations when the solutions would
not have changed.
 Making BnB search more monotone by adopting a bucketing approach to fractional
variables in deciding which variable to branch on, and through a discrete transformation
on the inputs.
We implement our technique and report experimental results based on the well-studied
\legacy" distributions. We did not use the named CATS distributions (matching, paths,
regions, scheduling) as there is no straight-forward way to adapt these to the single-minded
setting. In particular, we focus on the L4 (decay) distribution, which has been shown in
the literature to generate hard winner determination problems Leyton-Brown et al. [2000],
Sandholm [2002], Sandholm et al. [2005]. We nd sets of randomly generated instances from
the L4 distribution where the best parameterizations of our monotone BnB algorithm yield
better welfare than the approximation mechanisms of Lehmann et al. [2002] and Mu'alem
and Nisan [2008].
Additionally, the best parameterizations of monotone BnB (and for an optimality toler-
ance  < 1 at which welfare is better than existing approximation mechanisms) have better
runtime than optimal BnB. Monotone BnB is also fully parallelizable in the number of
allocated agents while the same is not true of optimal BnB. The fully parallelized runtime
cost of monotone BnB is signicantly smaller than that of optimal BnB for the best param-
eterizations of monotone BnB and instances we consider. Though our experimental results
depend crucially on these input distributions, we believe they demonstrate the potential of
the general approach and the specic application to BnB search.
In addition, while earlier work has developed techniques for the sensitivity analysis of
optimal solutions to IPs [Marsten and Morin, 1977, Feautrier, 1988], we are not aware of
earlier work on the sensitivity of BnB search when used with an optimality tolerance. For
this reason, we also provide some analysis of the kinds of decisions that tend to change
during search and the kinds of monotonicity failures that we see on our instances. We see
that on our test instances, the most common changes result from a pivot to a new LP
solution, which causes a change in the branch variable selected.
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8.2 Related Work
We follow earlier work of Parkes and Duong [2007] and Constantin and Parkes [2009],
who have applied so-called \computational ironing" to online stochastic combinatorial opti-
mization (OSCO). BnB search is more complex algorithmically than the OSCO algorithms
studied in this earlier work, and requires new technical contributions in nding an ecient
coupling with the approach of computational ironing.
Also thematically related to heuristic mechanism design is the GrowRange method of
Parkes and Schoenebeck [2004], which provides an anytime algorithm for welfare optimiza-
tion in general CAs by expanding the range of a VCG-based algorithm, while allowing for a
time-based interruption by the center (although without providing full strategyproofness.)
As discussed in Section 1.2.3, there are several papers that look at converting algorithms
into incentive compatible algorithms while preserving the welfare performance of the original
algorithm [Briest et al., 2005, Lavi and Swamy, 2011, Dughmi and Roughgarden, 2010,
Hartline and Lucier, 2010, Hartline et al., 2011]. A key dierence with most of this work
is that our mechanism is DSIC while most of these previous papers provide randomized
truthful in expectation mechanisms or BIC mechanisms. Of these papers, only Briest et al.
[2005] examine DSIC. They provide a DSIC mechanism whose outcome rule is an FPTAS
for social welfare, assuming the existence of an optimal pseudopolynomial time algorithm
for welfare maximization. Single-minded CAs, which we study, do not have an optimal
pseudopolynomial time algorithm for welfare maximization, so their main result does not
apply to our setting. They do leverage their technical insights to give a new algorithm for
multi-unit CAs where there are at least B copies of each item. However, for the single-
minded CA problem we study B may equal 1 (we may have only one copy of each item),
and their new algorithm does yield optimal worst-case approximation ratios (in contrast to
the algorithms of Lehmann et al. [2002] and Mu'alem and Nisan [2008]). In addition to the
specic dierences with respect to the work of Briest et al. [2005], we are not aware of any
computational validation of these other approaches. Indeed, one of our main contributions is
to implement and experimentally test our approach on distributions studied in the literature.
8.3 Preliminaries
In known single-minded CAs each agent has a target bundle Ti, known to the mechanism,
and a value wi > 0 for this bundle. We thus refer to agent reports as being this single
value wi, rather than a report of an agent's entire valuation function vi. Also, we consider
124CHAPTER 8 MONOTONE BRANCH AND BOUND SEARCH
deterministic allocation functions, so we can assume that gi(wi;w i) 2 f0;1g corresponding
to whether or not the agent is allocated its target bundle.
Denition 8.3.1. An allocation function g is monotone in a known single minded-domain
if gi(wi;w i) = 1 ) gi(w0
i;w i) = 1 for all w0
i  wi.
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, for deterministic allocation functions g and single-parameter
agent preferences, there exists a payment function p that makes (g;p) truthful i g is mono-
tone. In fact, once the allocation function is known, the payment function can be computed
by nding the \critical value" at which an agent starts receiving its target bundle. As a
result, for single-dimensional settings such as known single-minded CAs, the problem of
constructing truthful mechanisms can be reduced to that of nding monotone allocation
functions. In the context of the proposed framework, once an allocation has been conrmed
for an agent by performing a check of monotonicity for all higher reports the agent could
have made, then a parallel, downward sensitivity check is performed to nd the rst smaller
value at which the agent would no longer be allocated.
Known single-minded CAs are a special case of the more general class of downward
closed environments.
Denition 8.3.2. A single-dimensional mechanism design environment is downward closed
if an outcome is described by a set of agents allocated, and for a given outcome, there exists
an outcome that is associated with any subset of the allocated agents.
In the known single-minded setting, wlog, we can specify an outcome by giving the set
of agents that receive their target bundle. Technically there are many feasible allocations
that are aliated with satisfying a given set of agents, but we can limit consideration to
allocations that do not give agents more than their target bundle since this agents get no
additional value from additional items in the single-minded setting. The downward closed
property holds since if it is possible to give a set of agents each their target bundle, then we
can satisfy any subset of that set as well. While we focus on known single-minded CAs, the
general ironing procedure developed in Section 8.4 applies to single-dimensional, downward
closed environments.
8.4 Ironing, Discretization and a First Approach
We rst describe the very basic approach to making heuristic algorithms monotone for
single-parameter, downward closed domains. In the next sections, we propose techniques
to reduce the computational overhead in the particular context of BnB search.
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The basic idea of ironing is straightforward. We rst compute the set of allocated agents
using our allocation algorithm at the current values. We then perform sensitivity analysis
on the set of allocated agents. For each allocated agent, we check if the agent would still be
allocated under the allocation algorithm for all higher reported values. If an agent becomes
deallocated for higher reported values, then we must deallocate the agent since this indicates
a non-monotonicity in the provided allocation function. This general procedure is described
as ironed-alloc in Algorithm 7. We focus on the allocation function in the body of the paper,
but the same ideas can be applied to compute payments for allocated agents by performing
downward sensitivity rather than upward sensitivity.
Theorem 8.4.1. The ironed-alloc procedure is monotone and feasible for downward closed
domains.
Proof. An agent is allocated in ironed-alloc only if the agent is allocated at its current value
and all higher reported values. If this is the case, then ironed-alloc would still have allocated
the agent for all higher reports.
Algorithm 7 ironed-alloc(alloc-func, values)
allocated = alloc-func(values)
for agent 2 allocated do
if is-deallocated-at-higher-values(agent) then
allocated = allocated n agent
end if
end for
return allocated
Algorithm 8 discretized-ironed-alloc(alloc-func, values, )
for value 2 values do
value = bvalue=c
end for
allocated = alloc-func(values)
for agent 2 allocated do
if is-deallocated-at-higher-values(agent) then
allocated = allocated n agent
end if
end for
return allocated
If the underlying allocation function is monotone everywhere, then ironed-alloc will be
the same as the underlying algorithm. If it is not, then ironed-alloc may sacrice welfare
(since it must deallocate some agents) in order to preserve monotonicity.
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As stated, ironed-alloc applies to continuous type domains as long as we have a method
for sensitivity checking; i.e., to determine whether an agent will become deallocated for any
higher reports. However, such a procedure may not always be available, and even when it
is, implementing such procedures in practice may introduce an implicit discretization.12
For this reason, we introduce a discretized version of ironed-alloc that is monotone in
the original domain, even if the original domain is continuous, and still results in payments
that are individually rational. The procedure mimics ironed-alloc, except that agent bids
are rounded down to the nearest grid size  (Figure 7).
Theorem 8.4.2. Procedure discretized-ironed-alloc is monotone and admits individually
rational payments.
Proof. The proof of monotonicity is the same as Theorem 8.4.1. To see that payments are
individually rational, recall that given a monotone allocation function, the payment of an
agent is the lowest value at which the agent would still be allocated. Suppose that an agent
is allocated when bidding wi. This means that the agent would also be allocated with bid
bwi=c  wi, so the agent's payment is at most wi.
With grid size , we can obtain a procedure is-deallocated-at-higher-values by testing
all multiples of  that are greater than the agent's current value, to see whether the agent
would still be allocated. Because discretized-ironed-alloc rounds values down to multiples
of  prior to sending them to the allocation function, this will capture all possible points
where the agent could have become deallocated. We refer to this as the brute force sensitivity
method.
There is an interesting trade-o in using discretization in the context of ironing. On
one hand, the allocation function no longer accesses exact agent values, which can result in
allocations with lower welfare compared to the allocations computed using the true values.
On the other hand, adopting a discretization may actually improve the \ironed" welfare
because there are fewer points where the algorithm is required to still allocate the agent,
and as a result, the underlying algorithm may become more monotone and deallocate fewer
agents.
12Initially, we developed our sensitivity checking procedure for continuous values. We identied sensitivity
points w1 based on whether the search might change for any value strictly greater than w1 (open) or for
any value weakly greater than w1 (closed). To handle open points, we needed to introduce a parameter  to
jump the agent's value to w1 + when running counter-factuals. This discussion will be clearer after Section
8.6.
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8.5 Branch-and-Bound Search for Single-Minded CAs
An empirically eective way to nd an allocation with good welfare for CAs is to formulate
the problem as an integer program (IP) and use BnB search. We describe the essentials of
this approach in this section.
We assume that we are in a known single-minded setting with n agents and m items and
that each agent is interested in a single bundle Ti and reports value wi to the mechanism. We
can write the following winner determination IP (WDIP) to solve for the welfare-maximizing
allocation:
maximize
n X
i=1
wixi (8.1)
subject to
X
i:j2Ti
xi  1; 1  j  m (8.2)
xi 2 f0;1g; 1  i  n (8.3)
The linear programming (LP) relaxation of this IP is the same program, except with the
integer constraints (8.3) replaced by inequalities of the form 0  xi  1. Given this, Branch-
and-Bound (BnB) is a tree search technique that uses the relationship between an IP and
its LP relaxation to prune parts of the search tree. We will focus on the case where the
variables are binary (0 or 1) since the IPs we consider will have this form.
The basic components of the search are the nodes in the search tree. Each node k stores
an integer partial assignment, i.e. t = fx2 = 0;x4 = 1g, along with a solution fx
1;:::;x
ng
to LPt, where LPt is the LP relaxation of WDIP, with extra constraints added to enforce
t. Let t(k) denote the partial assignment stored in k. With a slight abuse of notation, we
say j 2 t(k) if xj is set to 0 or 1 in t(k).
Let the value of an LP be
Pn
i=1 wix
i, where x
1;:::;x
n is the solution to the LP, and
the value of a node k = val(k) be the value of its LP relaxation. Because the value of an
LP relaxation is an upper bound on its associated IP, val(k) is an upper bound on any
integer solution that agrees with t(k). A solution fx
ig is integral if x
i 2 f0;1g 8i, and
fractional otherwise. In Figure 8.1(a), node 1 corresponds to an empty partial assignment,
while nodes 2 and 3 correspond to partial assignments fx2 = 0g, fx2 = 1g respectively.
This indicates that x2 is set to 0 in node 2 and all its children, while x2 is set to 1 in node
3 and all its children.
A search tree has a root node with an empty partial assignment, and other nodes are
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X2 = 1 X2 = 0
X3 = 0
X3 = 1
Integral, Value: 2.1
{ x1* = 1, x3* = 1, x4* = 0 }
Fractional, Value: 2.15
{ x1* = 0.8, x4* = 0.1 }
Fractional, Value: 2.7
{ x1* = 0.2, x4* = 0.6 }
1
2 3
4 5
(a)
X2 = 1 X2 = 0
X3 = 0 X3 = 1 Integer, X1* = 1
Bias = 2.1
Value = W1 + 2.1
Frac, X1* = 0.5
Bias = 2.4
Value = 0.5W1 + 2.4
Frac, X1* = 0
Bias = 2.7
Value = 2.7
W1
Frac, X1* = 1.0 
Bias = 2.15
Value = W1 + 2.15
1
2 3
4 5
W1 ≥ 0.5:
W1 ≤ 0.5:
(b)
Figure 8.1: (a) A simple illustration of a Branch-and-Bound search tree. (b) An illustration
of the augmented search state and get-sens-single-state.
either an internal node with two children or a leaf node. The left child of an internal node k
corresponds to adding xj = 0 to t(k) while the right child corresponds to adding xj = 1 to
t(k), for some j = 2 t(k). An important property of a search tree is that any integer solution
agrees with the partial solution in exactly one leaf of the search tree, i.e. the leaves of any
search tree partition the space of possible integer solutions.
The search state s is a collection of nodes, and corresponds to the leaf nodes in a valid
search tree. I(s) denotes the integral nodes associated with s, F(s) the fractional nodes
associated with s, and K(s) = I(s) [ F(s) all nodes associated with s. In Figure 8.1(a),
the search state consists of nodes 2, 4, 5, with node 2 integral and nodes 4 and 5 fractional.
Given a search state s, we dene the dec(s) to be the decision associated with s. To specify
the decision, we assume that BnB is being run to an optimality tolerance  2 (0;1], where
 = 1 represents full optimality. The search decision consists of:
1. Whether or not to terminate the search because a solution with welfare at least 
times the optimal has been found.
2. If the search is terminated, a node k 2 I(s) that has the highest value.
3. If the search is not terminated,
(a) A node k 2 F(s) to be selected.
(b) A variable xj to be branched.
129CHAPTER 8 MONOTONE BRANCH AND BOUND SEARCH
The crux of BnB lies in how the decision associated with s is computed. We dene:
UB(s) = max
k:k2F(s)
val(k);LB(s) = max
k:k2I(s)
val(k)
If   UB(s)  LB(s), then terminate, and select a node k 2 I(s) that has value LB(s).
If   UB(s) > LB(s), then select a node k 2 F(s);  val(k) > LB(s) to be explored
(select-node) along with a variable xj to be branched (branch-variable). Altogether, the
BnB procedure proceeds as:
1. Initialize s to be a single node corresponding to the empty partial assignment.
2. Repeat until termination:
 Compute dec(s).
 If terminate, return the integral solution in the node given by dec(s) and termi-
nate.
 If not terminate, update s by replacing the node given by dec(s) with two children
corresponding to branching the variable xj given by dec(s).
There are various choices for how to implement the select-node and branch-variable
functions. For instance, select-node can choose the deepest node, breaking ties by value,
(depth-rst) or choose the node with the highest LP solution value (breadth-rst) or alternate
between the two. A popular choice for branch-variable is to select the most fractional
variable in the LP solution, but other choices are also possible (see e.g. Chapter II.4 in
[Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1998]). The best choices for these functions are typically domain
specic. In our work, we choose depth-rst for select-node until an integral node is found,
after which point we use breadth-rst. For branch-variable, we focus on variants of selecting
the most fractional variable.
Upon termination, BnB will return a solution with welfare at least  times the optimal.
This is true because at each step max(LB(s);UB(s)) is an upper bound on the value of
any integer solution to WDIP because of the admissibility (or optimistic) estimate of value
that comes from the use of LP relaxations and because the nodes in s partition the space
of integer solutions.
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8.6 Optimized Sensitivity Checking for BnB
In this section, we demonstrate an optimized sensitivity checker (i.e. an implementation of
is-deallocated-at-higher-values) that takes advantage of the structure of BnB search. In what
follows, we assume that we are performing sensitivity checking in the context of discrete-
ironed-alloc, and can therefore assume that input values are multiples of . To avoid LP
degeneracy (which is problematic for sensitivity because we are unsure which solution will
be picked for higher agent values), in our experiments, we add a random value in [0;) to
the discretized agent values. This perturbation is independent of an agent's report and thus
does not aect truthfulness. In practice, to maintain individual rationality, one would want
to subtract a random value, but our implementation adds a random value to avoid special
casing perturbations that lead to negative values. This should not have any substantive
eect on our experimental results, as properties of the solution are always computed with
respect to the original values prior to any discretization or perturbation. For the duration
of this section, we assume without loss of generality that we are performing sensitivity
checking for agent 1.
Rather than re-run the search for every higher multiple of , we would ideally like to skip
multiples of  that provably continue allocating agent 1 in the solution returned by BnB.
The core of such a procedure would consist of a function get-sensitivity that runs BnB with
agent 1's value set to w1, but in addition to returning an allocation, returns the next value
w0
1 > w1 for which we should re-run the search. We could then use the following procedure
(summarized in Algorithm 9) as a replacement for the brute force sensitivity checker. We
rst run get-sensitivity with agent 1's reported value. This returns the allocation BnB would
have returned, along with the next higher value w0
1 at which the allocation might change.
We set agent 1's value to w0
1, and re-run get-sensitivity. If the allocation returned continues
to allocate agent 1, then continue the process. Terminate if an allocation returned does not
allocate agent 1 or if the next highest value exceeds the maximum allowed value. If the
possible values are uncapped, we could always set a very high max value, and treat (the
rare case of) any reports greater than this value as being the max value.
The next two sections are devoted to dening get-sensitivity. We rst examine how a
change in w1 aects a specic node in the search state, and we then use these observations
to provide an implementation for get-sensitivity.
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Algorithm 9 optimized-is-deallocated-at-higher-values(alloc-func, values, agent, )
sens-value = values(agent)
while sens-value < max-value do
values(agent) = sens-value
alloc, next value = get-sensitivity(alloc-func,values, agent, )
if agent = 2 alloc then
return true
end if
sens-value = next-value
end while
return false
8.6.1 Impact of a Change in Value on a Search Node
We rst examine how a node in the search state (recall, associated with an LP) changes
when agent 1's reported value increases. We separate these changes into two types.
Solution value changes
As a agent 1's reported value increases, the solution to the LP relaxation in a given node
may not change, but the value of the solution will change if x
1 > 0 in the solution. If we
assume that the solution does not change, then we can easily track how the solution value
changes as the agent's reported value increases. Let x
1;:::;x
n be the fractional solution to
the LP relaxation at a node. The solution value as a function of agent 1's report w1 is
val(w1) = w1x
1 +
 
n X
i=2
wix
i
!
;
where the expression within the parenthesis does not depend on w1. We call x
1 the coecient
and the term in parenthesis the bias of the node.
LP solution changes
As an agent's reported value increases, the solution to the LP relaxation at the node can
change. LPs have the property that solutions lie at corners of the polyhedron formed by
the constraints of the LP. The solution stays the same for a range of values, until the
agent's value reaches a critical point where the LP is degenerate, and two solutions share
the same value. Above this, the new solution becomes the unique optimal solution. The
literature on LPs provides simple computational procedures for computing the sensitivity
of an LP solution to coecients in the objective function (see e.g. Section 5.1, [Bertsimas
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Figure 8.2: Sensitivity of the LP solution value to changes in agent 1's value.
and Tsitsiklis, 1997]).
Worked example
Figure 8.2 illustrates these two types of changes by charting how the value of the LP
relaxation changes as the value of agent 1 moves from 0 to 1. The gure on the left
represents the simple case where the LP corresponds to the root node of the following
instance with 3 agents and 5 goods: Agent 1 desires fA;D;Eg, agent 2 desires fA;Bg at
0.2, and agent 3 desires fB;Eg at 0.35. When agent 1's value is 0, the LP solution sets
x
2 = 0;x
3 = 1 and has value 0.35. When agent 1's value reaches 0.15, the LP solution
changes to x
1 = 0:5;x
2 = 0:5;x
3 = 0:5. At this point, the rst and second solutions have
the same value. When agent 1's value reaches 0.55, agent 1 becomes fully allocated with
x
1 = 1. In [0;0:15], the value of the LP solution does not depend on agent 1's value. In
[0:15;0:55] the value of the LP solution has slope 0.5, and in [0:55;0:1], the value of the LP
solution has slope 1.0. The gure on the right depicts a more complicated example for the
root node LP of an instance with 300 agents. Each marked point on the graph depicts a
point where the LP solution changes, and within marked points, the value of the LP solution
is linear in the value of agent 1, with the slope governed by the assignment x
1 in the LP
solution. This example is representative of how the LP solution can be quite sensitive to
changes in agent 1's value. As is the case in these examples, the slope increases as agent
1's value increases.
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8.6.2 Isolating Major Changes and Dening get-sensitivity
Having discussed the two ways in which a change in an agent's value aects a node in a
search state, we present our implementation of get-sensitivity. The get-sensitivity method
runs the search with agent 1's value set to w1, but in addition to running the search, returns
a higher value w0
1 > w1 at which to re-run the search. The guarantee is that if get-sensitivity
returns w0
1, then setting agent 1's value to any multiple of  in (w1;w0
1) and running BnB
must still result in an allocation that contains agent 1.
As we run the BnB procedure, we can ask at each search state, what higher value of agent
1's report might cause a change to occur in the search? Therefore, we reduce get-sensitivity
to the simpler problem of guring out the value at which the decision at a single state would
change. The minimum of these sensitivity values across all search states processed in BnB
provides the next value to be returned by get-sensitivity. We call this single search state
procedure get-sens-single-state.
A rst attempt at get-sens-single-state would consider any higher value at which any
aspect of a search state changes (e.g., the value of solution at any associated node in the
state.) But this would trigger a large number of changes since the number of nodes scales
with the number of steps in the search.
Instead, we focus (for a given state s) on identifying the next higher value at which
the search decision changes (i.e., whether or not we terminate, change the identity of the
integral node in the case of termination, or change the selected node or branch variable if
we do not terminate).
In what follows, we assume that select-node is breadth-rst and chooses the fractional
node with highest value, although we can adapt the procedure to other choices of select-
node. To handle other cases (such as depth-rst), we have to add to the augmented search
state the current deepest node whose value is not dominated by an integral node, and we
need to add extra events to breakpoint which detect when this deepest node changes. In
general, we need to modify the augmented search state and events detected to maintain the
invariant that breakpoint returns a value w0
1 such that values in [w1 temp;w1) all yield the
same decision.
In order to nd the lowest point where the decision associated with s changes, we intro-
duce an augmented search state. Let w1 temp be agent 1's value being currently considered.
We make a distinction versus w1 since w1 temp can be a value higher than w1, the value
that we are currently examining for sensitivity purposes. The augmented search state adds
the following information to a search state:
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1. For each node in the state, compute the coecient and bias for w1 temp.
2. Compute the best integral node for w1 temp.
3. Compute the best fractional node for w1 temp.
The purpose of this augmented search state is to allow us to understand how the search
state changes as agent 1's value increases further from w1 temp, and thus when the search
decision changes. As agent 1's value increases, we know that the values at the various
nodes in the state will each increase linearly based on the coecient of that node. With the
assumption that select-node is breadth-rst, the decision at s depends only on a comparison
between the best integral node and the best fractional node. Figure 8.1(b) gives an example
of the augmented search state.
The method get-sens-single-state for augmented state s0 repeatedly nds the next lowest
value w0
1 > w1 temp where one of the following changes occurs:
1. The best fractional node changes identity.
2. The best integral node changes identity.
3. The value of the best integral node crosses the value of the best fractional node
(possibly multiplied by  if we are not running to optimality).
4. The LP solution of some node changes.
For each such value, the method considers the next higher value on the discrete grid,
and at this value checks to see whether the search decision would actually change at this
state. If it does, then this becomes the relevant sensitivity value for this state| the rst
value at which the search decision rst changes.
8.6.3 Correctness of get-sens-single-state
Theorem 8.6.1. Method get-sens-single-state correctly computes the lowest point w0
1 where
the decision associated with search state s0 would have changed.
Proof. Let w1 temp be as dened in get-sens-single-state and w0
1 be the next lowest value
where one of the events 1-4 occurs. We rst show that s0 is correct for all values in
[w1 temp;w0
1). The coecients and biases in s0 are correct since event 4 has not triggered.
The best integral and best fractional nodes are correct since 1 and 2 have not triggered.
Since s0 is correct for this range of values, the only way the decision could have changed
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in this range of values is if the value of best integral node overtakes the value of the best
fractional node or vice versa. This is caught by event 3, and so must not occur in the range
[w1 temp;w0
1). Therefore, the decision is guaranteed not to change in [w1 temp;w0
1). Because
we are discretizing, we can extend this range to [w1 temp;w0
1) (the inputs to BnB have
to be multiples of ). get-sens-single-state then recomputes the decision with the updated
s0 at w0
1. If the decision has changed, then this is the lowest value at which a change
occurs. If the decision does not change, then we can apply the same argument to show
that the decision will not change in [w0
1;w00
1), where w00
1 is the next value at which an event
triggers.13
get-sens-single-state Example
Figure 8.1(b) shows the augmented search state s0 for dierent ranges of w1, agent 1's value.
The LP solutions in nodes 2 and 5 are not dependent on w1 while the solution in node 4 is
dependent on w1. When w1  0:5, the LP solution in node 4 assigns x
1 = 0:5 with a bias
of 2.4. When w1  0:5, the LP solution in node 4 assigns x
1 = 1:0 with a bias of 2.15.
We now analyze get-sens-single-state. Suppose w1 = 0:25; = 0:01. Node 2 is the best
integral node, while node 5 is the best fractional node. At w0
1 = 0:5 , event 4 is triggered as
the LP solution in node 4 changes to a solution with x
1 = 1:0. Note that at w0
1 = w0
1 = 0:5,
at node 4, the value of the previous LP solution is equal to the value of the new LP solution
(0:50:5+2:4 = 0:5+2:15). No further updates are needed for s0 as node 4's value (2.65) is
still less than node 5's. Though the LP solution in node 4 has changed, the decision remains
to select node 5 and continue searching. The same branch variable will be selected because
the LP solution for node 5 has not changed. As a result, get-sens-single-state will continue,
setting w1 temp to 0.5. Assuming that no LP solutions change, the next event triggered will
be event 1 at value w0
1 = w0
1 = 0:55. At this value, node 4 will overtake node 5 as the
best fractional node (the value of the LP solution in node 4 reaches 2.7 while the value of
the LP solution in node 5 stays at 2.7 and we assume lexicographic tie-breaking by node
index). The decision associated with s0 will now change because node 4 will be selected as
the next node to be explored. get-sens-single-state will return 0.55.
The example demonstrates the key ideas of get-sens-single-state. Not all events will lead
to changes in the decision, but we need to capture all of these events to make sure that s0
13There is a technical detail here due to ties. If w
0
1 = w
0
1, then we have a point where the values of two
nodes cross, and values will be tied at this point. As a result, dec(s
0) at w
0
1 may dier from dec(s
0) for w
0
1+
for a small . In these cases, we need to make sure to check the decision at the next multiple of  greater
than w
0
1 even if events 1-4 do not occur before then.
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reects the true state if agent 1 were to report these higher values. In particular, event 4 is
very important because it makes sure that the coecient and bias values are valid for the
range of agent 1's values being considered.
8.6.4 Implementing get-sens-single-state
The only problem that remains is how to compute the values when events 1-4 occur. For
event 4, we saw in Section 8.6.1 how to detect the next highest value at which the LP
solution changes. Because we detect event 4, we can assume that the coecients and biases
stored in s0 are correct. For events 1 and 2, we need to make pairwise comparisons between
the current best node and all other fractional and integral nodes respectively. For event 3,
we need to compare the best fractional node against the best integral node. Events 1-3 then
reduce to computing when the values of two nodes cross, given their coecients and biases.
If c1;b1;c2;b2 give the coecients and biases of two nodes, we simply solve the following
equation for the crossing value w
1 : c1w
1 + b1 = c2w
1 + b2 ) w
1 = (b2   b1)=(c1   c2).
8.6.5 Hot Restart and Inference
Hot Restart
With get-sens-single-state, we can now fully instantiate get-sensitivity and optimized-is-
deallocated-at-higher-values. To check whether an agent becomes deallocated, take the min-
imum next value returned by calls to get-sens-single-state from every state in the BnB
search and re-run BnB search with the agent's value updated to the minimum next value.
This procedure may already outperform brute force sensitivity because we may skip over
many higher multiples of  that would not have changed any search decision.
However, we can further improve performance with the following optimization. Suppose
that the minimal next value w0
1 returned by all the calls to get-sens-single-state across
all decisions made in the search occurs at step 1000 in the search. This implies that the
decisions at steps 1 through 999 would not have changed if agent 1's value is updated to
w0
1. As a result, we need not re-run all these steps of the search. We can save the state
after step 999 and rerun the search from this point. This inspires the following modied
procedure for get-sensitivity.
Let w1 min represent the lowest next-highest value returned by any call to get-sens-
single-state thus far in the search. Whenever a search decision is made, get-sens-single-state
is called. If the next value returned is weakly greater than w1 min, then ignore it (the search
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Figure 8.3: Progression of optimized-is-deallocated-at-higher-values.
decision would have changed earlier in the search). If the next value returned is less than
w1 min, then reduce w1 min to this value, and take a snapshot of the search state. Push this
snapshot, along with w1 min, onto a list of search states from which to re-run. We refer to
this as hot restart.
Figure 8.3 gives a way to view how this version of optimized-is-deallocated-at-higher-
values proceeds. Each stack in the diagram represents the search states from which the
search needs to be re-run based on current knowledge about the search, along with their
starting steps and the associated sensitivity value for agent 1 in that state. Below each
stack we give the step of the actual search, along with the current value (w1 temp) for agent
1 and the current minimum next value (w1 min) to which sensitivity checking will jump
once the current search is complete. w1 min will always equal the value stored in the top
search state in the stack. As we proceed from left to right, we see that we might add search
states to the stack. This occurs if get-sens-single-state returns a next value that is lower
than w1 min. Once we have run a search state to completion, we process the next search
state in the stack, running get-sensitivity starting at the indicated step and jumping agent
1's value w1 temp forward to the stored value. This is possible because we take a snapshot
of the search state whenever we add a search state to the stack. The stack will expand and
shrink, but the current agent value w1 temp will monotonically increase, and eventually, we
will have processed all search states in the stack and completed sensitivity analysis for the
agent.
Inference: Allowing Early-Stopping
Until this point, we are still actually running the search to completion (even though hot
restart lets us start low in the tree) for all higher values that trigger a sensitivity check,
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even though we only use the allocation to check whether the sensitivity agent remains in
the allocation. This is all we care about: we don't need the full details of the allocation!
Leveraging this insight, we devise early stopping rules in the sensitivity checker. If we
are sure that the search will terminate with a solution that contains agent 1, we do not need
to run the search to completion (this is what we mean by \inference"). The main idea is
to upper-bound the value of any solution where agent 1 is not allocated, and then use this
upper bound to argue that the search will always terminate with a solution that allocates
agent 1. One such upper bound is to take the max over the LP relaxations of all nodes in
the current state, with the extra constraint x1 = 0. This bound can be carried over from
previous search states as well. Indeed, if the current best integral node allocates agent 1
and has value greater than these bounds, search can be terminated early. This is formalized
in the following theorem.
Let s be the current search state. For a node k, let k(x1) indicate the value x
1 in the
solution stored at k. Let LPxi=0(k) be the value of LP relaxation at a given node, with the
extra constraint that variable xi = 0.
Theorem 8.6.2. Suppose that we are checking sensitivity for agent 1 at value w0
1 and in
a search state s. Suppose that the current best integral node in s allocates agent 1 and has
value w.
1. Let
w0 = max
k:k2F(s)
LPx1=0(k):
If w0 < w, then the search starting from s will result in a solution that allocates agent
1.
2. Let s0 be any search state that has been run to completion (i.e. all fractional nodes
have been pruned by some leaf node). Let
w0 = max
k:k2F(s0)
LPx1=0(k);
w00 = max
k:k2I(s0);k(x1)=0
val(k):
If max(w0;w00) < w, then the search starting from s will result in a solution that
allocates agent 1.
Proof. The main idea of the proof is to show that w0 in the rst case and max(w0;w00) in
the second case are valid upper bounds on the value of any solution with x1 = 0. Once this
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is shown, we know that the search starting in s will not nd any solutions that set agent 1
to 0 and have better solution value than the current best solution, which sets agent 1 to 1.
In the rst case, all leaf nodes with x1 = 0 have value less than w and will not be
selected. The children of the fractional nodes may yield a solution with x1 = 0, but the
value of these solutions is upper bounded by the value of the relaxation, LPx1=0(k).
In the second case, the key observation is that the value of a solution with x1 = 0 does
not change as agent 1's value increases. As a result, we can use upper bounds on solutions
with x1 = 0 from other search states s0 that have already been run to completion. w0 gives
the upper bound across fractional nodes in s0, while w00 gives the upper bound across leaf
nodes with x1 = 0. Any solution with x1 = 0 is either a leaf node with x1 = 0 or a child of
an fractional node, and therefore max(w0;w00) is a valid upper bound on the value of any
solution with x1 = 0.
At the cost of some extra computation (computing LP relaxations with the x1 = 0),
this allows us to stop searching once it is clear agent 1 will be allocated in any solution
returned.
8.6.6 Linear Program Caching, Parallelization
Linear Program Caching
The most expensive part of BnB search and sensitivity analysis is solving the LP relaxations
for nodes. However, a key insight is that in the course of sensitivity analysis, we may revisit
nodes with the same integer partial assignment over and over, with the only dierence being
that w1 might be set to a higher value. As a result, when running get-sensitivity, we cache
LP solutions, along with the upper bounds for when the LP solutions change (as in Section
8.6.1). When we need to solve an LP in a later BnB search with value w0
1, we rst make
a lookup in this cache to see if there is an already computed LP solution whose upper
bound is greater than w0
1 and reuse the previously computed solution if one is found. LP
solves dominate the runtime for sensitivity analysis, and this greatly decreases the number
of solves needed for sensitivity analysis (see Section 8.8.2).
An optimization related to LP caching is that of using optimal solutions from parent
nodes in the BnB search tree to \hot start" the LP solve process for child nodes during
sensitivity analysis. We did implement this, but we did not see substantial gains so we
abandoned it for simplicity and to keep our memory footprint small. It would be of interest
to pursue this direction further in future work.
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Figure 8.4: The allocation function for dierent agents on a decay instance with 1000 agents
and 100 items (see Section 9.7). Agents were chosen because of non-monotonicities in the
BnB search for these agents.
Parallelization
While we have to perform sensitivity analysis for every allocated agent, the sensitivity
analysis for each agent is completely independent of the sensitivity analysis for other agents.
As a result, sensitivity checking can be perfectly parallelized. In our experimental results,
we report this parallelized runtime, which is the time required to solve the initial search
plus the maximum runtime for optimized-is-deallocated-at-higher-values across all allocated
agents.
8.7 Making Branch-and-Bound Search more Monotone
In order for the allocation computed by discretized-ironed-alloc to have good welfare prop-
erties, we need the underlying heuristic algorithm to be monotone for many agents on many
instances. If not, then many agents will be deallocated, and even if the original, un-ironed
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solution has high welfare, the ironed solution will not. Recognizing this, we introduce two
methods for making BnB more monotone.
8.7.1 Input Discretization
As discussed in Section 8.4, one way to decrease the number of deallocations is to increase
the grid size . With discretization, an agent remains allocated as long as the heuristic
allocation function continues to allocate the agent for all higher multiples of . Figure 8.7
shows the allocation curve for several agents in one of our experimental instances. The
gure is generated using  = 0:01. Many of the non-monotonicities in the curves survive
for a small range of values. Increasing  allows these small ranges to be skipped over and
increases monotonicity. But there is a tradeo with solution quality because the input is
approximated.
8.7.2 Fractional Bucketing
We also introduce the notion of \bucketing" when selecting which variable to branch at a
node. The classic variable selection algorithm in BnB search is to take the most fractional
variable; i.e., the variable with value closest to 0.5. But this is very sensitive to small changes
in the LP solution, and can result in many search decision changes even if the selected node
remains the same since the branch variable may change. To remedy this, we experiment
with bucketing variables based on their fractionality and choosing the lexicographically
rst variable in the smallest bucket. For example, consider an LP solution fx1 = 0:41;x2 =
0:48;x3 = 0:7;x4 = 0:51g. The most fractional variable without any bucketing is x4. But
with a bucket size of 0:2, x1;x2;x4 are all placed in the same bucket (the bucket representing
values in [0:4;0:6]), and we break ties on x1. In the extreme case of a bucket size of 1.0,
all variables belong to the same bucket, but we make the exception that we don't select
variables that are already set to 0.0 or 1.0; therefore, a bucket size of 1.0 amounts to selecting
the rst variable that is set to a non-integer value. Larger bucket sizes make the underlying
search more monotone since the decisions in the search are less sensitive to small changes
in the LP solutions, and we see this in our experimental results.
8.8 Experimental Results
In this section, we present experimental results based on an implementation of monotone
BnB search for known single-minded CAs. Our experiments are performed using a custom
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Java implementation of BnB search, using CPLEX as our LP solver. The experiments
are run on a machine with two 8 core 2.4GHz Intel Xeon processors. We implement the
optimized version of get-sensitivity, as well as hot restart, inference / early-stopping, and
LP caching.
We generate agent valuations using the decay (L4) distribution with parameter  = 0:75
and a number of agents equal to ten times the number of items as this has been shown to
generate hard winner determination instances [Leyton-Brown et al., 2000, Sandholm et al.,
2005]. In our experiments, we x node selection to choose the deepest node if no integral
node has been found, and the node with highest value otherwise. For variable selection,
we select the most fractional variable with dierent bucket sizes, as described in Section
8.7.2. For our discretization procedure, we rst normalize values to [0;1] by dividing by a
maximum value. For the L4 distribution with  = 0:75, 30 is a reasonable maximum value.
Values larger than 30 are normalized to 1.0.
8.8.1 Welfare Analysis
We generate 50 random instances from the decay distribution with 300 agents, 30 items,
and  = 0:75. We vary , , and the variable selection algorithm. For variable selection,
the bucket sizes that we consider are no bucket size, 0.2 and 1.0. For this dataset, running
to full optimality is very fast (on the order of seconds), so these instances do not represent
a domain on which we would want to use our ironing procedure. Rather, they are a way to
examine the impact of search parameterization on the quality of the ironed solution.
Figure 8.5 presents the welfare results. Each graph is for a particular  2 f0:9;0:95;0:99g
and plots average welfare of the solution across the 50 instances (relative to the optimal)
as  increases (i.e., more discretization.) greedy-LOS indicates the welfare of the greedy
algorithm from Lehmann et al. [2002], while greedy-5 indicates the welfare of the algorithm
from Mu'alem and Nisan [2008] with a parameter choice of 5. Beyond this value, the run-
time becomes prohibitive without much improvement in welfare (Figure 8.6). The orig line
indicates the original welfare of the solution, i.e. welfare before we check whether agents
need to be deallocated. The iron line indicates the ironed welfare, i.e. welfare after agents
have been deallocated. To make the plots clearer, we plot the original welfare for the most
fractional variable without bucketing. The original welfare is similar for the other bucketing
strategies. Lines with b followed by a oating point number indicate use of bucket sizes.
For instance, b0.2-iron plots the ironed welfare for bucket size 0.2.
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Figure 8.5: Average welfare (compared to the optimal) for dierent search parameterizations
on small instances.
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Figure 8.6: Welfare and runtime for dierent choices of k for MAX(Exhaustive(k);Gk)
algorithm in Mu'alem and Nisan [2008]. Exhaustive(k) is exhaustive search over allocations
of size k, and Gk is a greedy algorithm that ranks using the compact ranking with parameter
k. In the compact ranking with parameter k, a bundle gets a score equal to its value if
its size is at most
p
m=k and 0 otherwise. This algorithm gives an O(
p
m) worst-case
approximation to the optimal social welfare, where the choice of k depends on .
Grid size ()
Figure 8.5 illustrates the eect of the grid size, , on the welfare of the ironing algorithm.
If  is too small, then there are many deallocations, and ironed welfare suers. If  is
too large, then optimizing against the discretized values gives a poor approximation to the
original problem, and welfare suers. There is a peak grid size that is optimal.
Most fractional bucket size
Figure 8.5 conrms that fractional-variable bucketing has a positive eect on the monotone
BnB. The curves with the highest ironed welfare are those with bucket size 1.0.
Optimality tolerance ()
The original welfare is quite similar across dierent values of . We also see that the welfare
of the ironed solution improves as  increases. In particular, for  > 0:95, an optimally
parameterized ironing algorithm does better than the greedy algorithms. (greedy-LOS and
greedy-5 do not have a grid size, so they appear as a constant line.) This occurs with
 = 0:95 despite monotonicity failure and agent deallocations. The good performance
is not because the underlying \orig" algorithm is identifying optimal solutions (and thus
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Figure 8.7: Runtime and number of LP solves for brute force and optimized ironing
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Figure 8.8: Histogram of the steps at which search decisions change, for dierent change
types.  = 0:95; = 0:01, averaged over all bucket sizes and datasets. 300 agents, 30 items.
monotone). Averaged across all bucket sizes, for  = 0:01 and  = 0:9, 34% of the original
solutions are optimal (with respect to the particular grid size). This increases to 45% and
92% for  = 0:95 and  = 0:99.
8.8.2 Eectiveness of Optimized Sensitivity
Comparison to brute force
We compare the brute force approach with the optimized sensitivity approach. We label
the sensitivity checking procedure for BnB the \optimized" algorithm. Figure 8.7 plots the
runtime and number of LPs solved across dierent grid sizes for  = 0:95 and no bucket
size. The graphs for dierent bucket sizes look very similar so for clarity, we only display
no bucket size.
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It shows that runtime is highly correlated with the number of LP solves. The optimized
ironing procedure yields the biggest gains when the grid size is small, though for all grid
sizes, the optimized procedure does have better runtime and a smaller number of calls to
the LP solver. Brute force checks every higher multiple of the  and thus performs work
linear in 1 / . Even for large grid sizes, where the brute force procedure only needs to
make a small number of calls to check sensitivity, the optimized procedure appears to match
or slightly improve on its performance. This is likely due to the fact that the optimized
procedure also leverages larger  in that it rounds to the next highest multiple of  when
checking sensitivity. We did not implement LP caching for the brute force trials, though,
which could potentially decrease runtime and number of LP solves.
LP caching
We dene an LP lookup as any time during sensitivity checking when we request the LP
solution at a given value for the sensitivity agent. LP caching allows us to reuse previously
computed solutions. With  = 0:95; = 0:01, and grouping all bucket sizes together, the
average cache hit rate for LP lookups is around 30%.
8.8.3 Analysis of Search Changes
We also study the particular types of decision changes that take place during sensitivity
checking. For  = 0:95; = 0:01, most decision changes are branch variable changes rather
than select node changes. With no bucket size, there is an average of 27.1 branch variable
changes and 3.8 select node changes. For bucket size 1.0, these numbers decrease to 15.4 and
8.0, indicating that larger bucket sizes do decrease the number of branch variable changes.
Figure 8.8 examines when these changes occur, and we see that branch variable changes
tend to occur in the earlier steps of the search while select node changes are more evenly
distributed.
8.8.4 Hard Instances
In the previous section, the instances we test are easily run to optimality by BnB in a few
seconds. However, they provide useful insights into the parameterizations of our framework
and show that our algorithm can outperform the welfare of greedy algorithms. In this
section, we examine instances where optimal BnB is more computationally intensive and
takes minutes to run to completion. We use decay instances with 1000 agents and 100 items,
 = 0:75. We test dierent parameters, but in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, we focus on the best
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Table 8.1: Welfare (% of optimal) on hard instances.
greedy (LOS) orig-0.025-98-1.0 iron-0.025-98-1.0
0.94 0.96 0.96 (+0.02)
0.89 0.93 0.93 (+0.04)
0.92 0.93 0.93 (+0.00)
0.94 0.93 0.93 (-0.01)
0.87 0.92 0.92 (+0.05)
0.91 0.93 0.93 (+0.02)
0.89 0.93 0.92 (+0.03)
0.91 0.91 0.91 (+0.00)
0.88 0.93 0.93 (+0.04)
0.92 0.93 0.93 (+0.01)
Table 8.2: Runtime (minutes) on hard instances
optimal 0.025-98-1.0 (t) 0.025-98-1.0 (p)
4.55 0.41 0.03
0.24 0.02 0.00
1.17 0.14 0.01
0.53 0.10 0.01
1.94 0.14 0.01
0.78 0.02 0.00
2.25 0.43 0.03
0.47 0.39 0.02
1.26 2.11 0.14
0.20 0.17 0.01
performing parameters  = 0:025; = 0:98 with bucket size 1:0. For welfare, orig indicates
the pre-ironed welfare, while iron indicates the welfare after deallocations. For runtime,
t indicates the total runtime for monotone BnB, while p indicates the fully parallelized
runtime discussed in Section 8.6.6.
From Table 8.1, we see that the welfare produced is better than greedy on these hard
instances, and also that few agents are deallocated as the ironed welfare is close to the
original welfare. We only report greedy-LOS since it outperforms parameterizations of
greedy-k for values of k with runtimes comparable to monotone BnB. Table 8.2 gives the
runtime for optimal BnB and the total and parallelized runtime for monotone BnB. Running
to optimality tends to take more time than monotone BnB, but there are exceptions. In
addition, the fully parallelized runtime (Section 8.6.6) for our algorithm is better than
optimal BnB. We also note that to maintain truthfulness with optimal BnB we must be
able to run every instance to completion, so we care about the long tail of the runtime
distribution. With monotone BnB, the search itself is fast because we run to an optimality
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tolerance, and sensitivity checking for a single agent is not overly expensive. The expense
comes in having to check every allocated agent, and as we have mentioned, this can be
parallelized. In this sense, we can reliably decrease runtime for monotone BnB with more
computational resources, in contrast with the scalability that would be oered by state-of-
the-art parallel Branch-and-Bound solvers.
8.9 Summary and Future Work
We introduce a method for monotone BnB search by performing automated sensitivity
analysis in regard to changes in the outcome of search in response to changes in objective
value coecients. In application to known single-minded CAs, the experimental results
demonstrate higher decision quality compared with greedy algorithms when coupled with
an optimality tolerance  < 1, and thus when the algorithm is not simply identifying
the optimal allocation. We believe the results in regard to the scalability of sensitivity
checking of BnB search are promising, and given the generality of the approach, hope
to uncover additional optimizations. Possible areas for further improvement are additional
inferential approaches that allow for short-circuiting, as well as additional ways to encourage
monotonicity. We may also be able to leverage the fact that LP value, as a function of a
specic agent's value, is convex.
8.9.1 Future work
1. Basic to our approach is the idea of performing sensitivity analysis for a given input
and adjusting the algorithm on that input so that the algorithm is monotone over the
entire input space. Probably the most intriguing, and challenging, direction for future
work is to understand whether this local adjustment is possible in achieving appro-
priate notions of monotonicity in problems of multi-dimensional mechanism design.
2. Extend monotone BnB search to other single-dimensional mechanism design problems,
including non-downward closed environments (e.g., scheduling, where correcting a fail-
ure of monotonicity could involve introducing additional \dummy" jobs for a machine
to process).
3. Explore the idea of sensitivity and computational ironing on other methods of heuristic
search, for example local search.
4. Extend monotone BnB search to handle cut generation, and expose a parameterized
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search framework to the methods of empirical algorithm design, to allow for automated
conguration [Hutter et al., 2010].
5. Consider alternative methods to \correct" an allocation when a failure of monotonicity
is identied, for example introducing randomization to allow for smoother notions of
monotonicity.
6. Related to this, for domains such as scheduling where downward closed does not
hold, consider output ironing by checking the sensitivity of the allocation of jobs to
a machine for higher costs, and if we nd more work at a counter-factual, allocating
the present agent more work by using dummy jobs (that is, x by adding work rather
than removing resources.).
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Learning Payment Rules
We have thus far limited our discussion of mechanism design to incentive compatible mech-
anisms. That is, the goal is to identify a mechanism that satises the incentive constraints
and optimizes a given design objective such as welfare or revenue. Chapter 6 concerns such
a mechanism design problem in the context of cake cutting and Chapter 8 examines this
problem for known single-minded CAs.
There are, however, signicant challenges associated with this classical approach. First,
it can be analytically cumbersome to derive well-performing DSIC or BIC mechanisms for
domains that are multi-dimensional, in the sense that each agent's private information is
described through more than a single number. An example of a multi-dimensional domain
is a multi-minded CA. Multi-minded CAs generalized single-minded CAs in that agents
can have up to k target bundles. Single-minded CAs are also technically multi-dimensional
as agent preferences are described by their target bundle and their value for that bundle,
but multi-minded CAs oer a clearer case and will be studied in this chapter. Though
we can use the VCG mechanism to optimize welfare for multi-minded CAs, there are few
results for working with other objective functions. Additionally, if we impose computational
constraints then we have few positive results. The positive results for single-minded CAs
discussed in Section 7.4 do not naturally extend to multi-minded CAs.
Second, incentive-compatibility can be costly, in that adopting it as a hard constraint
can preclude mechanisms with other desirable properties. For example, imposing DSIC
necessarily leads to poor revenue, vulnerability to collusion, and vulnerability to false-
name bidding in CAs where valuations exhibit complementarities among items [Ausubel and
Milgrom, 2006, Rastegari et al., 2011]. Of course, by the revelation principle (Section 2.2.2)
this weakness should be ascribed to insisting on mechanisms that are analyzed in equilibrium
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(dominant-strategy or otherwise) and not to the imposition of incentive constraints per se.
9.1 Our Results
In the face of these diculties, we adopt statistical machine learning to automatically infer
mechanisms with good incentive properties. Rather than imposing incentive-compatibility
as a hard constraint, we start from a given outcome rule, typically expressed as an algorithm,
and then use machine learning techniques to identify a payment rule that minimizes agents'
expected ex post regret. The ex post regret (or just regret where it causes no confusion) of an
agent for truthful reporting in a given instance is the maximum amount by which its utility
could increase through a misreport holding constant the reports of others. The expected ex
post regret is the average ex post regret over all agents and all preference types, calculated
with respect to a distribution on types.
While a mechanism with zero regret for all agents on all inputs is strategyproof, we are
especially interested in settings where the outcome rule does not allow for exact incentive-
compatibility. In this sense, the approach adopted in this paper is not an equilibrium
approach. But, there are two important comments to make in this regard.
First, we insist that an agent's payment, conditioned on an outcome, is independent
of its report. The only way an agent can improve its utility is by changing its report in
a way that changes the outcome. Generically, this ensures mechanisms that provide zero
marginal benet to deviation from truthful reports. This property is seen in practice in
the generalized second-price auction (GSP) used for sponsored search. This local stability
property has been emphasized by Erdil and Klemperer [2010] in the context of CA design.
In addition, a bound on expected regret implies a bound of the form \interim regret is
at most  with probability at least 1-," where interim regret is the ex post regret to an
agent for a particular type, averaged over all types of other agents. Based on this, support
for expected regret can be developed through a simple model of costly manipulation, where
agents face some cost for trying to engage in strategic behavior, and choose not to engage in
manipulation if this cost is greater than the -bound on interim regret. In this case, a 1 
fraction of the interim agents will have no incentive to manipulate, though there remains a
 fraction for whom the benet to manipulation may be greater than .
Our approach is applicable to domains that are multi-dimensional, and for domains
for which the computational eciency of outcome rules is a concern. In particular, we
are interested in domains for which incentive-compatibility is unavailable or undesirable,
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given the implications imposed on outcome rules (e.g., requiring that outcome rules have
undesirable economic or computational properties.) Because the payment rule is learned
on the basis of a given outcome rule, the framework is most meaningful in domains where
revenue considerations are secondary to properties of outcome rules.
The essential insight that underpins our approach is that the payment rule of a strat-
egyproof mechanism can be thought of as a classier for predicting the outcome. In par-
ticular, the payment rule implies a price to each agent for each outcome, and the selected
outcome in a mechanism must simultaneously maximize the reported value minus price for
every agent. The discriminant function of a classier provides a score to dierent outcomes
for a given input, with the outcome with the highest score corresponding to the prediction of
the classier. By limiting classiers to discriminant functions with this \value-minus-price"
structure, where the price can be an arbitrary function of the outcome and the reports of
other agents, we obtain a remarkably direct connection between multi-class classication
and mechanism design.
For an appropriate loss function, the discriminant function of a classier that minimizes
generalization error over a hypothesis class has a corresponding payment rule that minimizes
expected ex post regret among all payment rules corresponding to classiers in this class.
Conveniently, an appropriate method exists for multi-class classication with large outcome
spaces that supports the specic structure of the discriminant function, namely the method
of structural support vector machines [Tsochantaridis et al., 2005, Joachims et al., 2009].
Just like standard support vector machines, this also allows us to adopt non-linear kernels,
thus enabling discriminant functions and thus price functions that depend in a non-linear
way on the outcome and the reported types of agents.
The computational cost associated with our approach occurs oine during training,
which is the process of learning a payment rule for a given outcome rule. The learned
payment rules are fast to evaluate at run-time, i.e. in the context of a deployed mechanism,
and have a succinct representation through the standard support-vector machine approach.
A challenge in structural support vector machines is to handle the large number of possible
outcomes (i.e., labels in the classication problem) during training.
One way to address this in our context is to work with valuation functions for which
the training problem can be formulated as a succinct, convex optimization problem. In
particular, we adopt k-wise dependent valuations Conitzer et al. [2005] and leverage a
connection with maximum a posteriori (MAP) assignment for Markov networks to scale-up
our framework in application to CAs.
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In illustrating the framework, we focus on three situations where strategyproof payment
rules are not available:
(i) multi-minded combinatorial auctions, in which each agent is interested in a constant
number of bundles, where winner determination is provided through a greedy allocation
rule,
(ii) an assignment problem with multiple distinct items and agents with unit-demand
valuations and an egalitarian outcome rule, i.e., an outcome rule that maximizes the mini-
mum value of any agent, and
(iii) combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations, in which each agent's
valuation has a graphical representation and winner determination is provided through a
greedy allocation rule.
The experimental results demonstrate low expected regret even when the 0=1 classi-
cation accuracy is only moderately good, and better regret properties than those obtained
through the simple VCG-based payment rules that we adopt as a baseline. In addition,
we give special consideration to the failure of ex post individual rationality, and introduce
methods to bias the classier to avoid these kinds of errors and also post hoc methods to
adjust trained payments, or even allocations, to reduce or eliminate them.
For setting (i), we nd that our learned rules perform similarly to VCG-based rules.
In setting (ii), our learned rules perform signicantly better than VCG-based rules, which
is understandable given that the egalitarian objective is quite dierent from the welfare
maximizing objectives to which the VCG idea is designed. In setting (iii), our learned
rules provide better regret properties than VCG-based rules for large numbers of items,
and allow us to trade-o between IR violation and regret more eectively than VCG-based
rules. While our experiments for CAs in setting (i) are limited to only ve items, we are able
to scale to instances with tens of items in setting (iii) as our training problem is polynomial
in the number of items even though we are running a combinatorial auction.
9.2 Related Work
Our work is related to computational approaches to mechanism design discussed in Section
1.2.3. The main dierence between our approach and the automated mechanism design
(AMD) approach [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002, Guo and Conitzer, 2010b, Cai et al.,
2012a] is that we assume that we are provided an outcome rule and seek just the payment
rule, whereas AMD approaches optimize over both rules simultaneously. These approaches
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seem limited to domains in which the outcome rule can be succinctly represented, which
likely is not the case for the kinds of combinatorial auction problems that we consider in
this chapter.
Our work is also related to the approaches discussed in Section 1.2.3 that convert ap-
proximation algorithms into truthful mechanisms for dierent notions of truthfulness. A
key dierence between our work and this literature is that we do not enforce conditions
on the provided outcome rule whereas this literature is focused on welfare maximization
settings. Additionally, the target of minimizing expected ex post regret and the imposition
of agent-independent prices make the incentive properties of mechanisms designed through
our approach incomparable to mechanisms that are truthful in expectation or BIC. In com-
parison to mechanisms that are truthful in expectation which are necessarily randomized,
our mechanisms are deterministic.
In comparison to BIC, ex post regret is stronger in that BIC assumes that an agent can
misreport to a single other type for all type reports of other agents while ex post regret looks
at each possible realization of types for other agents and allows the agent to make a dierent
report for each realization. On the other hand,  expected ex post regret may not guarantee
-BIC since we take the expectation over an agent's own type, so the interim regret could
be larger than  for certain realizations of an agent's type. However, as mentioned earlier,
given the expected ex post regret we can derive a bound of the form \interim regret is at
most 0 with probability at least 1-."
Finally, in determining the outcome and payments for a given instance, the approach
of Bei and Huang [2011] and Hartline et al. [2011] evaluates the outcome rule on a number
of randomly perturbed replicas of that instance that is polynomial in the number of agents,
the desired approximation ratio, and a notion capturing the complexity of the type spaces.
When type spaces are large, as in the case of CAs, this may become intractable. By
contrast, our approach evaluates the outcome rule and the trained payment rule once for a
given instance and incurs additional computational costs only during training.
The work of Lahaie [2009, 2010] precedes our work in adopting a kernel-based approach
for combinatorial auctions, but focuses not on learning a payment rule for a given outcome
rule but rather on solving the winner determination and pricing problem for a given instance
of a combinatorial auction. Lahaie introduces the use of kernel methods to compactly
represent non-linear price functions, which is also present in our work, but obtains incentive
properties more indirectly through a connection between regularization and price sensitivity.
The main distinction between the two lines of work is that Lahaie focuses on the design of
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scalable methods for clearing and pricing approximately welfare-maximizing combinatorial
auctions, while we advance a framework for the automated design of payment rules that
provide good incentive properties for a given outcome rule, which need not be welfare-
maximizing.
Our discussion of k-wise dependent valuations builds on valuation structure for combina-
torial auctions introduced by Conitzer et al. [2005] and Abraham et al. [2012]. Our tractable
training results rely on connections between k-wise dependent valuations and associative
Markov networks [Taskar et al., 2004].
A discussion of related work on approximate incentive compatibility, or incentive com-
patibility in the large market limit, can for example be found in the recent surveys by
Carroll [2011] and Lubin and Parkes [2012]. A fair amount of attention has been devoted
to regret-based metrics for quantifying the incentive properties of mechanisms [e.g., Parkes
et al., 2001, Day and Milgrom, 2008, Lubin, 2010, Carroll, 2011]. Pathak and S onmez
[2010] provide a qualitative ranking of dierent mechanisms without payments in terms
of the number of manipulable instances. Budish [2010] introduces an asymptotic, abso-
lute design criterion regarding incentive properties in a large replica economy limit. Lubin
and Parkes [2009] provide experimental support that relates the divergence between the
payos in a mechanism and the payos in a strategyproof \reference" mechanism and the
amount by which agents deviate from truthful bidding in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a
mechanism.
9.3 Preliminaries
We adopt the same notation as that of Section 2.2. Specically, we assume a mechanism
design with money setting, and assume that a mechanism is dened by a pair of functions
(g;p), where g :  ! 
 and p :  ! Rn
0. Recall that when appropriate, gi() indicates the
part of the outcome that agent i receives (e.g., the items allocated to agent i in a combinato-
rial auction). We will consider settings without externalities and outcome rules that satisfy
consumer sovereignty and reachability of the null outcome (Section 2.2.1). Theorem 2.2.10,
which gives a simple characterization of strategyproofness, is crucial for our approach as it
provides the basic insight into how to utilize the discriminant function of a classier as a
payment rule.
We quantify the degree of strategyproofness of a mechanism in terms of ex post regret
(see Denition 2.2.2 in Section 2.2) which quanties the maximum amount an agent can
156CHAPTER 9 LEARNING PAYMENT RULES
gain by misreporting its type.
Analogously, the ex post violation of individual rationality of agent i 2 N in mechanism
(g;p), given true type i 2 i and reported types 0
 i 2  i of the other agents, is
irvi(i;0
 i) = jmin(ui((i;0
 i);i);0)j:
This quantity is zero when there is no violation of individual rationality (IR) for the
agent at this type prole, but negative when the agent's utility is negative for the outcome
and payment.
We consider situations where type proles  are drawn from a distribution with prob-
ability density function, D :  ! R, such that D()  0 and
R
2 D() = 1. Given such
a distribution, and assuming that all agents report their true types, the expected ex post
regret of agent i 2 N in mechanism (g;p) is ED[rgti(i; i)].
Outcome rule g is agent symmetric if for every permutation  of agents N, and all types
;0 2  such that i = 0
(i) for all i 2 N, gi() = g(i)(0) for all i 2 N. This specically
requires that i = j and 
i = 
j for all i;j 2 N. Similarly, type distribution D is agent
symmetric if D() = D(0), for every permutation  of N, and all types ;0 2  such that
i = 0
(i) for all i 2 N. Given agent symmetry, a price function t1 :  1  
i ! R for
agent 1 can be used to generate the payment rule p for a mechanism (g;p), with
p() =
 
t1( 1;g1());t1( 2;g2());:::;t1( n;gn())

;
so that the expected ex post regret is the same for every agent.
We assume agent symmetry going forward, which precludes outcome rules that break
ties based on agent identity, but obviates the need to train a separate classier for each
agent while also providing some benets in terms of simplifying the presentation of our
results. The experimental results are not aected by this assumption because ties occur
only with negligible probability. However, our framework can handle settings where either
the outcome rule is not agent symmetric or the type distribution is not agent symmetric.
In these cases, we would need to solve a separate training problem for each agent and learn
an agent-specic payment rule.
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9.4 Payment Rules from Multi-Class Classiers
A multi-class classier is a function h : X ! Y , where X is an input domain and Y is a
discrete output domain. One could imagine, for example, a multi-class classier that labels
a given image as a dog, cat, or some other animal. In the context of mechanism design,
we will be interested in classiers that take as input a type prole and output an outcome.
What distinguishes this from an outcome rule is that we will impose restrictions on the
form the classier can take.
Classication typically assumes an underlying target function h : X ! Y , and the
goal is to learn a classier h that minimizes disagreements with h on an input distri-
bution DX on X, based only on a nite set of training data f(x1;y1);:::;(x`;y`)g =
f(x1;h(x1));:::;(x`;h(x`))g with x1;:::;x` drawn from DX. This may be challenging
because the amount of training data is limited, or because h is restricted to some hypothe-
sis class H with a certain simple structure, e.g., linear threshold functions. If h(x) = h(x)
for all x 2 X, we say that h is a perfect classier for h.
We consider classiers that are dened in terms of a discriminant function f : X Y !
R, such that
h(x) 2 argmax
y2Y
f(x;y)
for all x 2 X. More specically, we will be concerned with linear discriminant functions of
the form
fw(x;y) = wT (x;y)
for a weight vector w 2 Rb and a feature map   : X  Y ! Rb, where b 2 N [ f1g. The
function   maps input and output into an b-dimensional space, which allows non-linear
features to be expressed. In general, we allow w to have innite dimension, while requiring
the inner product between w and  (x;y) to remain well-dened. Computationally, the
innite-dimensional case is handled through kernels, as described in Section 9.5.1.
9.4.1 Mechanism Design as Classication
Given an outcome rule g and access to a distribution D over type proles, our goal is
to design a payment rule p that gives the mechanism (g;p) the best possible incentive
properties, in the sense of expected regret.
Assuming agent symmetry, we focus on a partial outcome rule g1 :  ! 
1 and train a
classier to predict the outcome to agent 1. To train a classier, we generate examples by
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drawing a type prole  2  from distribution D and applying outcome rule g to obtain
the target class g1() 2 
1.
We impose a special structure on the hypothesis class. A classier hw :  ! 
1 is
admissible if it is dened in terms of a discriminant function fw of the form
fw(;o1) = w1v1(1;o1) + wT
 1 ( 1;o1)
for weights w such that w1 2 R>0 and w 1 2 Rm, and a feature map   :  1
1 ! Rm for
b 2 N[f1g. The rst term of fw(;o1) only depends on the type of agent 1, and increases
in its valuation for outcome o1, while the remaining terms ignore 1 entirely.
This restriction to admissible discriminant functions is crucial because it allows us to
directly infer agent-independent prices from the discriminant function of a trained classier.
For this, dene the associated price function of an admissible classier hw, as
tw( 1;o1) =  
1
w1
wT
 1 ( 1;o1);
where we again focus on agent 1 for concreteness. By agent symmetry, we obtain the
mechanism (g;pw) corresponding to classier hw, by dening payment rule,
pw() =
 
tw( 1;g1());tw( 2;g2());:::;tw( n;gn())

:
Even requiring admissibility, the hope is that appropriate choices for the feature map  
can produce rich function spaces, and thus ultimately useful payment rules. Moreover, this
admissibility structure can be adopted in the context of structural support vector machines,
as discussed in Section 9.5.1.
9.4.2 Example: Single-Item Auction
Before proceeding further, we illustrate the ideas developed so far in the context of a single-
item auction. In a single-item auction, the type of each agent is a single number, corre-
sponding to its value for the item, and there are two possible allocations from the point
of view of an agent: one where it receives the item, and one where it does not. Formally,
 = Rn and 
1 = f0;1g (agent 1 is allocated, or it is not).
Consider a setting with three agents and a training set:
(1;o1
1) = ((1;3;5);0); (2;o2
1) = ((5;4;3);1); (3;o3
1) = ((2;3;4);0);
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and note that this training set is consistent with an optimal outcome rule, i.e., one that
assigns the item to an agent with maximum value.
Our goal is to learn an admissible classier,
hw() = argmax
o12f0;1g
fw(;o1) = argmax
o12f0;1g
w1v1(1;o1) + wT
 1 ( 1;o1);
that performs well on the training set. Since there are only two possible outcomes, the
outcome chosen by hw is simply the one with the larger discriminant. A classier that is
perfect on the training data must therefore satisfy the following constraints:
w1  0 + wT
 1 ((3;5);0) > w1  1 + wT
 1 ((3;5);1);
w1  5 + wT
 1 ((4;3);1) > w1  0 + wT
 1 ((4;3);0);
w1  0 + wT
 1 ((3;4);0) > w1  2 + wT
 1 ((3;4);1):
This can for example be achieved by setting w1 = 1, and
wT
 1 ((2;3);o1) =
8
> <
> :
 max(2;3) if o1 = 1 and
0 if o1 = 0.
(9.1)
Recalling our denition of the price function as tw( 1;o1) =  (1=w1)wT
 1 ( 1;o1), we
see that this choice of w and   corresponds to the second-price payment rule.
In practice, we are limited to hypotheses that are linear in features  ((2;3);o1), and
should not expect that the classier is exact on the training data or generally on the distri-
bution of inputs. Nevertheless, we will see in Section 9.5.1 that through the use of kernels
we can adopt choices of   that allow for rich, non-linear discriminant functions.
9.4.3 Perfect Classiers and Implementable Outcome Rules
We now formally establish a connection between mechanism design and multi-class classi-
cation.
Theorem 9.4.1. Let (g;p) be a strategyproof mechanism with an agent symmetric outcome
rule g, and let t1 be the corresponding price function. Then, a perfect admissible classier
hw for partial outcome rule g1 exists if argmaxo12
1 (v1(1;o1)   t1( 1;o1))) is unique for
every type prole .
Proof. By the rst characterization of strategyproof mechanisms, g must select an outcome
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that maximizes the utility of agent 1 at the current prices, i.e.,
g1() 2 argmax
o12
1
(v1(i;o1)   t1( 1;o1)):
Consider the admissible discriminant f(1;1)(;o1) = v1(1;o1)   t1( 1;o1), which uses the
price function t1 as its feature map. Clearly, the corresponding classier h(1;1) maximizes
the same quantity as g1, and the two must agree if there is a unique maximizer.
The relationship also works in the opposite direction: a perfect, admissible classier hw
for outcome rule g can be used to construct a payment rule that turns g into a strategyproof
mechanism.
Theorem 9.4.2. Let g be an agent symmetric outcome rule, hw :  ! 
1 an admissible
classier, and pw the payment rule corresponding to hw. If hw is a perfect classier for the
partial outcome rule g1, then mechanism (g;pw) is strategyproof.
We prove this result by expressing the regret of an agent in mechanism (g;pw) in terms
of the discriminant function fw. Let 
i( i)  
i denote the set of partial outcomes for
agent i that can be obtained under g given reported types  i from all agents but i, keeping
the dependence on g silent for notational simplicity.
Lemma 9.4.3. Suppose that agent 1 has type 1 and that the other agents report types  1.
Then the regret of agent 1 for bidding truthfully in mechanism (g;pw) is
1
w1
 
max
o12
( 1)
fw(;o1)   fw(;g1())

:
Proof. We have
rgt1() = max
0
121
 
v1(1;g1(0
1; 1))   pw;1(0
1; 1)

 
 
v1(1;g1())   pw;1()

= max
o12
1( 1)
 
v1(1;o1)   tw( 1;o1)

 
 
v1(1;g1())   tw( 1;g1())

= max
o12
1( 1)
 
v1(1;o1) +
1
w1
wT
 1 ( 1;o1)

 
 
v1(1;g1()) +
1
w1
wT
 1 ( 1;g1())

=
1
w1
 
max
o12
1( 1)
fw(;o1)   fw(;g1())

:
Proof of Theorem 9.4.2. If hw is a perfect classier, then the discriminant function fw sat-
ises argmaxo12
1 fw(;o1) = g1() for every  2 . Since g1() 2 
1( 1), we thus have
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that maxo12
1( 1) fw(;o1) = fw(;g1()). By Lemma 9.4.3, the regret of agent 1 for bid-
ding truthfully in mechanism (g;pw) is always zero, which means that the mechanism is
strategyproof.
It bears emphasis that classier hw is only used to derive the payment rule pw, while
the outcome is still selected according to g.
We might ask whether classier hw could be used to obtain an agent symmetric outcome
rule gw, and, since hw is a perfect classier for itself, a strategyproof mechanism (gw;pw).
In particular, for each agent i, the outcome rule gw would be dened to select the outcome
o
i that maximizes, fw(;oi) = wivi(i;oi) + wT
 i ( i;oi). But the problem is that this
need not be feasible: there need not be a set of outcomes, o = (o
1;:::;o
n), such that this
outcome is itself feasible. For example, in the context of an auction, the outcome rule gw
implied by the trained classier might seek to give the same item to the more than one
agent.
The mechanism that we adopt, namely (g;pw), has in some sense the opposite problem|
it is guaranteed to be feasible because outcome rule g is feasible, but is only strategyproof if
hw is a perfect classier for g. While the learned payment rule, pw, always satises the agent-
independent property (2.1), the agent-maximizing property (2.2) (the second requirement
for strategyproofness) is violated when hw() 6= g1().
9.4.4 Approximate Classication and Approximate Strategyproofness
A perfect admissible classier for outcome rule g provides a payment rule for a strategyproof
mechanism. We now show that this result extends gracefully to situations where no such
payment rule is available, by relating the expected ex post regret of a mechanism (g;p) to
a measure of the generalization error of a classier for outcome rule g.
Fix a feature map  , and denote by H  the space of all admissible classiers with this
feature map. The discriminant loss of a classier hw 2 H  with respect to a type prole 
and an outcome o1 2 
1 is given by,
w(o1;) =
1
w1
 
fw(;hw())   fw(;o1)

:
Intuitively the discriminant loss measures how far, in terms of the normalized discriminant,
hw is from predicting the correct outcome for type prole , assuming the correct outcome
is o1. Note that (o1;)  0 for all o1 2 
1 and  2 , and (o1;) = 0 if o1 = hw(). In
addition, hw() = hw0() does not imply that w(o1;) = w0(o1;) for all o1 2 
1: even if
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two classiers predict the same outcome, one of them may still be closer to predicting the
correct outcome o1.
The generalization error of classier hw 2 H  with respect to a type distribution D and
a partial outcome rule g1 :  ! 
1, is given by
Rw(D;g) =
Z
2
w
 
g1();

D()d:
The following result establishes a connection between the generalization error and the ex-
pected ex post regret of the corresponding mechanism.
Theorem 9.4.4. Consider an outcome rule g, a space H  of admissible classiers, and a
type distribution D. Let hw 2 H  be a classier that minimizes generalization error with
respect to D and g among all classiers in H . Then the following holds:
1. If g satises consumer sovereignty, then (g;pw) minimizes expected ex post regret
with respect to D among all mechanisms (g;pw) corresponding to classiers hw 2 H .
2. Otherwise, (g;pw) minimizes an upper bound on expected ex post regret with respect
to D amongst all mechanisms (g;pw) corresponding to classiers hw 2 H .
Proof. For the second property, observe that
w(g1();) =
1
w1
 
fw(;hw())   fw(;g1())

=
1
w1
 
max
o12
1
fw(;o1)   fw(;g1())


1
w1
 
max
o12
( 1)
fw(;o1)   fw(;g1())

= rgt1();
where the last equality holds by Lemma 9.4.3. If g satises consumer sovereignty, then the
inequality holds with equality, and the rst property follows as well.
Minimization of expected regret itself, rather than an upper bound, can also be achieved
even in the absence of consumer sovereignty (which holds for all the outcome rules studied
in this paper) if the learner has access to the set of available outcomes, 
1( 1), that are
achievable for every  1 2  1.
9.5 A Solution using Structural Support Vector Machines
In this section we discuss the method of structural support vector machines (structural
SVMs) [Tsochantaridis et al., 2005, Joachims et al., 2009]. In particular, we show how
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structural SVMs can be adapted for the purpose of learning classiers with admissible
discriminant functions.
9.5.1 Structural SVMs
Given an input space X, a discrete output space Y , a target function h : X ! Y , and a
set of training examples f(x1;h(x1));:::;(x`;h(x`))g = f(x1;y1);:::;(x`;y`)g, structural
SVMs learn a multi-class classier h that given input x 2 X selects an output y 2 Y to
maximize fw(x;y) = wT (x;y). For a given feature map  , the training problem is to nd
a vector w for which hw has low generalization error.
Given examples f(x1;y1);:::;(x`;y`)g, training is achieved by solving the following con-
vex optimization problem:
min
w;0
1
2
wTw +
C
`
` X
k=1
k (Training Problem 1)
s.t. wT 
 (xk;yk)    (xk;y)

 L(yk;y)   k for all k = 1;:::;`, y 2 Y
k  0 for all k = 1;:::;`.
The goal is to nd a weight vector w and slack variables k such that the objective function
is minimized while satisfying the constraints. The learned weight vector w parameterizes the
discriminant function fw, which in turn denes the classier hw. The kth set of constraints
state that the value of the discriminant function on (xk;yk) should exceed the value of
the discriminant function on (xk;y) by at least L(yk;y), where L is a loss function that
penalizes misclassication, with L(y;y) = 0 and L(y;y0)  0 for all y;y0 2 Y . We generally
use a 0=1 loss function, but consider an alternative in Section 9.5.2 to improve ex post IR
properties. Positive values for the slack variables k allow the weight vector to violate some
of the constraints.
The other term in the objective, the squared norm of the weights, penalizes larger weight
vectors. Without this, scaling up the weight vector w can arbitrarily increase the margin
between fw(xk;yk) and fw(xk;y), and make the constraints easier to satisfy. Smaller values
of w, on the other hand, increases the ability of the learned classier to generalize by
decreasing the propensity to over-t to the training data.
Parameter C  0 is a regularization parameter: larger values of C encourage small k
and larger w, such that more points are classied correctly, but with a smaller margin (and
thus perhaps with less generalization power).
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The Feature Map and the Kernel Trick
Given a feature map  , the feature vector  (x;y) for x 2 X and y 2 Y provides an alternate
representation of the input-output pair (x;y). It is useful to consider feature maps   for
which  (x;y) = ((x;y)), where  : X  Y ! Rs for some s 2 N is an attribute map
that combines x and y into a single attribute vector, (x;y), which compactly represents
the pair. Given this, function  : Rs ! Rk, for b > s, maps the attribute vector to a higher-
dimensional space and can introduce additional non-linear interactions between attributes.
In this way, SVMs can achieve non-linear classication in the attribute space.
What is commonly described as \feature engineering" occurs through a combination of
designing a good attribute map and also dening a good function  to map the attribute
vector to a higher-dimensional feature vector. We insist that the size of the attribute vector
s is small enough to be manageable. On the other hand, through the use of kernels we can
allow for a large and even unbounded b, because in the dual of Training Problem 1,  (x;y)
only appears in an inner product of the form h (x;y); (x0;y0)i, or, for a decomposable fea-
ture map, h(q);(q0)i where q = (x;y) and q0 = (x0;y0). For computational tractability
it suces that this inner product can be computed eciently, and the kernel \trick" is to
choose  such that h(q);(q0)i = K(q;q0) for a simple closed-form function K, which is
known as the kernel.
Two common kernels are the polynomial kernel Kpolyd, which is parameterized by degree
d 2 N+, and the radial basis function (RBF) kernel KRBF, which is parameterized by
 = 1=(22) for  2 R+:
Kpolyd(q;q0) = (q  q0)d;
KRBF(q;q0) = exp
 
 
 
kqk2 + kq0k2   2q  q0
:
Both polynomial and RBF kernels use the standard inner product of their arguments, so
their ecient computation requires only that (x;y)(x;y0) can be computed eciently. A
polynomial kernel of degree 1 is known as a linear kernel and simply scales the components
of the attribute vector. In our experimental results we adopt the RBF kernel for part of
our study on CAs, but develop our other experimental results without making use of the
kernel trick.
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Dealing with an Exponentially Large Output Space
Training Problem 1 has 
(jY j`) constraints, where Y is the output space and ` the number
of training instances, and enumerating all of them is computationally prohibitive when Y is
large. Joachims et al. [2009] address this issue for structural SVMs through constraint gener-
ation: starting from an empty set of constraints, this technique iteratively adds a constraint
that is maximally violated by the current solution until that violation is below a desired
threshold . Joachims et al. show that this will happen after no more than O(C
 ) iterations,
each of which requires O(`) (resp. O(`2)) time and memory if linear (resp. polynomial or
RBF) kernels are used.
However, this approach assumes the existence of an ecient separation oracle, which
given a weight vector w, an input xk, and a target yk, nds an output y 2 argmaxy2Y fw(xk;y)+
L(yk;y). The existence of such an oracle remains an open question in application to multi-
minded CAs; see Section 9.6.1 for additional discussion on this.
Sometimes the subproblem maxy2Y fw(xk;y)+L(yk;y) can be written as a polynomially
sized linear program of a particular form. We will see this in the context of succinct,
graphical representations of agent valuations in the CA domain. In this case, we can modify
Training Problem 1 so that constraint generation is not needed, even when the output space
is exponential in the problem size Taskar et al. [2004]. Indeed, suppose that we can write
maxy2Y fw(xk;y) + L(yk;y) as a linear program of the form:
max wBz (9.2)
subject to z  0;Az  b;
where A;B;b are functions of xk and w is assumed to be given. Assuming that this program
is feasible and bounded, we have a dual linear program that attains the same objective value:
min bTz0 (9.3)
subject to z0  0;ATz0  (wB)T:
In this case, we can rewrite Training Problem 1 by replacing the many constraints for a
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single training example with a single constraint that uses a max function:
min
w;0
1
2
wTw +
C
`
` X
k=1
k
s.t. wT (xk;yk) + k  max
y2Y

wT (xk;y) + L(yk;y)

for all k = 1;:::;`
k  0 for all k = 1;:::;`.
We can now apply the LP formulation for nding the maximal value of fw(xk;y) +
L(x;y).
min
w;0
1
2
wTw +
C
`
` X
k=1
k
s.t. wT (xk;yk) + k  max
z0;Akzbk wBkz for all k = 1;:::;`
k  0 for all k = 1;:::;`.
By LP duality, we can replace the max linear program with a min linear program.
min
w;0
1
2
wTw +
C
`
` X
k=1
k
s.t. wT (xk;yk) + k  min
z0;(Ak)Tz(wBk)T(bk)Tz for all k = 1;:::;`
k  0 for all k = 1;:::;`.
We can now drop the min on the right hand side since for a xed weight vector w, the
objective tries to minimize k, so the right hand side will be minimized even if we do not
explicitly require this. We therefore have a single, succinct primal convex program even
though the number of original constraints was exponentially large:
min
w;0
1
2
wTw +
C
`
` X
k=1
k
s.t. wT (xk;yk) + k  (bk)Tzk;zk  0;(Ak)Tzk  (wBk)T for all k = 1;:::;`
k  0 for all k = 1;:::;`.
We apply these ideas in Section 9.6.2 to combinatorial auctions where agents have suc-
cinct, graph-based value representations. This allows us to have a scalable training problem
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even though the winner determination problem remains NP-hard. Though we work directly
with the features  (xk;yk) in our experiments, it is still possible to use kernels in conjunc-
tion with the succinct formulation of the convex program. This would require working with
the dual of the succinct primal convex program (see Taskar et al. [2004] for more details).
Required Information
In summary, the use of structural SVMs requires specication of the following:
1. The input space X, the discrete output space Y , and examples of input-output pairs.
2. An attribute map  : X  Y ! Rs. This function generates an attribute vector that
combines the input and output data into a single object.
3. A kernel function K(q;q0), typically chosen from a well-known set of candidates, e.g.,
polynomial or RBF. The kernel implicitly calculates the inner product h(q);(q0)i,
e.g., between a mapping of the inputs into a high dimensional space.
4. If the space Y is prohibitively large, and we wish to scale our training problem to a
large number of training examples, we require either:
(a) a routine that allows for ecient separation, i.e., a polynomial time algorithm
that computes argmaxy2Y fw(xk;y)+L(yk;y) for a given w;x, to allow for con-
straint generation or,
(b) a polynomially sized LP that solves maxy2Y fw(xk;y) + L(yk;y), to enable the
formulation of the training problem as a polynomially sized primal convex opti-
mization problem.
In addition, the user needs to stipulate particular training parameters, such as the
regularization parameter C, and the kernel parameter  if the RBF kernel is being used.
9.5.2 Structural SVMs for Mechanism Design
We now specialize structural SVMs such that the learned discriminant function will provide
a payment rule, for a given symmetric outcome function g and distribution D. In this
application, the input domain X is the space of type proles , and the output domain Y
is the space 
1 of outcomes for agent 1.
We construct training data by sampling   D and applying g to these inputs:
f(1;g1(1));:::;(`;g1(`))g = f(1;o1
1);:::;(`;o`
1)g:
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For admissibility of the learned hypothesis hw() = argmaxo12
1 wT (;o1), we require
that
 (;o1) = (v1(1;o1); 0( 1;o1))
For this reason, we must use an attribute map 0 :  1  
1 ! Rs rather than  :
  
1 ! Rs, and the kernel 0 we specify will only be applied to the output of 0. Given
these mappings, we let  0( 1;o1) = 0(0( 1;o1)): This results in the following more
specialized training problem:
min
w;0
1
2
wTw +
C
`
` X
k=1
k (Training Problem 2)
s.t. (w1v1(k
1;ok
1) + wT
 1 0(k
 1;ok
1))   (w1v1(k
1;o1) + wT
 1 0(k
 1;o1))  L(ok
1;o1)   k
for all k = 1;:::;`, o1 2 
1
k  0 for all k = 1;:::;`.
If w1 > 0 then the weights w together with the feature map  0 dene a price func-
tion tw( 1;o1) =  (1=w1)wT
 1 0( 1;o1) that can be used to dene payments pw(), as
described in Section 9.4.1. In this case, we can also relate the regret in the induced mecha-
nism (g;pw) to the classication error as described in Section 9.4.3.
Theorem 9.5.1. Consider training data f(1;o1
1);:::;(`;o`
1)g. Let g be an outcome func-
tion such that g1(k) = ok
1 for all k. Let w;k be the weight vector and slack variables output
by Training Problem 2, with w1 > 0. Consider corresponding mechanism (g;pw). For each
type prole k in the training data,
rgt1(k) 
1
w1
k
Proof. Consider input k. The constraints in the training problem impose that for every
outcome o1 2 
1,
w1v1(k
1;ok
1) + wT
 1 0(k
 1;ok
1)  
 
w1v1(k
1;o1) + wT
 1 0(k
 1;o1)

 L(ok
1;o1)   k
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Rearranging,
k  L(ok
1;o1) +
 
w1v1(k
1;o1) + wT
 1 0(k
 1;o1)

 
 
w1v1(k
1;ok
1) + wT
 1 0(k
 1;ok
1)

) k  L(ok
1;o1) + fw(k;o1)   fw(k;ok
1)
This inequality holds for every o1 2 
1, so
k  max
o12
1

L(ok
1;o1) + fw(k;o1)   fw(k;ok
1)

 max
o12
1

fw(k;o1)   fw(k;ok
1)

 w1rgt1(k);
where the second inequality holds because L(ok
1;o1)  0, and the nal inequality follows
from Lemma 9.4.3. This completes the proof.
We choose not to enforce w1 > 0 explicitly in Training Problem 2 as it would require
a custom formulation of the dual problem. Instead, in our experiments we simply discard
hypotheses where the result of training is w1  0. This is sensible since the discriminant
function value should increase as an agent's value increases, and negative values of w1
typically mean that the training parameter C or the kernel parameter  (if the RBF kernel
is used) are poorly chosen.
Looking forward to our experiments, this requirement of positive w1 did not present a
practical concern. For example, for multi-minded combinatorial auctions, 1049=1080 > 97%
of the trials had positive w1 for the trained classier, and for the egalitarian assignment
problem all of the trained classiers had w1 > 0. In the discussion of a tractable training
formulation for positive k-wise dependent valuations, we directly impose the constraint that
w1 = 1 since the tractable training formulation has a succinct primal which can be solved
directly. We believe the constraint can be imposed more generally, but it would require a
custom dual formulation of the structural SVM training, and we leave this to future work.
Payment Normalization
One issue with the framework as stated is that the payments pw computed from the solution
to Training Problem 2 could be negative. We solve this problem by normalizing payments,
using a baseline outcome ob. If there exists a null outcome o0, such that v1(1;o0) = 0 for
every 1, then this outcome provides the baseline. For example, in CAs, the null outcome
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is the empty bundle. Otherwise, we adopt as the baseline outcome the outcome ob with the
lowest price to agent 1 for a given set of types of other agents. For this, let tw( 1;o1) be
the price function corresponding to the solution w to Training Problem 2. Adopting the
baseline outcome ob, the normalized payments t0
w( 1;o1), are dened as
t0
w( 1;o1) = max(0;tw( 1;o1)   tw( 1;ob)):
Even when the baseline outcome is dened as that with the lowest price, it is still only
a function of the types of other agents  1, and so the prices t0
w remain a function of  1
and o1 and are still agent independent.
Individual Rationality Violation
Even after normalization, the learned payment rule pw may not satisfy individual rationality
(IR). Recall that this requires that an agent's payment is no greater than its reported value
for the outcome. We oer three solutions to this problem, which can also be used in
combination.
Payment osets One way to reduce IR violations is to make an additional adjustment to
prices, across all type reports, designed to reduce the prices. In particular, for a given oset
o > 0, and given normalized prices t0
w, we can then further adjust prices by the oset to
obtain nal prices t00
w( 1;o1) = max(0;t0
w( 1;o1)   o ). The eect is to leave the price
on the baseline outcome unchanged (since its price was already normalized to zero), but
to apply the oset where possible to other outcomes. The oset must chosen in an agent
independent way, either as a xed oset applied to all instances or an oset that depends
only on  1. In our experiments we only consider osets that are uniformly applied to all
instances.
Although the use of a payment oset decreases the IR violation it might increase regret
because of the non-linearity in taking the max with zero. For instance, suppose there are
only two outcomes o11;o12, where o12 is the null outcome. Suppose agent 1 values o11 at
5 and receives the null outcome if he reports truthfully. Suppose further that payments tw
are 7 for o11 and 0 for the null outcome. With no payment oset, the agent experiences
no regret, since he receives utility 0 from the null outcome, but negative utility from o11.
However, if the payment oset is greater than 2, the agent's regret becomes positive (as-
suming consumer sovereignty), because he could have reported dierently and received o11
and received positive utility.
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Adjusting the loss function L We incur an IR violation when there is a null outcome
onull (for example allocating no items to an agent in a combinatorial auction), such that
g1() 6= onull and fw(;onull) > fw(;g1()) for some type ; i.e., the discriminant value
of the null outcome is greater than that for the actual outcome selected by the outcome
rule. This happens because the discriminant fw(;o1) is a scaled version of the agent's
utility for outcome o1 under payments pw. If the utility for the null outcome is greater
than the utility for g1(), and the payment on null outcomes is normalized to zero, then the
payment tw( 1;g1()) must be greater than v1(1;g1()) (so that the discriminant value
fw(;g1()) < fw(;onull)), causing an IR violation.
Recognizing this, we can discourage these types of errors by modifying the constraints
of Training Problem 2: when ok
1 6= onull and o1 = onull, we can increase L(ok
1;o1) to heavily
penalize misclassications of this type. With a larger L(ok
1;o1), a larger k will be required if
fw(;ok
1) < fw(;onull). As with payment osets, this technique will decrease IR violations
but is not guaranteed to eliminate all of them. In our experimental results, we refer to this
as the null loss x, and the null loss refers to the value we choose for L(ok
1;onull) where
outcome ok
1 6= onull.
Deallocation In settings that have a null outcome and are downward closed (i.e., settings
where a feasible outcome o remains feasible if oi is replaced with the null outcome), we can
also choose to modify the function g to allocate the null outcome whenever the price function
tw creates an IR violation. This reduces ex post regret, and in particular ensures ex post
IR for all instances. On the other hand, the total value to the agents necessarily decreases
under the modied allocation, and we begin to deviate from the intended outcome rule. In
our experimental results, we refer to this as the deallocation x.
9.6 Applying the Framework
In this section, we discuss the application of our framework to three domains: multi-minded
combinatorial auctions, combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations, and egal-
itarian assignment.
9.6.1 Multi-Minded Combinatorial Auctions
We adopt the same notation introduced in Section 7.1. Recall that we have a set N of
agents and a set G = f1;:::;mg of items, with jNj = n, jGj = m.
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The outcome space 
i for agent i is the set of all subsets of the m items, and in full
generality, the type of agent i can be represented by a vector i 2 i = R2m
that species
its value for each possible bundle. The set of possible type proles is then  = R2mn, and
the value vi(i;oi) of agent i for bundle oi is equal to the entry in i corresponding to oi.
We require that valuations are monotone, such that vi(i;oi)  vi(i;o0
i) for all oi;o0
i 2 
i
with o0
i  oi, and normalized such that vi(i;;) = 0. Assuming agent symmetry and
adopting the view of agent 1, the partial outcome rule g1 :  ! 
1 species the bundle
g1() allocated to agent 1. We require feasibility of outcome rules, so that no item is
allocated more than once.
In a multi-minded CA, each agent is interested in at most  bundles for some constant
. The special case where  = 1 is the well studied problem of single-minded CAs discussed
in Section 7.4. If a bundle contains multiple bundles of interest, the agent's value for that
bundle is the bundle with the highest value among the contained bundles of interest (i.e.,
we adopt XOR semantics). We choose to study multi-minded CAs rather than single-
minded CAs because they provide an example for which truthful, algorithmic mechanism
design is not well understood. Multi-minded CAs are an example of a multi-parameter
mechanism design problem where the valuation proles and thus the training data can
still be represented in a compact way. In the case of multi-minded CAs, the compact
representation arises by explicitly writing down the identities and values of an agent's 
target bundles. In addition, in multi-minded CAs, the inner products between valuation
proles, which are required to apply the kernel trick, can be computed in polynomial time.
Attribute Maps
To apply structural SVMs to multi-minded CAs, we need to specify an appropriate attribute
map . In our experiments we use two attribute maps 1 :  1  
1 ! R2m(2m(n 1)) and
2 :  1  
1 ! R2m(n 1), which are dened as follows:
1( 1;o1) =
2
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
4
0

0
 1
0

0
3
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
5
9
> > =
> > ;
dec(o1)(2m(n   1))
9
> > =
> > ;
(2m   dec(o1)   1)(2m(n   1))
; 2( 1;o1) =
2
6 6
6 6
6
4
2 n o1
3 n o1
:::
n n o1
3
7 7
7 7
7
5
:
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Here, dec(o1) =
Pm
j=1 2j 1Ij2o1 is a decimal index of bundle o1, where Ij2o1 = 1 if j 2 o1
and Ij2o1 = 0 otherwise. Attribute map 1 thus stacks the vector  1, which represents
the valuations of all agents except agent 1, with zero vectors of the same dimension, where
the position of  1 is determined by the index of bundle o1. The resulting attribute vector
is simple but potentially restrictive. For example, it precludes two instances with dierent
allocated bundles from sharing attributes, which provides an obstacle to generalization of
the discriminant function across bundles.
Attribute map 2 stacks vectors ino1, which are obtained from i by setting the entries
for all bundles that intersect with o1 to 0. This captures the fact that agent i cannot be
allocated any of the bundles that intersect with o1 if o1 is allocated to agent 1. Both 1
and 2 are dened for a particular number of items and agents, and in our experiments we
train a dierent classier for each number of agents and items. In practice, one can pad out
items and agents by setting bids to zero and train a single classier.
Ecient Computation of Inner Products
Ecient computation of inner products is possible for both 1;2. For both 1 and 2, com-
puting inner products reduces to the question of whether inner products between valuation
proles are eciently computable. For 1, we have that


1( 1;o1);1(0
 1;o0
1)

= Io1=o0
1
n X
i=2


i;0
i

;
where indicator Io1=o0
1 = 1 if o1 = o0
1 and Io1=o0
1 = 0 otherwise. For 2,


2( 1;o1);2(0
 1;o0
1)

=
n X
i=2


i n o1;0
i n o1

:
We next develop ecient methods for computing the inner products hi;0
ii on compactly
represented valuation functions. The computation of hi n o1;0
i n o1i can be done through
similar methods.
In the single-minded setting, let i correspond to a bundle Si  f1;:::;rg of items with
value vi, and 0
i correspond to a set S0
i  f1;:::;rg of items valued at v0
i.
Each set containing both Si and S0
i contributes viv0
i to T
i 0
i, while all other sets contribute
0. Since there are exactly 2r jSi[S0
ij sets containing both Si and S0
i, we have
T
i 0
i = viv0
i2r jSi[S0
ij:
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This is a special case of the formula for the multi-minded case.
Lemma 9.6.1. Consider a multi-minded CA and two bid vectors x1 and x0
1 corresponding to
sets S = fS1;:::;Ssg and S0 = fS0
1;:::;S0
tg, with associated values v1;:::;vs and v0
1;:::;v0
t.
Then,
xT
1 x0
1 =
X
TS;T0S0

( 1)jTj+jT0j  (min
Si2T
vi)  ( min
S0
j2T0 v0
j)  2
r j(
S
Si2T Si)[(
S
S0
j2T0 S0
j)j
: (9.4)
Proof. The contribution of a particular bundle B0 of items to the inner product is (maxSi2S;SiB0 vi)
(maxS0
j2S0;S0
jB0 v0
j), and thus
xT
1 x0
1 =
X
B0

(max
Si2S
SiB0
vi)  ( max
S0
j2S0
S0
jB0
v0
j)

:
By the maximum-minimums identity, which asserts that for any set fx1;:::;xng of n num-
bers, maxfx1;:::;xng =
P
ZX(( 1)jZj+1  (minxi2Z xi)),
max
Si2S
SiB0
vi =
X
TS
S
Si2T SiB0

( 1)jTj+1  (min
Si2T
vi)

and
max
S0
j2S0
S0
jB0
v0
j =
X
T0S0
S
S0
j2T0 S0
jB0

( 1)jT0j+1  ( min
S0
j2T0 v0
j)

:
The inner product can thus be written as
T
1 0
1 =
X
B0
X
TS;T0S0
S
Si2T SiB0
S
S0
j2T0 S0
jB0

( 1)jTj+jT0j  (min
Si2T
vi)  ( min
S0
j2T0 v0
j)

:
Finally, for given T  S and T0  S0, there exist exactly 2
r j(
S
Si2T Si)[(
S
S0
j2T0 S0
j)j
bundles
B0 such that
S
Si2T Si  B0 and
S
S0
j2T0 S0
j  B0, and we obtain
T
1 0
1 =
X
TS;T0S0

( 1)jTj+jT0j  (min
Si2T
vi)  ( min
S0
j2T0 v0
j)  2
m j(
S
Si2T Si)[(
S
S0
j2T0 S0
j)j
:
If S and S0 have constant size, then the sum on the right hand side of (9.4) ranges over
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a constant number of sets and can be computed eciently.
Dealing with an Exponentially Large Output Space
Recall that Training Problems 1 and 2 have constraints for every training example (k;ok
1)
and every possible bundle of items o1 2 
1. For CAs, there will be exponentially many such
bundles. In lieu of an ecient separation oracle, a workaround exists when the discriminant
function ensures that the induced prices weakly increase as items are added to a bundle.
Given this property of item monotonicity, it suces to include constraints for bundles that
have a strictly larger value to the agent than any of their respective subsets. Coupled with
the assumption that valuations in CAs are monotone, and the admissibility property of the
discriminant function, no other bundles can have a greater discriminant value than these
bundles.
But imposing item monotonicity directly on the training problem requires a number of
constraints that is exponential in the number of items. For polynomial kernels and certain
attribute maps, a possible sucient condition for item monotonicity is to force the weights
w 1 to be negative. However, as with the discussion of enforcing w1 > 0 directly, these
weight constraints do not dualize conveniently and results in the dual formulation no longer
operate on inner products h 0( 1;o1); 0(0
 1;o0
1)i. As a result, we would be forced to work
in the primal, and incur extra computational overhead that increases polynomially with the
kernel degree d. We have performed some preliminary experiments with polynomial kernels,
but we have not looked into reformulating the primal to enforce item monotonicity.
For this reason, the baseline experimental results in Section 9.7 do not assume item
monotonicity, and instead use an inecient separation oracle, that simply iterates over all
possible bundles o1 2 
1.
An alternative that we have also studied is to optimistically assume item monotonicity,
and only include the constraints associated with bundles that are explicit in agent valuations.
We also present experimental results that test this optimistic approach, and while there is a
degradation in performance, results are mostly comparable. This provides a useful approach
to scaling up training for representation languages such as the XOR representation adopted
for multi-minded CAs for which it is simple to identify the small set of bundles that are
candidates for maximizing the discriminant function (= agent utility.)
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Figure 9.1: An example of a 2-wise dependent valuation. The values listed in the nodes give
the agent's weights for the corresponding items. Each item has some small value on its own,
but complementarities exist between pairs of items which give added utility to the agent.
Note that while this graph is complete, this is not necessary. Absent edges are assumed to
have weight 0.
9.6.2 Combinatorial Auctions with Positive k-wise Dependent Valuations
We also study combinatorial auctions where agents have positive k-wise dependent valua-
tions Conitzer et al. [2005]. This setting allows us to apply the ideas discussed in Section
9.5.1 to attain a polynomial time training formulation despite the exponential size of 
1.
When an agent has a k-wise dependent valuation, the agent's valuation is described
by a hypergraph G = (V;E) with hyperedges of size at most k. The nodes in the graph
correspond to the items being auctioned, and the hyperedges to groups of these items. These
nodes and hyperedges are each assigned weights g(v) and g(e) respectively. An agent's value
for a subset of items o1 2 
1 is the sum of the weights of nodes and hyperedges contained
in o1, i.e.,
P
v2V;v2o1 g(v) +
P
e2E;eo1 g(e). Figure 9.1 gives a pictorial view of a simple
2-wise valuation over 3 items.
A positive k-wise dependent valuation adds the restriction that hyperedge weights are
positive. This restriction is required for our results, and is also studied by Abraham et al.
[2012]. This forces agent valuations to be superadditive, i.e. i(o1)  i(o2) + i(o3) for
o1 = o2 [ o3, and o2 \ o3 = ;. When we have multiple agents, we use gi(v) and gi(e) to
denote the weights that agent i assigns to nodes v and edges e. For convenience, let gi(e)
for an edge not in the agent's edge set is dened to be 0. If we are given the agent's type i,
then it can be convenient to write g(i;v) or g(i;e) to represent the weights in the agent's
underlying graph when its type is i.
Though these valuations are very dierent from the multi-minded valuations we dis-
cussed earlier, the winner determination problem for positive k-wise dependent valuations
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is still NP-hard for any value of k > 1 Abraham et al. [2012]. Because the winner de-
termination problem is NP-hard, we seek to learn a payment rule for a greedy allocation
algorithm.
Going forward, we specialize to the case of k = 2, which represents the case where the
agent's hypergraph is just a graph. We believe a similar approach can work for any value of
k, but we leave this to future work. The single agent winner determination problem (where
nodes can have negative values but hyperedge weights are non-negative) is tractable for any
k. The only complication is in designing an appropriate attribute map. Interestingly, in
this case the training problem will look like a single agent winner determination problem.
Intuitively, the attribute values on which the discriminant function is evaluated will model
the value to the rest of the agents given that agent 1 receives a particular bundle, and
this `two-agent' view (agent 1 and the rest of the agents) can be encoded with a single
valuation function and thus eectively appears as a single agent problem. This single agent
problem is non-trivial as nodes can have negative values when the impact on other agents
is incorporated, so the bundle of all items is not necessarily the value-maximizing subset.
This single agent winner determination problem where nodes can have negative values
but hyperedges have non-negative weights turns out to be tractable for k-wise dependent
valuations and a suitably dened attribute map.
A Concrete Example
To clarify the construction, we introduce a simple example where agents have 2-wise de-
pendent valuations. We refer back to this example to illustrate our greedy algorithm and
attribute map. Consider a setting where we have 3 agents and 3 items. We denote the
agents and items using indices 1;2;3 but the association should be clear from context. The
agents have the following 2-wise dependent valuations:
g1(1) = 1;g1(2) = 4;g1(3) = 2;g1((1;2)) = 4
g2(1) = 2;g2(2) = 6;g2(3) = 2;g2((2;3)) = 3;g2((1;3)) = 6
g3(1) = 5;g3(2) = 3;g3(3) = 1;g3((1;2)) = 2;g3((1;3)) = 7
A Greedy Algorithm
Before describing our attribute map, it will be useful to introduce a simple greedy algorithm
GREEDY-KWISE that tries to nd an allocation with good welfare. We use GREEDY-KWISE
both in our attribute map and as an outcome rule in our experimental results.
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Let G = f1;:::;mg denote the set of all items. Given some subset of items S  G, the
greedy algorithm orders the items by index and assigns the items incrementally. At each
step, the algorithm computes the gain in welfare of assigning the item to each agent and
chooses the agent that provides the maximal gain in welfare. Note that if an item j has
been assigned to an agent i, then when considering the assignment for item k the gain in
welfare of assigning it to agent i includes agent i's node weight for item k as well as agent
i's edge weight for edge (j;k) (if the edge exists in the agent's valuation graph). We let
GREEDY-KWISEi(S) denote agent i's allocation when this greedy algorithm is run on S.
Applied to the example from Section 9.6.2, the greedy algorithm rst considers the
assignment of item 1. Agent 3 has the highest value, so 1 goes to agent 3. We then consider
item 2. The gain in giving this to agent 1 is 4, the gain to agent 2 is 6, and the gain to
agent 3 is 3 + 2 = 5 (for agent 3, we add in both g3(2) and g3((1;2)) since 1 was given to
agent 3). As a result, agent 2 has the highest gain and we give the item to agent 2. Then
for item 3, the gains are 2, 2 + 3 = 5, and 1 + 7 = 8 respectively. As a result, item 3 is
assigned to agent 3.
Attribute Map
In order to have a tractable training problem, we want our attribute map 3( 1;o1) to
be decomposable across items and pairs of items. We detail the reasons for this in the
next section, but the intuition is that we want 3( 1;o1) to resemble a 2-wise dependent
valuation so that we can view the separation problem as a single agent winner determination
problem for an agent with 2-wise dependent valuations where nodes can have negative
weight but edges have positive weight. If nodes and edges all have positive weight, then the
single agent problem has a trivial solution: take all the items. However, when nodes can
have negative weight, the problem is non-trivial (even when edges weights remain positive-
restricted).
Our attribute map 3( 1;o1) maps from  1  
1 ! R2m+m(m 1). For each possible
item j 2 f1;:::;mg, we have two entries in 3( 1;o1).
Vj(0)  I(j = 2 o1); Vj(1)  I(j 2 o1);
where I is an indicator variable. Vj(0) approximates the \gain" of not allocating item j to
agent 1; Vj(1) does the opposite, approximating the \cost" of allocating item j to agent 1.
We detail how these are calculated below.
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Additionally, for each possible pair of items j1;j2, we have two entries in 3( 1;o1):
Vj1;j2(0)  I(fj1;j2g \ o1 = ;); Vj1;j2(1)  I(fj1;j2g  o1):
where I is an indicator variable, and where the Vj1;j2() indicate the value of agent one ob-
taining (or not) both items. To specify Vj(0);Vj(1) and Vj1;j2(0);Vj1;j2(1), we use GREEDY-
KWISE.
We dene Vj(0) as the \gain" for item j by the agent who is allocated it under the greedy
algorithm, i.e. gi(j) where j 2 GREEDY-KWISEi(R). By contrast, we want Vj(1) to be
the\cost" of allocating item j to agent 1; therefore we dene it as welfare(GREEDY-KWISE(G)) 
welfare(GREEDY-KWISE(G n fjg))). The values Vj1;j2(0) = Vj1;j2(1) are similar to Vj(0).
These expressions look at the allocation of GREEDY-KWISE on all items, and see if j1;j2
are assigned to the same agent. If they are not, then they are set to zero. Otherwise, they
are set to  g((j1;j2)). The negative sign here is important for tractability and ensures
that edge weights are non-negative for the modied single agent problem (see the next
section). The intuition for why we do not make Vj1;j2(1) equal to the \cost" of allocating
items j1;j2 is that if j1 2 o1;j2 2 o1 then this cost is already accounted for in Vj1(1) and
Vj2(1). In fact, the cost is double-counted since in both GREEDY-KWISE(R n fj1g) and
GREEDY-KWISE(R n fj2g) no agents can derive value from edge (j1;j2) since one of the
items is missing in both cases. We use a particularly simple allocation algorithm here, but
any algorithm as long as its computation time is not prohibitive.
Returning to our example from Section 9.6.2, recall that when run on all agents, the
greedy algorithm gives items 1 and 3 to agent 3 and item 2 to agent 2. The total welfare in
this case is 19. The total value to agents 2 and 3 is also 19 since agent 1 does not receive
any items. In this case, we then have the following values for V .
 V1(0): Agent 3 receives item 1, so this is set to g3(1) = 5.
 V2(0): Agent 2 receives item 2, so this is set to g2(2) = 6.
 V3(0): Agent 3 receives item 3, so this is set to g3(3) = 1.
 V1(1): We consider the greedy allocation where item 1 cannot be allocated. The
greedy algorithm gives item 2 to agent 2, and then item 3 to agent 2 as well (since
the gain will be 5 versus 1). As a result, the total welfare is 11. The welfare dierence
for the other agents is 8, so V1(1) = 8.
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v1(1;) ( 1;) v1(1;)   ( 1;)
Item 1
1
Item 2
4
Item 3
2
4
Item 1
8 [5]
Item 2
10 [6]
Item 3
6 [1]
-7 [-7]
Item 1
-7 [-5]
Item 2
-6 [-6]
Item 3
-4 [-1]
4 7 [7]
Figure 9.2: A pictorial representation of the attribute map 3 for our concrete example. We
make the attribute map 3 resemble a 2-wise dependent valuation (with values for not being
assigned a node and not being assigned any of the items for an edge shown in brackets)
so that when combined with agent 1's valuation, we have a modied single agent problem.
We do not show the weight vector w in these panels, but there would be weights wj(1)
multiplying the unbracketed values in each node j, weights wj(0) multiplying the bracketed
values in each node j, as well as weights wj1;j2(0) and wj1;j2(1) multiplying the unbracketed
and bracketed values on the edges.
 V2(1): Without item 2, the greedy algorithm gives item 1 to agent 3 and then item 3
to agent 3 as well (gain of 8 for agent 3 versus gain of 2 for agent 1). The total welfare
is 13, so V2(1) = 19   13 = 6.
 V3(1): Without item 3, item 1 goes to agent 3 and item 2 goes to agent 2. The total
welfare is 11, so V3(1) = 19   11 = 8.
 V1;2(0);V1;2(1): The original allocation allocates items 1 and 2 to dierent agents, so
these values are 0.
 V1;3(0);V1;3(1): Items 1 and 3 are allocated to agent 3, so this is set to  g3((1;3)) =
 7.
 V2;3(0);V2;3(1): The original allocation allocates items 2 and 3 to dierent agents, so
these values are 0.
A useful way to think of this attribute map 3 is that it modies agent 1's 2-wise
valuation. Pictorially, we can think of this as combining agent 1's valuation graph with the
valuation graph induced by the feature map. See Figure 9.2 for an illustration.
A Tractable Training Problem
We are now ready to show that we can use the techniques discussed in Section 9.5.1 to make
training polynomial-time in the number of items despite having an exponentially large space
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of possible labels (bundles in this context).
If we assume that agents have positive 2-wise dependent valuations and we use the
attribute map specied above, then we will be able to compute maxo12
1 fw(;o1)+L(ok
1;o1)
using a linear program whose coecients are linear in w. For this result, we require two
restrictions:
1. We impose constraints (such as positivity) on certain elements of the vector w. This
restriction of the space of possible weights enables us to obtain a polynomial-time
training formulation, at the possible loss of some pricing accuracy. It also prevents us
from using the kernel trick over the positive-restricted weights, although we can still
use kernels on the rest. In the present analysis we choose not to add this complexity
and work with a linear kernel only.
2. The loss function L(ok
1;o1) is equal to 0 everywhere. This assumption simplies our
proofs, but it turns out we only require that the loss function can be expressed as a
sum of products where each product consists of a weight multiplied by a.) an indicator
of whether o1 contains a given subset of items or b.) an indicator of whether o1 does
not intersect a given subset of items. As a result, we can adjust null loss by using an
indicator for o1 not intersecting the entire set of items.
In addition to these restrictions, the tractable training problem for positive k-wise de-
pendent valuations departs from the general framework by xing the weight w1 to equal
1 (instead of letting it be learned by the framework, checking positivity, and dividing all
terms by w1). We believe it is possible to adopt the same constraint more generally, but
it is easier in the setting for positive k-wise dependent valuations since there is a succinct
primal formulation and it is not necessary to worry about modications to the dual of the
structural SVM formulation.
The proof of this result relies on a connection between k-wise dependent valuations
and Markov networks, and applying a result from the literature on nding the maximum a
posteriori (MAP) assignment in Markov networks.
Theorem 9.6.2. When agents have positive 2-wise dependent valuations and we use the
attribute map 3 (described above) without a kernel, then we can solve the structural SVM
training problem (with the modications discussed above in Assumptions 1 and 2.) in time
polynomial in m, the number of items in the auction and n, the number of agents.
Proof. We observe that 3( 1;o1) is a vector with 2m + m(m   1) elements. Therefore,
the weight vector w 1 will have the same number of elements. We index elements of these
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vectors using notation similar to the notation we use for 3( 1;o1). That is, we let wj(p)
correspond to the attribute term that includes Vj(p), where p 2 f0;1g. Similarly, we let
wj1;j2(p) correspond to the attribute term that includes Vj1;j2(p), where p 2 f0;1g.
In the primal formulation of Training Problem 1, we add the constraints that wj1;j2(p) 
0 for p 2 f0;1g and all j1;j2. While not strictly necessary, we also impose that w1 = 1 (as we
are working with the primal formulation, the enforcement of such a constraint is available
to us; alternatively, we could forgo this constraint and operate in the dual, enabling the use
of kernels over the unconstrained components of the attribute map).
max
o12
1
fw(;o1) = max
o12
1
v(1;o1)   wT
 13( 1;o1)
= max
o12
1
X
j2G
g(1;j)I(j 2 o1) +
X
1j1<j2r
g(1;(j1;j2))I(fj1;j2g  o1)
 
X
j2G
(wj(0)Vj(0)I(j = 2 o1) + wj(1)Vj(1)I(j 2 o1))
 
X
1j1<j2r
(wj1;j2(0)Vj1;j2(0)I(fj1;j2g \ o1 = ;)
+ wj1;j2(1)Vj1;j2(1)I(fj1;j2g  o1))
= max
o12
1
X
j2G
 wj(0)Vj(0)I(j = 2 o1) +
X
j2G
(g(1;j)   wj(1)Vj(1))I(j 2 o1)
+
X
1j1<j2r
( wj1;j2)Vj1;j2(0)I(fj1;j2g \ o1 = ;)
+
X
1j1<j2r
(g(1;(j1;j2))   wj1;j2Vj1;j2(1))I(fj1;j2g  o1)
An important observation is that the coecients of the indicator variables I(fj1;j2g 
o1) and I(fj1;j2) \ o1 = ;) for the edges (j1;j2) will be positive. Indeed, as we de-
ned in Section 9.6.2, Vj1;j2(0) = Vj1;j2(1)  0. Combining this with the assumption
that g(1;(j1;j2))  0 and our constraint that wj1;j2  0, we see that the coecients of
I(fj1;j2g  o1) and I(fj1;j2) \ o1 = ;) are positive.
Applying the ideas of Taskar et al. [2004], we see that the above maximization problem
can be solved by the following integer program. The integer program has a binary variable
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corresponding to each of the indicator variables in the above maximization.
max
X
j2G
 wj(0)Vj(0)Ij;0 +
X
j2G
(g(1;j)   wj(1)Vj(1))Ij;1
+
X
1j1<j2m
( wj1;j2(0)Vj1;j2(0))Ij1;j2;0
+
X
1j1<j2m
(g(1;(j1;j2))   wj1;j2(1))Ij1;j2;1
s.t. Ij;0 + Ij;1 = 1 for all j 2 G
Ij1;j2;p  Ij1;p;Ij1;j2;p  Ij2;p for all 1  j1 < j2  m;p 2 f0;1g
Ij;p 2 f0;1g for all j 2 G;p 2 f0;1g
Ij1;j2;p 2 f0;1g for all 1  j1 < j2  m;p 2 f0;1g
The rst set of constraints ensures that exactly one of Ij;0 and Ij;1 is active. The second
set of constraints ensures that Ij1;j2;p is active if and only if Ij1;p and Ij2;p are active. Note
that the `if' direction follows because the objective coecients of Ij1;j2;p are non-negative,
so the second set of constraints will be tight if Ij1;p and Ij2;p are both set to 1. Therefore,
the value of the objective corresponds to fw(;o), where o consists of the items j for which
Ij;1 is set to one.
To complete the proof, we apply Theorem 3.1 from Taskar et al. [2004] to show that the
LP relaxation of this integer program is integral.
9.6.3 The Assignment Problem
In the assignment problem, we are given a set of n agents and a set f1;:::;ng of items,
and wish to assign each item to exactly one agent. The outcome space of agent i is thus

i = f1;:::;ng, and its type can be represented by a vector i 2 i = Rn. The set of
possible type proles is then  = Rn2
.
We consider an outcome rule that maximizes egalitarian welfare in a lexicographic man-
ner: rst, the minimum value of any agent is maximized; if more than one outcome achieves
the minimum, the second lowest value is maximized, and so forth. A simple example shows
that this outcome rule violates weak monotonicity (Section 2.2.1), a necessary condition for
the existence of a strategyproof payment rule.
Proposition 3. The outcome rule that maximizes egalitarian welfare for the assignment
problem is not weakly monotone.
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Proof. Consider a setting with two agents and two items. Denote the items by a and b.
Suppose that v2(2;a) = 3;v2(2;b) = 4.
Suppose that v1(1;a) = 1;v1(1;b) = 2. When given 1;2, the assignment that opti-
mizes egalitarian welfare gives b to agent 1 and a to agent 2. The minimum value received
by any agent is 2 (the value agent 1 receives for b).
Now consider 0
1, where v1(0
1;a) = 4;v1(0
1;b) = 6. When passed 0
1;2, the assignment
that optimizes egalitarian welfare gives a to agent 1 and b to agent 2. The minimum value
received by any agent is 4 (the opposite assignment gives minimum value of 3).
We have that v1(0
1;a)   v1(0
1;b) =  2 <  1 = v1(1;a)   v1(1;b) contradicting weak
monotonicity.
This outcome rule can be computed by solving a sequence of integer programs. As such,
our focus in this application is not on studying our framework for the setting of tractable
outcome rules, but rather for understanding its performance on an objective that is very
dierent than welfare maximization. We continue to assume agent symmetry, and adopt
the view of agent 1.
To complete our specication of the structural SVM framework for this application, we
need to dene an attribute map 4 : Rn2 n N ! Rs, where the rst argument is the type
prole of all agents but agent 1, the second argument is the item assigned to agent 1, and s
is a dimension of our choosing. A natural choice for 4 is:
4( 1;j) = (2[ j];3[ j];:::;n[ j]) 2 R(n 1)2
;
where i[ j] denotes the vector obtained from i by removing the jth entry. The attribute
map thus reects the agents' values for all items except item j, capturing the fact that the
item assigned to agent 1 cannot be assigned to any other agent.
9.7 Experimental Evaluation
We perform a series of experiments to test our theoretical framework. To run our exper-
iments, we use the SVM struct package [Joachims et al., 2009], which allows for the use of
custom kernel functions, attribute maps, and separation oracles.
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9.7.1 Setup
We begin by briey discussing our experimental methodology, performance metrics, and
optimizations used to speed up the experiments.
Methodology
For each of the settings we consider, we generate three data sets: a training set, a validation
set, and a test set. The training set is used as input to Training Problem 2, which in turn
yields classiers hw and corresponding payment rules pw. For each choice of the parameter
C of Training Problem 2, and the parameter  if the RBF kernel is used, a classier hw is
learned based on the training set and evaluated based on the validation set. The classier
with the highest accuracy on the validation set is then chosen and evaluated on the test
set. During training, we take the perspective of agent 1, and so a training set size of `
means that we train an SVM on ` examples. Once a partial outcome rule has been learned,
however, it can be used to infer payments for all agents. We exploit this fact during testing,
and report performance metrics across all agents for a given instance in the test set.
Metrics
We employ three metrics to measure the performance of the learned classiers. These
metrics are computed over the test set f(k;ok)g`
k=1.
Classication Accuracy Classication accuracy measures the accuracy of the trained
classier in predicting the outcome. Each instance of the ` instances has n agents, so in
total we measure accuracy over n` instances:14
accuracy = 100 
P`
k=1
Pn
i=1 I(hw(i; i) = ok
i ))
n`
:
Ex Post Regret We measure ex post regret by summing over the ex post regret experi-
enced by all agents in each of the ` instances in the dataset, i.e.,
regret =
P`
k=1
Pn
i=1 rgti(k
i ;k
 i)
n`
:
14For a given instance , there are actually many ways to choose (i; i) depending on the ordering of
all agents but agent i. We discuss a technique we refer to as sorting in Section 9.7.1, which will choose a
particular ordering. When this technique is not used, for example in application to the assignment problem,
we x an ordering of the other agents for each agent i, and use the same ordering across all instances.
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Individual rationality violation This metric measures the fraction of individual ratio-
nality violation across all agents:
ir-violation =
P`
k=1
Pn
i=1 I(irvi(i; i) > 0)
n`
:
Optimizations
In the case of multi-minded CAs, we rst map the inputs  1 into a smaller space, which
allows us to learn more eectively with smaller amounts of data. The barrier to using more
data is not the availability of the data itself, but the time required for training, because
training time scales quadratically in the size of the training set due to the use of non-linear
kernels. For this step, we use instance-based normalization, which normalizes the values in
 1 by the highest observed value and then rescales the computed payment appropriately,
and sorting, which orders agents based on bid values.
Before passing examples  to the learning algorithm or learned classier, they are nor-
malized by a positive multiplier so that the value of the highest bid by agents other than
agent 1 is exactly 1, before passing it to the learning algorithm or classier. The values and
the solution are then transformed back to the original scale before computing the payment
rule pw. This technique of instance-based normalization leverages the observation that agent
1's allocation depends on the relative values of the other agent's reports, so that scaling
all reports by a factor does not aect the outcome chosen. We apply this to multi-minded
CAs and the assignment problem, but not to our experiments on CAs with positive k-wise
dependent valuations.
In the sorting step, instead of choosing an arbitrary ordering of agents in  i, we choose
a specic ordering based on the maximum value the agent reports. For example, in a
single-item setting, this amounts to ordering agents by their value. In the multi-minded
CA setting, agents are ordered by the value they report for their most desired bundle. The
intuition behind sorting is that we can again decrease the space of possible  i reports the
learner sees and learn more quickly. In the single-item case, we know that the second-price
payment rule only depends on the maximum value across all other agents, and sorting places
this value in the rst coordinate of  i. We apply sorting to the assignment problem by
ordering agents by their maximum value for any item. We do not apply sorting to our
experiments with k-wise dependent valuations in CAs.
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9.7.2 Single-Item Auction
As a sanity check, we rst perform experiments in application to a single-item auction with
the ecient outcome rule, where the agent with the highest bid receives the item. For the
distribution D on value proles, we simply draw each agent's value independently from a
uniform distribution on [0;1]. The outcome rule g allocates the item to the agent with the
highest value. We use a training set size of 300, and validation and test set sizes of 1000.
We use an RBF kernel and parameters C 2 f104;105g and  2 f0:01;0:1;1g.
In this case, we know that the associated payment function that makes (g;p) strate-
gyproof is the second-price payment rule.
The results reported in Table 9.1 and Figure 9.3 are for the 1;2 attribute maps,
which can be applied to this setting by observing that single-item auctions are a special
case of multi-minded CAs. In particular, letting 0 be the 0 vector of dimension n   1,
1( 1;o1) = ( 1;0) if o1 = ; and 1( 1;o1) = (0; 1) if o1 = f1g and 2( 1;o1) =  1
if o1 = ; and 2( 1;o1) = 0 if o1 = f1g. For both choices of the attribute map we
obtain excellent accuracy and very close approximation to the second-price payment rule.
This shows that the framework is able to automatically learn the payment rule of Vickrey's
auction (and despite the non-linearity in learning to price the item at what is eectively a
maximum over the values of other agents.)
Table 9.1: Performance metrics for single-item auction.
n
accuracy regret ir-violation
1 2 1 2 1 2
2 99.7 93.1 0.000 0.003 0.00 0.07
3 98.7 97.6 0.000 0.000 0.01 0.00
4 98.4 99.1 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.01
5 97.3 96.6 0.001 0.001 0.02 0.00
6 97.6 97.4 0.000 0.001 0.00 0.02
9.7.3 Multi-Minded CAs
Type Distribution
Recall that in a multi-minded setting, there are m items, and each agent is interested in
exactly  > 1 bundles. For each bundle, we use the following procedure to determine
which items are included in the bundle. We rst assign an item to the bundle uniformly
at random. Then with probability , we add another random item (chosen uniformly from
the remaining items), and with probability (1   ) we stop. We continue this procedure
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Figure 9.3: Learned payment rule vs. second-price payment rule for single-item auction with
2 agents, for 1 (left) and 2 (right).
until we stop or have exhausted the items. This procedure is inspired by Sandholm's decay
distribution for the single-minded setting Sandholm [2002], and we use  = 0:75 to be
consistent with that setting, where this parameter value generated harder instances of the
winner determination problem.
Once the bundle identities have been determined, we sample values for these bundles.
Let c be an m-dimensional vector with entries chosen uniformly from (0;1]. For each agent i,
let di be an m-dimensional vector with entries chosen uniformly from (0;1]. Each entry of
c denotes the common value of a specic item, while each entry of di denotes the private
value of a specic item for agent i. The value of bundle Sij is then given by
vij = min
Sij0Sij

hSij0;c + (1   )dii
m

for parameters  2 [0;1] and  > 1. The inner product in the numerator corresponds to a
sum over values of items, where common and private values for each item are respectively
weighted with  and (1   ). The denominator normalizes all valuations to the interval
(0;1]. Parameter  controls the degree of complementarity among items:  > 1 implies that
goods are complements, whereas  < 1 means that goods are substitutes. Choosing the
minimum over bundles Sij0 contained in Sij nally ensures that the resulting valuations are
monotonic.
Outcome Rules
We use two outcome rules in our experiments on multi-minded CAs. For the optimal
outcome rule gopt, the payment rule pvcg makes the mechanism (gopt;pvcg) strategyproof.
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Under this payment rule, agent i pays the externality it imposes on other agents. That is,
pvcg;1() =
0
@max
o2

X
i6=1
vi(i;oi)
1
A  
X
i6=1
vi(i;gopt;i()):
The second outcome rule with which we experiment is a generalization of the greedy
outcome rule for single-minded CA Lehmann et al. [2002]. Our generalization of the greedy
rule is as follows. Let  be the agent valuations and oi(j) denote the jth bundle desired by
agent i. For each bundle oi(j), assign a score vi(i;oi(j))=
p
joi(j)j, where joi(j)j indicates
the total items in bundle oi(j). The greedy outcome rule orders the desired bundles by
this score, and takes the bundle oi(j) with the next highest score as long as agent i has
not already been allocated a bundle and oi(j) does not contain any items already allocated.
While this greedy outcome rule has an associated payment rule that makes it strategyproof
in the single-minded case, it is not implementable in the multi-minded case, as evidenced
by the example provided in the appendix of this chapter.
Description of Experiments
We experiment with training sets of sizes 100, 300, and 500, and validation and test sets
of size 1000. All experiments we report on are for a setting with 5 agents, 5 items, and
3 bundles per agent, and use  = 0:5 to generate the valuations, the RBF kernel, and
parameters C 2 f104;105g and  2 f0:01;0:1;1g.
Basic Results
Table 9.2 presents the basic results for multi-minded CAs with optimal and greedy outcome
rules, respectively. For both outcome rules, we present the results for pvcg as a baseline.
Because pvcg is the strategyproof payment rule for the optimal outcome rule, pvcg always
has accuracy 100, regret 0, and IR violation 0 for the optimal outcome rule. The main
ndings are that our learned payment rule has low regret for the optimal outcome rule and
regret that is about the same as or better than the regret of pvcg when the outcome rule is
greedy. Given that greedy winner determination is seeking to maximize total welfare it is
natural the VCG-based payments would perform reasonably well in this environment.
Across all instances, as expected, accuracy is negatively correlated with regret and ex
post IR violation. The degree of complementarity between items, , as well as the outcome
rule chosen, has a major eect on the results. Instances with low complementarity ( = 0:5)
yield payment rules with higher regret, and 1 performs better on the greedy outcome
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Table 9.2: Results for multi-minded CA with training set size 500.
Optimal outcome rule Greedy outcome rule
accuracy regret ir-violation accuracy regret ir-violation
n  pvcg 1 2 pvcg 1 2 pvcg 1 2 pvcg 1 2 pvcg 1 2 pvcg 1 2
2 0.5 100 70.7 91.9 0 0.014 0.002 0.0 0.06 0.03 50.9 59.1 40.6 0.079 0.030 0.172 0.22 0.12 0.33
3 0.5 100 54.5 75.4 0 0.037 0.017 0.0 0.19 0.10 55.4 57.9 54.7 0.070 0.030 0.088 0.18 0.21 0.36
4 0.5 100 53.8 67.7 0 0.042 0.031 0.0 0.22 0.18 61.1 58.2 57.9 0.056 0.033 0.056 0.14 0.20 0.31
5 0.5 100 15.8 67.0 0 0.133 0.032 0.0 0.26 0.19 64.9 61.3 63.0 0.048 0.027 0.042 0.13 0.19 0.24
6 0.5 100 61.1 68.2 0 0.037 0.032 0.0 0.22 0.20 66.6 63.8 63.8 0.041 0.034 0.045 0.12 0.20 0.24
2 1.0 100 84.5 93.4 0 0.008 0.001 0.0 0.08 0.02 87.8 86.6 84.0 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.04 0.06 0.09
3 1.0 100 77.1 83.5 0 0.012 0.005 0.0 0.13 0.09 85.3 86.7 85.7 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.04 0.07 0.05
4 1.0 100 74.6 81.1 0 0.014 0.009 0.0 0.16 0.12 82.4 86.5 84.2 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.05 0.08 0.08
5 1.0 100 73.4 77.4 0 0.018 0.011 0.0 0.19 0.12 82.7 85.8 84.9 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.04 0.10 0.10
6 1.0 100 75.0 77.7 0 0.020 0.013 0.0 0.20 0.16 80.0 87.4 88.1 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.04 0.08 0.07
2 1.5 100 91.5 96.9 0 0.004 0.000 0.0 0.06 0.02 94.7 91.1 91.7 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.02 0.04 0.04
3 1.5 100 91.0 93.4 0 0.004 0.001 0.0 0.05 0.03 97.1 92.8 93.2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.01 0.02 0.04
4 1.5 100 92.5 94.2 0 0.003 0.001 0.0 0.03 0.04 96.4 91.5 92.1 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.02 0.07 0.07
5 1.5 100 91.7 93.9 0 0.004 0.002 0.0 0.06 0.03 97.5 90.5 91.4 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.01 0.06 0.04
6 1.5 100 91.9 93.7 0 0.003 0.001 0.0 0.05 0.04 98.4 92.2 92.8 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.01 0.06 0.06
rule while 2 performs better on the optimal outcome rule. For high complementarity
between items the greedy outcome tends to allocate all items to a single agent, and the
learned price function sets high prices for small bundles to capture this property. For
low complementarity the allocation tends to be split and less predictable. Still, the best
classiers achieve average ex post regret of less than 0.032 (for values normalized to [0,1])
even though the corresponding prediction accuracy can be as low as 67%.
For the greedy outcome rule, the performance of pvcg is comparable for  2 f1:0;1:5g
but worse than the payment rule learned in our framework in the case of  = 0:5, where
the greedy outcome rule becomes less optimal.
Eect of Training Set Size
Table 9.3 charts performance as the training set size is varied for the greedy outcome rule.
While training data is readily available (we can simply sample from D and run the outcome
rule g), training time becomes prohibitive for larger training set sizes. Table 9.3 shows that
regret decreases with larger training sets, and for a training set size of 500, the best of 1
and 2 outperforms pvcg for  = 0:5 and is comparable to pvcg for  2 f1:0;1:5g.
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Table 9.3: Eect of training set size on accuracy of learned classier. Multi-minded CA,
greedy outcome rule. Training set size is given in the column labels for 1;2. pvcg does
not have a training set size.
n 
accuracy 100 300 500 regret 100 300 500
pvcg 1 2 1 2 1 2 pvcg 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 0.5 50.9 54.3 48.2 57.0 46.9 59.1 40.6 0.079 0.045 0.195 0.032 0.098 0.030 0.172
3 0.5 55.4 50.1 49.8 55.7 54.4 57.9 54.7 0.070 0.054 0.078 0.038 0.082 0.030 0.088
4 0.5 61.1 53.4 56.2 56.4 58.5 58.2 57.9 0.056 0.050 0.059 0.040 0.061 0.033 0.056
5 0.5 64.9 14.2 57.9 61.0 61.8 61.3 63.0 0.048 0.173 0.064 0.038 0.048 0.027 0.042
6 0.5 66.6 58.4 58.8 62.2 63.9 63.8 63.8 0.041 0.039 0.059 0.037 0.049 0.034 0.045
2 1.0 87.8 80.7 80.5 84.4 84.1 86.6 84.0 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.008
3 1.0 85.3 74.9 78.0 83.0 80.6 86.7 85.7 0.006 0.020 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006
4 1.0 82.4 78.5 80.1 84.2 83.1 86.5 84.2 0.006 0.015 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.007
5 1.0 82.7 81.0 81.8 84.3 84.3 85.8 84.9 0.007 0.020 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009
6 1.0 80.0 81.8 83.7 87.6 88.3 87.4 88.1 0.006 0.062 0.018 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.005
2 1.5 94.7 83.3 88.1 89.3 89.8 91.1 91.7 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
3 1.5 97.1 86.9 87.6 90.3 91.5 92.8 93.2 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
4 1.5 96.4 88.4 90.7 89.3 90.8 91.5 92.1 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
5 1.5 97.5 87.2 88.5 91.4 90.5 90.5 91.4 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002
6 1.5 98.4 86.3 86.8 91.4 92.5 92.2 92.8 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
Table 9.4: Impact of payment oset and null loss x for  = 0:5 and greedy outcome rule,
training set size 300. All results are for 2, null loss values appear in the second row.
payment
oset
accuracy regret ir-violation ir-x-welfare-avg
0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
0 59.7 61.8 61.7 0.065 0.048 0.042 0.35 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.43 0.52
0.05 61.7 61.2 60.1 0.054 0.045 0.044 0.29 0.20 0.15 0.37 0.54 0.65
0.10 62.1 59.3 56.7 0.048 0.047 0.051 0.23 0.14 0.10 0.48 0.66 0.75
0.15 60.4 55.1 52.2 0.047 0.055 0.064 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.59 0.75 0.84
0.20 57.8 51.7 48.5 0.052 0.067 0.079 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.70 0.83 0.90
0.25 54.3 47.7 44.3 0.061 0.082 0.096 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.79 0.89 0.93
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Figure 9.4: Impact of payment oset and null loss x for greedy outcome rule, training set
size 300.
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IR Fixes
Table 9.4 summarizes our results regarding the various xes to IR violations, for the partic-
ularly challenging case of the greedy outcome rule and  = 0:5. The extent of IR violation
decreases with larger payment oset and null loss. Regret tends to move in the opposite di-
rection, but there are cases where IR violation and regret both decrease. The three rightmost
columns of Table 9.4 list the average ratio between welfare after and before the deallocation
x, across the instances in the test set. With a payment oset of 0, a large welfare hit is
incurred if we deallocate agents with IR violations. However, this penalty decreases with
increasing payment osets and increasing null loss. At the most extreme payment oset
and null loss adjustment, the IR violation is as low as 2%, and the deallocation x incurs a
welfare loss of only 7%.
Figure 9.4 shows a graphical representation of the impact of payment osets and null
losses. Each line in the plot corresponds to a payment rule learned with a dierent null
loss, and each point on a line corresponds to a dierent payment oset. The payment
oset is zero for the top-most point on each line, and equal to 0:29 for the lowest point
on each line. Increasing the payment oset always decreases the rate of IR violation, but
may decrease or increase regret. Increasing null loss lowers the top-most point on a given
line, but arbitrarily increasing null loss can be harmful. Indeed, in the gure on the left, a
null loss of 1:5 results in a slightly higher top-most point but signicantly lower regret at
this top-most point compared to a null loss of 2:0. It is also interesting to note that these
adjustments have much more impact on the hardest distribution with  = 0:5.
Item Monotonicity
Table 9.5 presents a comparison of a payment rule learned with explicit enumeration of all
bundle constraints (the default that we have been using for our other results) and a payment
rule learned by optimistically assuming item monotonicity (see Section 9.6.1). Performance
is aected when we drop constraints and optimistically assume item monotonicity, although
the eects are small for  2 f1:0;1:5g and larger for  = 0:5. Because item monotonicity
allows for the training problem to be succinctly specied, we may be able to train on more
data, and this seems a very promising avenue for further consideration (perhaps coupled
with heuristic methods to add additional constraints to the training problem).
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Table 9.5: Comparison of performance with and without optimistically assuming item
monotonicity. (i-mon) indicates a payment rule learned by optimistically assuming item
monotonicity. greedy outcome rule. Training set size 300.
n 
accuracy regret ir-violation
2 2 (i-mon) 2 2 (i-mon) 2 2 (i-mon)
2 0.5 46.9 46.3 0.098 0.232 0.28 0.38
3 0.5 54.4 8.6 0.082 0.465 0.33 0.06
4 0.5 58.5 48.2 0.061 0.811 0.31 0.25
5 0.5 61.8 57.0 0.048 0.136 0.26 0.26
6 0.5 63.9 61.3 0.049 0.078 0.25 0.20
2 1.0 84.1 82.2 0.008 0.010 0.06 0.08
3 1.0 80.6 80.1 0.009 0.010 0.10 0.09
4 1.0 83.1 79.7 0.009 0.012 0.11 0.11
5 1.0 84.3 77.2 0.009 0.020 0.10 0.11
6 1.0 88.3 83.9 0.005 0.013 0.08 0.11
2 1.5 89.8 89.1 0.002 0.003 0.03 0.06
3 1.5 91.5 91.3 0.002 0.003 0.04 0.04
4 1.5 90.8 89.7 0.003 0.003 0.06 0.06
5 1.5 90.5 87.3 0.003 0.005 0.04 0.05
6 1.5 92.5 70.8 0.002 0.081 0.06 0.17
9.7.4 Combinatorial Auctions with Positive k-wise Dependent Valuations
We experiment with our framework on combinatorial auctions with positive k-wise de-
pendent valuations. We nd that our learned payment rules can outperform VCG-based
payment rules in terms of regret for settings with large numbers of items, and outperform
VCG-based payment rules in terms of the trade-o between IR violation and regret. Be-
cause we have a formulation of the separation problem as a small LP as discussed in Section
9.6.2, we are able to train payment rules and compute regret for larger instances.
In order to experiment with positive k-wise dependent valuations in combinatorial auc-
tions, we need a way to generate such valuations. To construct an agent's valuation, we
rst specify the nodes and edges in a graph (V;E), and then assign weights g(v) and g(e)
over the nodes and edges. For every possible edge (j1;j2), we add the edge to the agents'
graph with probability . g(v) is sampled uniformly at random from [0;1]; the weight for
each added edge is also sampled uniformly at random from [0;1]. With this setup, the edge
probability parameter  lets us generate test instances of varying edge density. So that our
regret numbers are comparable across dierent size instances, we normalize each agent's
weights by the expected value for the set of all items.
The outcome rule we use is GREEDY-KWISE outlined in Section 9.6.2. We use a training
set size of 1000 and validation and test sets of size 500. While in the experiments for multi-
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Table 9.6: Basic results for valuations with  = 0:1. Metrics for 10 and 20 items are
computed using an approximation based on the tractable separation oracle for our training
problem. Metrics are not computed for VCG-based rules because computation requires
brute force enumeration over all possible bundles(but can be eciently computed for the
succinctly represented, trained payment rule).
agents items
accuracy regret ir-violation
 pvcg  pvcg  pvcg
6 2 94.9 97.3 0.006 0.008 0.025 0.008
6 4 70.7 82.7 0.020 0.022 0.146 0.045
6 6 53.1 66.4 0.027 0.031 0.246 0.082
6 10 28.3 { 0.033 { 0.442 {
6 20 { { { { { {
minded CA and egalitarian assignment a sample type prole is converted into a single
training point, in these experiments we convert a single sample type prole into n training
points, one corresponding to each of the n agents serving as agent 1. In running our
experiments, we noticed that training in this way improves testing performance (in the
testing phase, each sample type prole is converted into n dierent testing points). For
this setting, it appears that training on just a single agent for each sampled type prole
over-emphasizes a single agent and learns a payment rule with worse performance when
applied to all agents. We did not observe this in the other two settings (and it would have
been dicult to do this since the training problem does not scale well), but gaining a better
understanding of this phenomenon is a direction for future work.
We compare against a VCG-based payment rule which runs GREEDY-KWISE on all
agents and GREEDY-KWISE on all agents excluding agent i and charges agent i the dierence
in value to agents other that i in the two allocations.
Tables 9.6 and 9.7 and Figure 9.7.4 compare our learned payment rules (with 0 null
loss) to the VCG-based payment rule for  = 0:1 and  = 0:9. The learned payment rule
has better regret, despite having worse accuracy. However, the learned payment rule incurs
signicant IR violation.
We examine the IR violation issue in Figure 9.7.4. Here we implement the two IR xes of
increasing the null loss value and applying payment osets. We see that across all instances,
we can nd settings of the null loss for which our IR / regret curve lies beneath that of the
VCG-based payment rule, indicating that we have settings which have better regret and
lower IR violation. We also see that despite having signicant IR failures when we have no
payment oset, we can signicantly decrease IR violation at the cost of a small amount of
regret increase by using a payment oset.
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Table 9.7: Basic results for valuations with  = 0:9. Metrics for 10 and 20 items are
computed using an approximation based on the tractable separation oracle for our training
problem. Metrics are not computed for VCG-based rules because computation requires
brute force enumeration over all possible bundles (but can be eciently computed for the
succinctly represented, trained payment rule).
agents items
accuracy regret ir-violation
 pvcg  pvcg  pvcg
6 2 79.9 82.1 0.024 0.028 0.108 0.048
6 4 64.0 51.8 0.038 0.056 0.227 0.118
6 6 61.6 42.7 0.030 0.062 0.229 0.129
6 10 61.6 { 0.026 { 0.238 {
6 20 { { { { { {
9.7.5 The Egalitarian Assignment Problem
In the assignment problem, agents' values for the items are sampled uniformly and inde-
pendently from [0;1]. We use a training set of size 600, validation and test sets of size
1000, and the RBF kernel with parameters C 2 f10;1000;100000g and  2 f0:1;0:5;1:0g.
We nd that our learned payment rules have signicantly better accuracy and regret than
VCG-based payment rules. We explain the improvement over VCG-based payments by
observing that the egalitarian rule is not maximizing total welfare, and thus not compatible
in this sense with VCG-based ideas.
The performance of the learned payment rules is compared to that of three VCG-based
payment rules. For this, let W be the total welfare of all agents other than i under the
outcome chosen by g, and Weg be the minimum value any agent other than i receives under
this outcome. We consider the following payment rules:
(1) the vcg payment rule, where agent i pays the dierence between the maximum total
welfare of the other agents under any allocation and W;
(2) the tot-vcg payment rule, where agent i pays the dierence between the total welfare
of the other agents under the allocation maximizing egalitarian welfare and W; and
(3) the eg-vcg payment rule, where agent i pays the dierence between the minimum
value of any agent under the allocation maximizing egalitarian welfare and Weg.
The results for attribute map 4 are shown in Table 9.8. We see that the learned
payment rule pw yields signicantly lower regret than any of the VCG-based payment rules,
and average ex post regret less than 0:074 for values normalized to [0;1]. Since we are
not maximizing the sum of values of the agents, it is not very surprising that VCG-based
payment rules perform rather poorly. The learned payment rule pw can adjust to the
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Figure 9.5: Regret v. Number of Items for learned payment rule and VCG-based payment
rules. For 10 and 15 items, we do not have regret number for the VCG-based rules because
computing regret requires enumeration over all possible bundles. In this case, the regret for
learned payment rules and 10 and 15 items is an upper bound on the true regret obtained
by applying our tractable separation oracle.
outcome rule, and also achieves a low fraction of ex post IR violation of at most 3%.
9.8 Summary and Future Work
Whereas in Chapter 8 we give a computational procedure that makes BnB search monotone
and therefore truthful for known single-minded CAs, in this chapter we relax away from
exact incentive compatibility and propose a framework that applies to general mechanism
design settings. We introduce a new paradigm for computational mechanism design, in
which statistical machine learning is adopted to design payment rules for outcome rules,
and show encouraging experimental results. The mechanism design domain can be multi-
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Table 9.8: Results for assignment problem with egalitarian outcome rule
n
accuracy regret ir-violation
vcg tot-vcg eg-vcg pw vcg tot-vcg eg-vcg pw vcg tot-vcg eg-vcg pw
2 64.3 67.5 67.5 89.0 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
3 48.0 52.1 42.5 77.9 0.070 0.077 0.127 0.041 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04
4 40.6 43.1 30.8 71.0 0.111 0.123 0.199 0.054 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.02
5 32.4 35.3 24.5 63.9 0.157 0.169 0.254 0.071 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.01
6 27.1 29.9 20.0 59.0 0.189 0.208 0.290 0.074 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.01
parameter, and the outcome rules can be specied algorithmically and need not be designed
for objectives that are separable across agents. Central to our approach is to relax incentive
compatibility as a hard constraint on mechanism design, adopting in its place the goal of
minimizing expected regret while requiring agent-independent prices.
Future Work
Future directions of interest include:
1. Considering alternative learning paradigms, including formulations of the problem as
a regression rather than classication problem.
2. Gaining a better understanding of our results for single-minded CA in relation to
Lahaie [2011]. Lahaie [2011] shows that only quadratic prices are needed to nd
market clearing prices for single-minded CAs. In light of these results, it would be
interesting to do a more thorough examination of the trade-o between polynomial and
RBF kernels when learning payment rules for single-minded CA. Though the market
clearing problem diers from the problem of learning admissible, agent-independent
payment rules, it does suggest that polynomial kernels are quite powerful and it may
not be necessary to go all the way to RBF kernels.
3. Developing formulations that can impose constraints on properties of the learned pay-
ment rule, concerning for example the core, budgets, or individual-rationality proper-
ties.
4. Developing methods that learn classiers more likely to induce feasible outcome rules,
so that these learned outcome rules can be used directly.
5. Extending the approach to domains without money by developing a structure on
discriminant functions appropriate to the incentive considerations facing rational self-
interested agents in such domains.
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6. Investigating the extent to which alternative goals such as regret percentiles or interim
regret can be achieved through machine learning.
7. Continuing to explore succinct valuation representations in our method, perhaps by
supporting the use of concise approximate valuations with additional kernel operators.
Appendix: Greedy Allocation Rule is not Weakly Monotone
Consider a setting with a single agent and four items.
If the valuations 1 of the agent are
v1(1;o1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
20 if o1 = f1;2;3;4g
12 if 1 2 o1 and j = 2 o1 for some j 2 f2;3;4g, and
0 else
then the allocation is f1g.
If the valuations are 0
1 such that
v1(0
1;o1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
12 if o1 = f1;2;3;4g
5 if 1 2 o1 and j = 2 o1 for some j 2 f2;3;4g, and
0 else
then the allocation is f1;2;3;4g.
We have v1(0
1;f1;2;3;4g)   v1(0
1;f1g) < v1(1;f1;2;3;4g)   v1(1;f1g) contradicting
weak monotonicity.
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Figure 9.6: Regret v. IR Violation trade-o for learned payment rule and VCG-based
payment rule for k-wise dependent valuations. We do not have regret numbers for the VCG-
based rule and 10 and 20 items because computing regret requires brute force enumeration
over all possible bundles. In this case, the regret numbers for the learned payment rule are
an upper bound on regret obtained by using our tractable separation oracle.
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Conclusions
Resource allocation problems are abundant in modern day life. In this dissertation, we
undertake the study of resource allocation procedures that satised the properties of fairness,
truthfulness, or both. For fairness, we focus on the cake cutting problem of dividing a
heterogeneous, divisible good. For truthfulness, we study both the cake cutting problem
as well as combinatorial auctions (CAs). The approaches are inspired by thinking about
computational aspects of resource allocation problems. For cake cutting, we consider issues
of communication complexity and depart from the classic cake cutting setting where agent
valuations cannot be succinctly communicated. Instead, we consider a direct revelation
model under restricted valuations where valuations can be succinctly communicated to a
decision maker. This minor change in perspective opens a large number of interesting
questions, some of which we tackle in this dissertation. On the mechanism design side, we
take computational approaches to mechanism design whereby our mechanisms cannot be
specied by hand but rather are the result of some computational procedure. This helps
us leverage eective heuristic methods for the purposes of mechanism and circumvent the
analytical diculties associated with complex mechanism design settings.
The computer science approaches outlined above are important to bridging the gap
between theory and practice. The assumptions on cake cutting, while restrictive, allow for
stronger results and also have the potential to create algorithms that have more natural
interactions with agents. The contributions to computational approaches to mechanism
design give us approaches for dealing with complex settings while keeping in mind the
importance of computational tractability. We believe the lens of computation can facilitate
the adoption and use of research on resource allocation in practice.
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10.1 Brief Review
10.1.1 Cake Cutting with Restricted Valuations
The rst part of this dissertation examines the cake cutting problem of fairly dividing a
heterogeneous, divisible good. In Chapter 3, we introduce the cake cutting problem and
discuss classic results from the literature. We then describe the focus of the cake cutting
work in this dissertation, introducing a direct revelation model and restricted families of
valuations. The most restrictive family of valuations, piecewise uniform valuations, capture
the situation where intervals of cake are either desired or undesired, with the marginal value
being the same across all desired intervals. We also introduce the more general classes of
piecewise constant and piecewise linear valuations. Though these are restrictive, they are
signicantly more general than piecewise uniform valuations and can be used to attain close
approximations of general valuations. Though they are less expressive, the key advantage
to these valuations is that they can be succinctly communicated. In the most general case of
piecewise linear valuations, an agent can specify the intervals on which its density function is
linear and provide the slope and intercept of the density function on each of these intervals.
Succinct representation allows for a new paradigm akin to the direct revelation model in
mechanism where cake cutting algorithms operate directly on agents' exact valuations. The
contributions in this section of the dissertation assume these restricted families of valuations
and a direct revelation model. Specically, the main contributions are:
 Algorithms for welfare maximization. In Section 4.2 we design algorithms that
nd maxsum fair allocations, i.e. allocations that have the best social welfare among
a set of fair allocations. We provide a linear programming approach for the case of
piecewise constant valuations. For piecewise linear valuations, we prove that exactly
computing a maxsum EF allocation is impossible since there are cases where all max-
sum EF allocations require cuts at irrational endpoints, even if the agents' valuations
are specied by rational numbers. Circumventing this, we provide an algorithm for
two agents and piecewise linear valuations that nds an allocation with envy at most
 and welfare at least as great as any maxsum EF allocation. This algorithm runs in
time polynomial in log(1=). We also provide an algorithm for more general valua-
tions that nds an allocation with envy at most  and welfare at most  less than any
maxsum EF allocation in time polynomial in 1=.
 Analysis of maxsum fair allocations. In Section 4.3 we analyze the properties
of maxsum fair allocations. The main ndings are that maxsum EF allocations may
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not be Pareto-ecient and that the welfare of maxsum EF allocations are at least
as great as the welfare of maxsum EQ allocations when agents have piecewise linear
valuations. These ndings shed light on the question on the quality of maxsum fair
allocations and how maxsum fair allocations dier for various notions of fairness.
 More expressive cake cutting. One potential barrier to the application of cake
cutting algorithms is the assumption that agent valuations are completely additive.
That is, agents receive positive value even if they are given a set of very small, disjoint
intervals. In Chapter 5, we study the special case of piecewise uniform valuations, but
allow agents to have a minimum length parameter  that species that intervals less
than a certain length yield no value. Exact proportionality is not possible in this set-
ting, and we give approximately proportional algorithms that are essentially optimal
for this setting. We also investigate approximate proportionality and envy-freeness
together and give an intricate algorithm that nds an approximately proportional and
EF allocation for two agents.
 Truthful cake cutting. The previous results assume that agents truthfully report
their valuations, or alternatively, that valuations are publicly known to the cake cut-
ting algorithm. In Chapter 6, we investigate cake cutting under the assumption that
agents are strategic and may misreport their preferences if it is benecial. The main
result is a DSIC, proportional, EF, Pareto-ecient, and polynomial time deterministic
mechanism for any number of agents with piecewise uniform valuations. The result
depends on a particular network ow graph and application of the max-ow min-cut
theorem for polynomial time computation and to prove incentive compatibility. The
mechanism resembles the probabilistic serial and simultaneous eating mechanisms for
the random assignment problem. We also give randomized mechanisms. These mech-
anisms handle piecewise linear valuations, but are only truthful in expectation (over
the randomness of the mechanism).
10.1.2 Computational Approaches to Mechanism Design
The second part of this dissertation takes two dierent computational approaches to mech-
anism design. While classical mechanism design in economics typically seeks an analytic
description of mechanisms, we adopt approaches that produce mechanisms as the result of a
computational process. This allows us to leverage sophisticated, heuristic algorithms for the
purposes of mechanism design and also design mechanisms for complex, multi-parameter
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settings that are dicult to analyze or reason about theoretically. We have two specic
contributions:
 Monotone branch and bound (BnB) search. In Chapter 8, we take the ap-
proach of heuristic mechanism design [Parkes, 2009], using BnB search as the heuris-
tic algorithm in application to known single-minded CAs. We design a procedure
that performs sensitivity analysis on the BnB search tree, deallocating items when
we nd failures of monotonicity. This yields a modied BnB search procedure that
is monotone in the agents' reported values for their publicly known target bundle.
We implement and test monotone BnB search on distributions from the literature
and nd settings where monotone BnB search produces welfare better than existing
monotone approximation algorithms while exhibiting better runtime (including the
overhead introduced by sensitivity checking) than running BnB search to optimality.
 Learning payment rules. While our work on BnB search treats incentive compat-
ibility as a hard constraint and therefore modies the outcome rule to attain exact
incentive compatibility, in Chapter 9 we examine a dual approach where we take the
outcome rule as xed and seek a payment rule that minimizes agent incentives to
misreport. We draw a novel connection between incentive compatible mechanisms
and a particular type of multi-class classier. The specic classication problem we
solve is to predict the outcome rule given an agent's reported valuations. A payment
rule can be derived from the form of the learned classier. An exact classier gives
an incentive compatible payment rule, while a classier that minimizes a carefully
dened error function produces a payment rule that minimizes expected ex-post re-
gret, where the expectation is take over valuations drawn from a commonly known
distribution. We implement the techniques using structural support vector machines
and apply the framework to multi-minded CAs, positive k-wise dependent valuations,
and the assignment problem where the outcome rule maximizes egalitarian welfare.
In each of these settings we nd that the learned payment rules have expected regret
better than the VCG-inspired baselines we compare against.
10.2 Future Directions
In this section I outline some possible future directions related to the topics discussed in
this dissertation. While each chapter contains specic areas for future work, I view the
issues listed below as more high-level directions and agendas to be pursued.
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Restricted valuations in the classic model of cake cutting. Our work on cake
cutting focuses on a direct revelation model where agents have restricted families of val-
uations. It is interesting to think about whether we can obtain stronger results in the
classic model of cake cutting while assuming restricted families of valuations. Recent work
by Kurokawa et al. [2013] takes a step in this direction by showing that a bounded EF
algorithm for piecewise uniform valuations in the classic cake cutting model would imply a
bounded EF algorithm for general valuations.
Truthfulness, fairness, and eciency. The main open question from Chapter 6 is
whether we can obtain truthful, proportional, and EF mechanisms when agent valuations are
piecewise constant (rather than piecewise uniform). As discussed in that chapter, previous
results show that truthfulness and Pareto-eciency are not possible [Schummer, 1997], but
truthfulness and fairness may still be possible.
We can also consider truthful and fair (EF) CAs. Several papers consider whether
truthful, EF, and welfare-maximizing mechanisms exist for dierent classes of valuations
[P apai, 2003, Cohen et al., 2011, Feldman and Lai, 2012]. In particular, Feldman and Lai
[2012] show that such mechanisms do not exist for a subclass of sub-additive valuations.
Given this impossibility, a natural question is to consider mechanisms that relax exact
truthfulness, fairness, or welfare-maximization.
Approximate incentive compatibility. Can we extend the framework for learning
payment rules to other notions of approximate incentive compatibility? The current frame-
work learns a rule that minimizes expected ex-post regret, averaged across all agents given
a random draw from the distribution of types. A dierent measure to minimize would be
interim regret. Fixing an agent's type, interim regret compares an agent's expected utility
under truthful reports to the agent's expected utility under the best possible report, where
the expectation is taken over other agent's types conditional on drawing the agent's type.
We could minimize expected interim regret where this regret is averaged over a draw of the
agent's type from the distribution (this is a weaker notion than expected ex post regret),
or we could try to minimize a threshold  that guarantees that interim regret is at most .
These alternate measures of approximate incentive compatibility do not map nicely to ex-
isting machine learning approaches, but it would be interesting to try and develop methods
to learn payment rules that minimize these measures.
Along these same lines, it would be interesting to do some empirical work on appoximate
incentive compatibility. Specically, in Chapter 9 the payment rules we learn have an agent
independence property. Is agent independence enough to ensure truthful reports in practice?
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How do agents behave when participating in mechanisms with payment rules that satisfy
agent independence but are not fully incentive compatible? Is there some way to quantify
how incentive compatible such mechanisms are? For instance, if deviations are possible
but require large changes in reports, intuitively these mechanisms will be less vulnerable
to manipulation. Similarly, though Chapter 9 focuses on nding payment rules with small
regret, it might be the case that even small amounts of regret cause agents to deviate,
thereby changing the distribution that other agents face, thereby causing the mechanism
to unravel. It would be nice to quantify the robustness of the learned payment rules. In
other words, if agents best respond to the learned payment rules, do their strategies end up
deviating greatly from truthful reporting?
It is also interesting to think about combining heuristic mechanism design with approx-
imate incentive compatibility. In the work in Chapter 8 we perform sensitivity analysis and
make BnB search fully monotone. This can be costly due to deallocations that occur when
violations of monotonicity are discovered. We can imagine performing sensitivity analysis
that decreases the number of monotonicity violations without making the outcome rule ex-
actly monotone. There is a trade-o here between exact incentive compatibility and better
welfare due to fewer deallocations.
Learning and mechanism design without money. Guo and Conitzer [2010a] in-
vestigate a mechanism design without money setting where articial payments are used to
construct a truthful in expectation mechanism for divisible items. The main idea is the
following. Given a subset of items, design instantaneous pricing functions for each item
(that do not depend on the agents' reports), and grant each agent a budget. To allocate
the items, randomly order the agents and let agents spend their budget on the remaining
items. Agents have no incentive to misreport since their reports do not aect the prices
or budgets, and the agents will purchase the combination of items that maximizes their
value. Guo and Conitzer [2010a] show how certain families of pricing functions can yield
good worst case guarantees on social welfare (compared to the optimal social welfare).
An interesting direction for future work is to try and extend the learning framework from
Chapter 9 to a mechanism design without money setting. Assuming the existence of a prior
on agent types, perhaps machine learning methods can be used to learn pricing functions
that have good expected social welfare (in contrast to the focus on worst-case analysis
of Guo and Conitzer [2010a]). While the pricing functions studied by Guo and Conitzer
[2010a] cannot depend on the agents' reports (otherwise an agent might misreport so that
the other agents get higher or lower prices and purchase items that are more advantageous
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to the agent), in a Bayesian setting it may be useful to split the agents and items into
separate groups and use the reports of agents in other groups to price and allocate items
among a group of agents. This brings the problem closer to the framework of Chapter 9
where payment rules can be functions of other agents' reports.
Selecting outcome rules based on regret. Adopting the results of Chapter 9 as a
module, we can think about parameterizing a family of outcome rules and trying to nd
the parameterization that minimizes regret. It would be interesting to come up with some
domains where we have natural parameterizations of outcome rules and adopt this extra
layer on top of the framework for learning payment rules.
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